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ABSTRACT

There is perhaps no problem confronting Christian theism more than that of the problem
from evil. Evil in the world is not merely a problem for the Christian worldview, however, but
also for various other metaphysical systems. This project takes up a comparative analysis of four
major worldviews—naturalism, pantheism, process panentheism, and theism—and argues that of
the four, theism provides not only the best explanation for the phenomena of evil in the world but
it also gives an overall thicker worldview response to the challenges that evil presents. But
theism in-and-of-itself is not enough. A specific form of theism is needed—a form of theism that
is grounded in the perichoretic relationship of the divine Trinity—that accounts for both God’s
aseity and His being essentially loving. Having compared each of the four worldviews and
having argued for the need of a Trinitarian concept of God, this project then takes up the
challenge of providing a uniquely Christian theodicy, which I have dubbed the Trinitarian
Perichoretic Theodicy (TPT). TPT offers a way forward in answering not only the
theological/philosophical issues related to the problem from evil but it also provides a framework
for responding to those sufferers who have been affected by the presence of evil in the world.
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CHAPTER 1: WHY GOD AND EVIL MATTER?

Introduction
There is, perhaps, no problem confronting Christian theism more than the so-called
problem of evil. As William Lane Craig acknowledges, “The problem of evil is certainly the
greatest obstacle to belief in the existence of God.”1 For, after all, if God were all-powerful and
all-good, why would He allow evil to exist in the world? If He were good, surely He would want
to stop any evil that He could. If He were all-powerful there should be nothing keeping Him
from eliminating evil in the world. It would seem, then, that God is, if He exists, either unloving
or incapable of stopping the evil that we see and experience. This famous objection by David
Hume2 is by no means the only problem facing the question of God’s existence and evil in the
world. Why is there evil at all? Why is God not doing more about evil in the world?
Questions like these stir at our hearts and beg for answers—answers not only to our
intellectual inquiries, but also to the existential realities that come along with the existence of
evil in the world. In the midst of their existential plight, people find themselves asking, “Why did
God allow this to happen to me or to this group of people?” When looking back to such events as
September 11, 2001, when many Americans died because of the attacks of terrorists, or natural
disasters that devastate whole people groups, as in the events of the tsunami of 2004 off the coast
of the Indian Ocean, hurricane Katrina in 2005, the earthquake of Pakistan and Kashmir in 2005,
and, most recently, the typhoon that hit the Philippines in 2013, people are left asking “Where

1

Craig, “Problem of Evil.” http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-problem-of-evil [accessed November 2,

2013].
2

David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company,
1998), pt X, 63.

1

was God in the midst of all of these tragedies?” How should Christians respond? How are
Christians to make sense of all of this in light of their own convictions about God and His
relationship to the world? Moreover, will God make right the wrongs that take place in His good
creation?
On top of an already complicated issue, it must be taken into consideration that not just
one problem of evil exists. There is the philosophical/ theological problem of evil as well as the
existential/religious problem of evil.3 One may also include related issues such as the question of
Hell and divine hiddenness. All of these relate to the larger problem of evil. Regarding the
philosophical/theological problem, as John Feinberg rightly points out: one’s conception of God
plays a significant role in how one answers the question of evil.4 For not all concepts of God are
equal. Even among people within the same general worldview, there are substantial differences
between their ideas of God. Which view of God, if God indeed exists, is the correct view of
God? Is there any reason to think that one conception of God is better than another when
considering the problem of evil in the world? The question of God’s nature is especially
important to Christian theists. Unlike Jews or Muslims, who hold to God as one person,
Christians believe that God is tri-personal. Is there any reason to think that God is one way over
the other? What ultimate difference, if any, does it make if God is mono-personal or tri-personal?

3

This point will be worked out more fully in chapter one. It will suffice now to simply state, briefly, there
are different problems of evil. Yet, one may even question the bundling together of the existential, religious, and
emotional as referring to ‘one’ distinct problem.
4

John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problems of Evil (Wheaton, IL:
Crossway Books, 2004), 23-24.
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The problem of evil not only affects theists of every stripe, but all people who have been
confronted by the tragedies and horrors of evil in the world. Each worldview5 must confront the
reality and problems brought about by evil—problems that touch every tangent of our finite
earthly existence. While each worldview provides an answer to such questions, not all worldview
responses are on par with one other. Some worldviews provide a thicker response to the question
of evil than others.6 The problem of evil raises questions related to the meaning and purpose of
life and whether or not this life is all that there is. Is there any meaning to our finite existence or
to the suffering we experience in the world? Is this all there is to life? Should we echo the words
of the Apostle Paul and suggest that if this life is all there is, then “let us eat and drink, for
tomorrow we die.”7As theologian Paul Tillich reminds us, each one of us stands in between
being and non-being. We all teeter on the edge of life and death.8 But even if this life is all that
there is, can a person find meaning and purpose in the face of suffering? For a serious seeker, she
must contend with the question of what constitutes a thick worldview response to evil and how
such a response differs from a thin worldview response. What criteria should one use when
analyzing worldview responses to evil in the world? Which worldviews are even live options in
the face of evil?

5

While worldviews are as prevalent as there are human persons, there are, nevertheless, general features
that places people within the confines of a broader worldview, mostly in response to how a person answers the
question of God and ultimate reality.
When philosophers speak of “thick” or “thin” with respect to possible worlds or worldviews, they have in
mind the extent to which a person finds value, meaning, and purpose within that world. A “thin” world is one where
there is no objective value, meaning, or purpose; whereas a “thick” world is one that is teaming with such attributes.
For a fuller discussion, see J. P. Moreland, Kingdom Triangle (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2007), 26-29.
6

7

I Corinthians 15:32. Some consider Paul to have in mind Mender’s comedy Thais.

8

Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1957), 66-75.
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Any adequate response to the problem of evil must answer such questions as the ones
raised above. How does Christian theism fare with such questions in comparison to other
worldviews? Does Christianity have within it, not only the resources to present a rational
explanation for why evil exists in the world and an answer to what God is doing about evil (or, at
least, why He allows it), but also the capacity to provide a response to the existential dimension
of evil in the world? In this project I will argue that, in comparison to other major worldviews,
Christianity provides a thick response, not only to the intellectual problem of evil, but also to the
existential/religious problem as well. In addition, Christian theism provides a thicker response
than other theistic worldviews. Particularly, within the central teachings of Christian theism, and
especially the uniquely Christian teachings such as the tri-personal nature of the Christian God,
the incarnation and resurrection of the Son of God, and the Kingdom of God, Christians have a
robust answer to the problem of evil. I concur with William Lane Craig when he says, “As a
Christian theist, I’m persuaded that the problem of evil, terrible as it is, does not in the end
constitute a disproof of the existence of God. On the contrary, in fact, I think that Christian
theism is man’s last best hope of solving the problem of evil.”9

Purpose and Method
Why another work on the problem of evil? Has not much ink been spilled over this one
topic already? Can anything new be said that has not already been said? In response to this
challenge, there are at least four reasons why this work is needed.
First, while it is true that much has been written on this topic, even within the last thirty
years or so, the problem of evil still remains a significant challenge to Christian theism. As noted

9

Craig, “Problem of Evil.”

4

earlier, evil affects everyone in some way or another, and it is not just a challenge to Christianity,
but to all worldviews. This work, in part, will consider how the Christian worldview compares
with other major worldview systems in making sense of evil in the world. As will be argued,
other worldviews, when confronted with evil, have difficulties of their own.
A second purpose of this present work is to provide a uniquely Christian response to the
problem of evil. Philosophers of religion have largely led the charge in confronting the
intellectual challenges brought on by the various arguments from evil. Though there have been
some significant attempts at answering the existential problem from evil, as well, this area has
not received nearly as much attention.10 Regarding the intellectual problem, Alvin Plantinga, in
his monumental work, God, Freedom, and Evil, has largely put to rest the so-called logical
problem from evil, so much so, that hardly anyone, including most atheists, accepts it as a real
threat to theism. Even its more modest cousin, the evidential problem from evil,11 has received
much attention by skeptical theists, such as William Alston12 and Stephen Wykstra,13 and a

William Hasker, “On Regretting the Evils of This World,” in The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings,
edited by Michael L. Peterson (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 152-167; Richard Rice,
Suffering and the Search for Meaning (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2014); Though not as prominent by
philosophers of religion, there have been several pastorally and popular level works aimed at the existential
problem. Consider John Thomas and Gary Habermas, Enduring Your Season of Suffering (Lynchburg, VA: Liberty
University Press, 2011); Gary Habermas, Why is God Ignoring Me?: What to do When it Feels Like He’s Giving You
the Silent Treatment (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2010); Phillip Yancey, Where Is God When It
Hurts? A Comforting, Healing Guide for Coping with Hard Times (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1990). See also
John Swinton, Raging with Compassion (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2007).
10

11
William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” in The Problem of Evil, edited
by Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 26-37; Paul
Draper, “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists,” The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by
Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 12-29.

William P. Alston, “The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition,” in The
Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1996), 97-125.
12

Stephen J. Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the
Evils of ‘Appearance,’” in The Problem of Evil, edited by Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 138-160.
13
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variety of other prominent philosophers.14 But where have the theologians been? This is not to
say that no theologians have given the topic of evil due consideration;15 but, in large, theologians
have been somewhat absent, or, at least, the ones who have been writing have largely ignored the
work of philosophers of religion. What is said of theologians can also be said by-in-large of
biblical scholars.16 But philosophers of religion, particularly those who are convinced of the truth
claims of Christianity, are not entirely off the hook. Many of them have done their defense
within the realm of a generic theism. How do we get from a generic theism to a more distinctly
Christian theism in responding to evil? Part of my aim here is to take seriously Alvin Plantinga’s
charge, in his highly influential essay, “Advice to Christian Philosophers.”17 Plantinga writes:
Christian philosophers, however, are the philosophers of the Christian community; and it is
part of their task as Christian philosophers to serve the Christian community. But the
Christian community has its own questions, its own concerns, its own topics for
investigation, its own agenda, and its own research program. Christian philosophers ought
not merely take their inspiration from what’s going on at Princeton or Berkley or Harvard,
attractive and scintillating as that may be; for perhaps those questions and topics are not the
ones, or not the only ones, they should be thinking about as the philosophers of the Christian
14

William Hasker, The Triumph of God Over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 2008); Daniel Howard-Snyder, “God, Evil, and Suffering,” In Reasons for the Hope Within,
edited by Michael J. Murray. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999), 76-114; Michael L.
Peterson, God and Evil: An Introduction to the Issues (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998); Alvin Plantinga,
“Epistemic Probability and Evil,” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 69-96; Richard Swinburne, “Some Major Stands of Theodicy,”
The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1996): 30-48; Peter van Inwagen, “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence,” The
Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1996), 151-174.
15
Henri Blocher, Evil and the Cross: Christian Thought and the Problem of Evil (Leicester: Apollos,
1994); Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, translated by Margaret Kohl. First Fortress Press
edition (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993); William A. Dembski, The End of Christianity: Finding a Good
God in an Evil World (Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman, 2009); John R. Schneider, “Seeing God Where the
Wild Things Are: An Essay on the Defeat of Horrendous Evil,” Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, edited by
Perter van Inwagen (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004): 226-262.
16
N. T. Wright, Evil and the Justice of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press), 2006; Terence E.
Fretheim, Creation Untamed: The Bible, God, and Natural Disasters (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2010).

Alvin Plantinga, “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” in The Analytic Theist: an Alvin Plantinga Reader,
edited by James T. Sennett (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998), 296-315.
17

6

community. There are other philosophical topics the Christian community must work at, and
other topics the Christian community must work at philosophically. And obviously,
Christian philosophers are the ones who must do the philosophical work involved. If they
devote their best efforts to the topics fashionable in the non-Christian philosophical world,
they will neglect a crucial and central part of their task as Christian philosophers. What is
needed here is more independence, more autonomy with respect to the projects and concerns
of the non-theistic philosophical world.18
Elsewhere he continues,
But this means that the Christian philosophical community need not devote all of its efforts
to attempting to refute opposing claims and/or to arguing for its own claims, in each case
from premises accepted by the bulk of the philosophical community at large. It ought to do
this, indeed, but it ought to do more. For if it does only this, it will neglect a pressing
philosophical task: systematizing, deepening, clarifying Christian thought on these topics.
So here again: my plea is for the Christian philosopher, the Christian philosophical
community, to display, first, more independence and autonomy: we needn’t take as our
research projects just those projects that currently enjoy widespread popularity; we have our
own questions to think about. Secondly, we must display more integrity. We must not
automatically assimilate what is current or fashionable or popular by way of philosophical
opinion and procedures; for much of it comports ill with Christian ways of thinking. And
finally, we must display more Christian self-confidence or courage or boldness. We have a
perfect right to our pre-philosophical views: why, therefore, should we be intimidated by
what the rest of the philosophical world thinks plausible or implausible?19
As a part of the Christian philosophical community, the problem of evil should, no less,
be considered from a uniquely Christian perspective. As Plantinga argues, the Christian
community has its own questions about the problems arising from evil in the world. A question I
want to consider in this present work is whether generic theism can provide the kind of robust
answer to evil that is needed. Moreover, I want to consider how the unique doctrines of
Christianity, such as the Trinity, incarnation, resurrection of Jesus, and kingdom of God play a
vital role in answering the problem of evil. Along the same lines, how does the reality of evil in
the world shape every area of Christian theology? Lastly, I want to consider, from the Christian

18

Ibid., 298-299.

19

Ibid., 312.
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perspective, what it is that God is doing about evil in the world? How does God’s activity in the
world, according to the Christian worldview, compare, say, with other theistic worldviews?
Thirdly, this project aims to be an attempt at constructive theology, or, perhaps, analytic
theology, and integrative in nature, bringing together the best insights from theologians,
philosophers, and biblical scholars on the problem of evil. Sadly, philosophers are often
unsatisfied with the work of theologians; whereas, biblical scholars and theologians often think
they can begin and do their disciplines apart from philosophy. The truth is, as a part of the
Christian community, all of these disciplines are needed and are working toward a common
objective. This is all the more the case when considering the problem of evil.
Fourth, and lastly, this work serves to bring together a response to both the intellectual
and existential problems of evil. Philosophers have rightly understood these two problems as
distinct and that we should approach them differently; however, they have done so almost at the
risk of severing the two. While evil raises significant intellectual problems for the theist, it is also
a very real existential feature of reality that the theist must deal with. For any worldview that
seeks to confront the problem of evil, it must do so in a multi-dimensional way. It must not only
meet the intellectual demands raised by the problem of evil, but it should also provide a response
to the existential dimension. Christian theism, as I shall argue, provides a robust answer to both
dimensions of the problem of evil.
So how might one go about such a task? There are four legs to my approach. First, I
begin by comparing different worldview responses to the problem of evil. While there are many
views on God’s nature and relationship to the world, there are at least three, understood in
generally broad terms, which serve as “live options”: theism, pantheism, and panentheism. The
God of theism is typically understood to be personal, creator of all things, omnipotent,

8

omniscient, omnibenevolent, eternal, and the like.20 God, for theists, exists independently of the
world. As the Creator of all things, the world depends on God and not the other way around.
Pantheists, on the other hand, generally hold to God as both impersonal and identical (in some
sense or another) with the world. But there is a third option—panentheism. Panentheism is a
mixture of theism and pantheism. Panentheists understand God as, in some sense, dependent on
the world for it actualization, but, yet, God transcends the world. Taken along with naturalism,
theism, pantheism, and panentheism become the major worldview contenders for explaining evil
in the world. Each of the three theological worldviews has quite a different take on the nature
and existence of evil and on what God is doing (or can do) about evil in the world. But
naturalists, too, must explain evil’s place in the world.
Having argued for theism as the best explanation for the phenomena of evil in the world,
I move to the second leg of my method—consideration on whether or not generic theism is a
viable option for answering the questions raised by evil in the world. By “generic theism” I have
in mind the classical concept of God held by Jews, Muslims, Christians, and certain African and
Hindu religions. According to this view, God is the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent,
eternal, and personal, uncaused Creator of all things. The term “generic” does not mean how
people commonly take it today, as if the thing in question is “cheap” or “of poor quality”; rather,
generic connotes the idea of something being “wide-spread” or “common.” In this case, generic
theism means the common or wide-spread understanding of God, one that many theistic
worldviews could adopt. It would be helpful to clarify up front that I do not fundamentally
disagree with this understanding of God. Thinking of God in such a way helps to bring into

20

Though, even here, some theists may not emphasize all of the specified attributes above in order to
answer why God allows evil. For example, adherents of a view such as finite godism limit God’s omnipotence in
order to accommodate for certain features of their worldview.
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sharper focus certain core features of what God is like. However, generic theism is, as I will
argue, inadequate in providing a robust answer to the question of evil in the world. The Christian
concept of God, a God who is essentially tri-personal, provides the kind of explanatory power
needed to make sense of not only the intellectual problem of evil, but also the religious or
existential problem.
The third leg will examine various theodicies that have been proposed to justify why God
allows evil in the world. Many, if not most, of the theodicies considered provide valuable
insights for why God allows evil. But in-and-of-themselves these theodicies fall short, again, in
providing proper explanatory power. Most of the theodicies considered adopt a greater good
hypothesis, that is to say, that evils are in some sense necessary in order to bring about a greater
good in God’s overarching purposes. As will be argued, there are problems with taking this route
for the Christian theist, namely, that it requires 1) an overly meticulous form of sovereignty,
often taking away human responsibility and 2) that there are no gratuitous evils in the world.
Lastly, most of the theodicies considered can be used to work with a great number of theisms,
and do not do much by way of arguing specifically for Christian theism. This leads to the last
part of my proposal.
In the fourth leg of this project I will attempt to tease out a new theodicy. A theodicy is
an attempt at justifying God’s goodness in the face of evil in the world.21 I am hesitant to use the
word “theodicy” in describing my aim in this project, since theodicies are often viewed as
inadequate or incapable of providing a satisfying answer to all of the evils that we encounter, and
since I believe I am doing more than offering a theodicy. According to C. Stephen Layman,
when offering a response to evil, the theist has four argumentative strategies available: 1) offer a

21

John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 243.
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theodicy; 2) show that the arguments from evil against theism are flawed; 3) argue that, though
evil counts against theism, natural theology and religious experience warrant theism and thus
“override” the evidence of evil against theism; and 4) argue that though theism does not answer
all of the evils that take place in the world, it provides an explanation that is as good or better
than its metaphysical competitors. Layman calls this last approach “The Comparative
Response.”22 This work will seek to forge (1) and (4) as an argumentative strategy. After all, the
Christian worldview, worked out from reflection on the pages of the Bible, is itself, in a real
sense, a response to evil.23 This point is often neglected in discussions related to the problem of
evil. But what makes the proposal here different from other theodicies? The chief difference is
that the theodicy I am proposing is one that examines the comprehensive response of a
worldview system, namely the Christian worldview, to the problem of evil. I am aware that there
is not just one Christian theism and that, even among the major divisions of Christianity, such as
Protestants or Catholics, there are divisions upon divisions. This approach, then, will be
something like putting forth a mere Christian theism. My goal is not to argue for one stripe of
Christian theism over another, but, rather, to look at the chief features of the Christian
worldview, beliefs that are shared by most all Christian traditions. It is inevitable in a project like
this to emphasize certain beliefs (or twists on beliefs) over others, and there is no doubt that,
perhaps, my own traditional biases will come out. I will do all that I can to keep such biases in
check. It may be that if this project is successful other Christian traditions will have to modify or
adjust some of the aspects of this proposal to fit with their own traditions.

22
C. Peter Layman, “Natural Evil: The Comparative Response,” International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 54 (2003): 1. Cf. Jeremy Evans, The Problem of Evil: The Challenge to Essential Christian Beliefs
(Broadman & Holman Publishing, 2013), 113-131.
23

I owe this insight to John Hick, who, in Evil and the God of Love, attempts to provide a Christian
theodicy. See also N. T. Wright, Evil and the Justice of God.

11

In certain ways, the theodicy that I am here proposing, which I have dubbed, the
Trinitarian Perichoretic Theodicy, is an extension of the free will theodicy/defense, though it
will certainly contain important elements from various other theodicies, such as soul-making
theodicies and natural law/creation order theodicies. Why trinitarian? That a theodicy begin with
the Trinity is important for various reasons. First, the Christian view of God as a tri-unity of
persons sets it apart from the various other theistic contenders, in that, God, as a tri-personal
being, is, in His very nature, essentially good and loving, which, as I shall argue, is a harder
thesis to defend if God is merely unitarian or one person. Second, if God is tri-personal, as
Christians believe, then at the center of all reality is a loving relationship among persons. As will
be argued, that God exists as a tri-unity of persons in loving relationship has explanatory power
for 1) why God created humans with certain creaturely freedoms, 2) why human creaturely
communities, and the rest of creation, too, require significant interdependence and interrelationality for things to work properly, 3) why evil works against such features in God’s good
world, and 4) what God is doing about evil in the world (particularly through the work of the
incarnate and raised Son and the empowering work of the Holy Spirit).
The Christian concept of perichoresis also plays a significant part in the theodicy that I
am putting forth. Perichoresis is an ancient Christian doctrine, which expresses the
interpenetrating relationship between the persons of the Trinity. Some of the Church Fathers,
particularly from the Eastern tradition, have understood the notion of perichoresis as giving
insight not only to the Trinity, but also to the incarnation and life in the Kingdom.24 This project
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will especially consider the connections between perichoresis and the Trinity, firstly, and,
secondly, perichoresis with respect to the Kingdom of God.

Key Terms and Concepts
As with any philosophical or theological work, it is of upmost importance to consider key
terminology in order to avoid ambiguity or equivocation. Below I seek to establish parameters
for thinking about some of the key concepts surrounding discussions on the problem from evil. I
give consideration to the various kinds and types of evil (e.g., moral, natural, and gratuitous) as
well as the often neglected distinction between pain and suffering. While philosophers and
theologians are often careful to distinguish between moral, natural, and gratuitous evils, that is
not always the case with respect to pain and suffering. Generally, the latter are often lumped
together without giving any significant consideration to the possible distinctions between them.
Lastly, I consider what theists mean when they speak of God and creation as being good.

Evil, Kinds of Evil, and the Good
When asked to define evil, our response might be like that of Augustine’s on time: “If no
one asks me, I know; but if I wish to explain it to one who asks, I know not.”25 Some have
concluded that evil is indefinable, much like the word “person.” We know a person when we see
one, even if we cannot arrive at a clear or concise definition of what constitutes personhood.
Perhaps the same is true of evil. Perhaps we do not have sufficient conditions for classifying
something as evil. Nevertheless, even if that is the case, it does not mean that we have no
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parameters or boundaries for considering just what it means to call something evil. In what
follows, I seek to sketch out some parameters for thinking about evil.26
Before moving on to a discussion on the nature of evil, it would be helpful to make some
preliminary distinctions between different kinds of evil. Philosophers and theologians have
recognized that evil comes in two forms: moral evil and natural evil. Moral evils are such that
the evil produced is the result of a moral agent. Murder, rape, genocide, and bio-chemical
warfare are all examples of evil produced by a moral agent. Natural evils, on the other hand,
refer to those evils that come about through some kind of non-human means. When human (or
animal) life has been devastated by such natural events as hurricanes, tornados, or tsunamis, such
is classified as natural evil. Natural evils may also come about through disease. Some
philosophers even classify certain unintentional actions brought by human agents as belonging to
natural evil. An example of such a case might include a child injured due to dashing out in front
of an oncoming vehicle. In such a case the driver would not be held morally culpable, since the
action was not intentional on the part of the driver.27 It may also be helpful to consider that some
evils, which appear to be a result of natural processes, are, rather, the result of moral agency.
Examples of this variety include evils caused by pollution or forest fires. One final category is
the notion of gratuitous or horrendous evils. Gratuitous evils are those kinds of evils that are
seemingly pointless to us. They seem to serve no purpose for why they occur in the world. There
seems to be no justification for why God might allow such evils.
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Classifying evils as “moral,” “natural,” or “gratuitous” sheds some light on thinking
about evil, but such a classification does nothing by way of telling us just what evil is. How
should we understand the nature of evil? Christians have generally sided with Augustine’s view
that evil is privatio boni—the “absence” or “privation” of good.28 In the Enchiridion, Augustine
described privatio boni as follows:
In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health; for
when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present—namely, the
diseases and wounds—go away from the body and dwell elsewhere: they altogether cease to
exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance but a defect in the fleshly substance—the
flesh itself being a substance, and therefore something good, of which those evils—that is,
privations of the good which we call health—are accidents. Just in the same way, what are
called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good. And when they are cured,
they are not transferred elsewhere: when they cease to exist in the healthy soul, they cannot
exist anywhere else.29
As Augustine worked out his views on evil, he had one eye on neo-Platonic thought and the
other on the narrative of Genesis. From Genesis, Augustine understood that God created all
things good and that the whole taken together was “very good.” Evil, for Augustine, is something
that exists in reality; however, it does not have being of its own. Much like a parasite needs its
host in order to remain alive, evil, for Augustine, could not exist apart from the good.30 Working
from within a Neo-Platonic framework, Augustine equated being with goodness. A thing that it
is a good without any evil is considered to be a “perfect good.”31 An example of such a good
would be God, who is “supremely and unchangeably good.”32 Yet, because God is supremely or
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unchangeably good, He, unlike all created goods, is incapable of corruption. Goods that have
been corrupted are “faulty” or “imperfect” goods.33 But because God created all things good, as
put forth by the Genesis narrative, no particular thing can exist and be completely corrupt at the
same time; otherwise, it would cease to be.34
Philosopher of religion, John Hick, who also stands broadly within the Christian
tradition, finds Augustine’s view wanting. Hick, in Evil and the God of Love, seems to affirm the
biblical teaching that God is supremely good, and that creation itself, too, is good, in a derivative
way. Yet, he questions whether Augustine (and Aquinas) too readily accepts the neo-Platonic
equation of being with goodness, going beyond the simple affirmation of Scripture.35
Augustine’s defense of holding to the neo-Platonic equation of good with being rests in his
acceptance of the greater chain of being, “the claim that certain characteristics, which are
necessarily present in different degrees in every existent thing—principally ‘measure, form, and
order’,—are intrinsically good. To possess these characteristics is to be a part of the continuum
of entities constituting the created universe, so that to exist is, as such, to be good.”36 However,
says Hick, Augustine provides no philosophical arguments for accepting this principle; rather, it
is a holdover from the neo-Platonic view of reality. Further, claims Hick, “there appears to be no
basis within Christian theology for affirming the intrinsic goodness of existence in any other than
the biblical sense that God wills and values the world that he has created.”37 For Hick, to affirm
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that creation is good is only to affirm that it “is willed and valued by God.”38 But such an
affirmation of creation’s goodness, says Hick, “does not entail any metaphysical doctrine of the
identity of being and goodness; nor does there appear to be any adequate reason to adopt such a
doctrine.”39
So how are we to think of evil? Hick believes that one must distinguish between the
theological insight that “evil is the going wrong of something good,” which he thinks follows
from the Christian teaching on God and creation, and evil as “nothingness or nonbeing.”40 The
Augustinian approach to evil, however, is inadequate, in that, it does not fully capture evil’s true
nature in light of human experience. There is no doubt that evil is a reality for Hick. It is both a
“positive” and “powerful” element of human experience. “Empirically,” says Hick, “it is not
merely the absence of something else but a reality with its own distinctive and often terrifying
quality of power.”41 It does not take much reflection to see the limitations and inadequacy of the
privation understanding of evil as an empirical description. Hick argues,
What we call evil in nature can, it is true, often be regarded as consisting in the corruption or
perversion or disintegration of something which, apart from such disruption, is good. . . .
Volcanic eruptions, droughts, tornadoes, hurricanes, and planetary collisions can perhaps
likewise be regarded as breakdowns in some imagined ideal ordering of nature. In all such
cases the evil state of affairs can plausibly be seen as the collapse of a good state of affairs,
and as tending toward non-existence, at least in the relative sense of the dissolution of a
previously established arrangement of life or matter. But does such an account really lay
bare that aspect of the event or of the situation that makes us call it evil? Do we regard a
volcanic eruption, for example, as evil considered simply as a loss of a previous ‘measure,
form and order’? Do we not, on the contrary, regard it as evil only if it causes harm to
human, or at least to sentient life? Is the eruption of a volcano an uninhabited island, or
(assuming it to be uninhabited) on Venus, an evil? Or again, is the natural decay of
vegetation in virgin jungle to be accounted evil? Or the burning up of a star or the
38

Ibid., 172.

39

Ibid.

40

Ibid., 180.

41

Ibid., 55.

17

fragmentation of a meteor a million million light years distant from us in space? If not, the
quality of evil is not attributed to physical disintegration as such, but only in so far as it
impinges deleteriously upon the realm of the personal, or at least upon the sphere of animal
life. It is in fact not loss of ‘measure, form and order’ per se that is evil, but only this
considered as a cause of pain and suffering.42
It is not so much, then, that natural occurrences, such as tornados or tsunamis, are evils in and of
themselves, but, rather, how such events move into the realm of the personal or sphere of animal
life, causing pain, suffering, and destruction. But even in those cases of evils caused by human
agency, it seems that the privation view is all the more inadequate of a response. It is not merely
the devaluation or absence of the good, but “it can be a terrifying positive force in the world.”43
Hick explains, “Cruelty is not merely an extreme absence of kindness, but is something with a
demonic power of its own. Hatred is not merely lack of love, or malevolence merely in minimum
degree of goodwill.”44Moral evils, it would seem, go beyond “merely privations of their
corresponding moral goods.”45
Given Hick’s critique of Augustine’s notion of the privation view, how should one think
of evil? Is there any hope for the privationist view? In their essay, “Evil is Privation,” Bill Anglin
and Stewart Goetz argue that privationists are at least minimally committed to the belief that
“evil is evil just insofar as there is a privation of something which ought to be there.”46 This
seems right, to me at least, but it does nothing by the way of answering Hick’s objection that
something like hatred seems to go beyond a mere lack of love. If a theist is going to maintain the
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privation view, it must, at least, be able to accommodate Hick’s objection regarding the positive
nature of evil in the world. Perhaps, reflection on the goodness of God and the goodness of
creation will provide some insights, here.
Most theists recognize that God is essentially good. This is especially the case for
Christian theists. Christians, along with Jews, hold to a further claim that all that God made is
good. At the climax of the creation account in Genesis 1, we read that God pronounced all He
had made was “very good.”47 Therefore, in working out a view of evil, Christians, and, perhaps,
Jews too, will want to preserve both God’s goodness and the goodness of what God had made,
something that the privation view does well. As noted earlier, God is essentially good; creation,
on the other hand, is good in a derivative sense, in that it is contingently so. By saying that
creation is “derivatively” and “contingently” good, I do not mean that God could have created
something evil, but only that God, who is the creator of all things, is the only being who is good
necessarily. Any other thing that exists is dependent on God for its existence, thus contingent.
Those things that are derivatively good are so because they find their source in God, who is
necessarily good.
But what, here, do Christians mean by “good”? Thomas Morris suggests a two-fold claim
for understanding God’s goodness. First, a theist might think of God as being wholly good. By
this, the Christian theist means that God has no defects or blemishes. As Morris points out, this
understanding of God’s goodness means that “God never does anything which is ultimately
wrong or evil” and that “His character contains no flaw, and he is subject to no moral
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weakness.”48 Secondly, as previously noted, God is necessarily good.49 To speak of God as
necessarily good means that “God is so firmly entrenched in goodness, or alternately, that
goodness is so entrenched in God, that it is strictly impossible for there to be in him any sort of
flaw or defect,” that is to say, “he is utterly invulnerable to evil.”50 It goes to follow that if God is
essentially good, then those actions which God perform must also be good.51
But how are we to understand the goodness of creation? Biblical scholars and theologians
often debate on whether interpreters should understand Scripture, on certain issues, as using
“being” language or “functional” language. In his recent book, The Lost World of Genesis One,
Hebrew and Ancient Near-Eastern scholar, John Walton, builds a case that the Genesis one
narrative is one of “functional” ontology and not “material” ontology. When pondering
existence, we can think of something as existing in more than one way, says Walton. For
example, as I look at my coffee cup, I think of its material composition. I consider the various
types of material used to compose my cup, the various elements within the paint, the smoothness
of the edges, and so on. However, I can also look at my coffee cup and think in a different way
on why it exists as it does. What is its purpose? Why is it shaped as it is? The former
understanding of my coffee cup has to do with questions concerning material ontology; whereas
the latter has to do with questions concerning its functional ontology. Walton argues that people
from the ancient near-eastern world were far less concerned about material existence as they
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were about functional existence. Much of the problem for modern interpreters has to do with
how we moderns view ontology. Walton explains:
When we speak of cosmic ontology these days, it can be seen that our culture views
existence, and therefore meaning, in material terms. Our material view of ontology in turn
determines how we think about creation, and it is easy to see how. If ontology defines the
terms of existence, and creation means to bring something into existence, then one’s
ontology sets the parameters by which one thinks about creation. Creation of a chair would
be a very different process than the creation of a company. Since in our culture we believe
that existence is material, we consequently believe that to create something means to bring
its material properties into existence. Thus our discussions of origins tend to focus on
material origins.52
However, “people in the ancient world,” argues Walton, “believed that something existed not by
virtue of its material properties, but by virtue of its having a function in an ordered system.”53 By
“ordered system,” we are not speaking in scientific terms; rather, it has to do with “an ordered
system in human terms, that is, in relation to society and culture.”54 Walton continues,
In this sort of functional ontology, the sun does not exist in virtue of its material properties,
or even in its function as a burning ball of gas. Rather it exists by virtue of the role that it has
in its sphere of existence, particularly in the way that it functions for humankind and human
society. . . . In a functional ontology, to bring something into existence would require giving
it a function or a role in an ordered system, rather than giving it material properties.
Consequently, something could be manufactured physically but still not “exist” if it has not
become functional.55
Walton’s view of the Genesis 1 narrative is controversial, since many theologians today still
think of the narrative of Genesis 1 in terms of having to do with material origins. My purpose,
here, is not to solve the debate between “function” and “material” ontology in the ancient world;
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rather, it is to bring Walton’s insight on ontology into our discussion on the nature of the
goodness of creation.
When we think of the goodness of God’s creation, perhaps much of what the biblical
writers had in mind had to do with, not merely the substance of the thing made, which
privationist theories have often placed emphasis on, but also the function given to that thing that
was made. This insight, it seems, is one that those who promote the privation theory of evil often
fail to emphasize. Evil does not have to do with the corruption of the thing only but also a
disruption to the order and function that God assigned to certain things within creation.
So as not to equivocate on terms, confusing Walton’s emphasis on function within an
ordered system with how I’m going to use the notion in this project, it may be helpful to think of
God establishing more than one order—or, perhaps better, distinctions within that one order—the
natural order of creation and the moral order of creation. By natural order, I mean the order in
which God established the world or universe to function in a certain way. Here, one might
include such things as the laws of nature, or, more accurately, law-like regulating principles.
These regulating principles generally describe the ‘goings on’ of the universe, such as the need
for things like gravity or plate tectonics crashing into one another in order for the world to
operate as it does. If, indeed, God created the universe to operate in such a way, then, perhaps,
when the text describes all that God had made as good, it may include such things. Now, surely,
the biblical writers did not have a scientific worldview when they wrote about the goodness of
creation, nor did they posit such things as law-like regulating principles behind the ‘goings on’ in
the world (at least not as far as we know); nevertheless, they did understand that reality
functioned in an orderly way, and this was the result of God’s bringing it about to do so. The
emphasis on goodness, then, is not so much on the “how” God brought about order within
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creation (whatever that may include), but, rather, that there is order to the way things are to
function in the world that God has made. That stones fall to the ground when dropped or waves
crash into the shore of a beach are examples of the goodness of creation, because these are part
of the fabric of the natural created order as God intended.
Much of the same could be said with respect to the moral ordering of things. The moral
order of creation has to do with God’s establishing that some of His creatures with a capacity to
perform certain morally significant actions are to function in a certain way within the larger
framework of the natural order. There is a moral fabric that runs through the whole of God’s
intentions for these creaturely moral agents to operate within such a world. Goodness, here, then,
refers to the order in which moral agents are intended to function within the world that God has
made. When humans and, perhaps, angels too, comply with how God intended them to function
as moral agents, then such is good, since these kinds of things line up with the fabric of the moral
order God intended for creation.
Whether Genesis 1 establishes material origins or not is debatable, but Genesis 1 is not
the only passage within Scripture which emphasizes that the spacio-temporal universe came into
existence ex nihilo.56 Traditionally, Christians have held to the belief that God brought all things
into existence out of nothing, using no pre-existing materials to make and form the universe, as
Platonists thought and as Process theologians today believe.57 If God created all things, then that
which God brought into existence is good. Otherwise, if God created something that was
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essentially evil, then God is to be held responsible for the origin of that evil. Further, if, as I have
been arguing, goodness in creation refers to, not only the thing created, but also to the ordering
of how things are to function, including how moral agents are to function within the larger
universe, then an evil is not merely the privation of the good of some “thing,” but can also be
ascribed to the absence of some good as it relates to God’s intentions for the created order,
particularly the moral order.
Privation, then, would seem to be an important aspect of something being ‘evil’ or having
‘badness’. Here, we might concur with Brian Davies when speaking of our descriptions of
something that is evil.
To say that something is bad or in a bad way assumes that we have a sense of what it would
be like for it not to be so (just as to say that someone is ill assumes that we have a sense of
what it would be like for someone to be well). If ‘good’ is a logically attributive adjective . .
. , it sets a standard for things as we describe them as being bad since its use depends on our
understanding of a noun. We do not understand what is being said when told that something
is a bad X unless we have a sense of what it would be to be a good X. If rotten apples were
the norm, we would not understand what a bad apple is. So we are indeed complaining when
calling something bad . . . . And in doing so we are, I think, always noting that something is
not as good as it could or should be.58
The key in understanding the privationist view of evil is not so much in understanding that the
privation of the good in view is the good’s opposite, but, rather, that something is not how it
should be. It is out of sorts, so to speak.59 So when Hick speaks of hatred as not being merely a
lack of love, he is right, since a lack of love might also include something like indifference or
greediness. That is not to say, however, that when a person exhibits hatred toward another that
nothing is lacking. As Davies rightly notes, we understand that something is a bad X because we
have a sense of what some good X looks like. When a person exhibits hatred toward another
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person, it may be the case that love is lacking, but there might also be other qualities missing,
such as a lack of kindness or a desire to bring about unity. But beyond these, hatred toward
others breaks into a failure to maintain God’s intentions in keeping with the moral order of
creation. We know what it looks like for things like harmony and peace to be exhibited within
creation. Hatred is in contrast to and brings about a lack in such an order.
Whether I have answered Hick’s objection or not remains to be seen. Nevertheless, both
Hick and the privationist account of evil recognize that evil is a reality in the world. Before
finishing this section, it would be helpful to consider one final point. Certain religions like
Zoroastrianism, and even some Christians, believe that reality consists of two eternal opposing
forces, such as God and Satan. The Christian view has classically rejected this way of thinking,
since as noted above, God alone is the creator of all things and a necessary being. Satan, who is a
created being and contingent, owes his existence to God, along with any power that he may have.
Christians thus reject any notion that evil is eternal or personal and that it is an entity equal to
God.
In summary, it seems that we can draw four conclusions about the nature of evil from the
Christian perspective: 1) evil is a part of reality and not just an illusion; 2) evil is not a creation
of God, nor is it a substance, person, or force; 3) evil cannot exist apart from the good (though it
is true that good can exist apart from evil); and 4) evil is the absence, privation, or lack of some
good, whether in a thing or in God’s intentions for the moral created order.

Pain and Suffering
In the literature on the problem of evil, too often the words “pain” and “suffering” are
used interchangeably. There are, as we shall see, certain important reasons for not equating the
two. I would also contend with Eleonore Stump that the problem from evil has more to do with
25

suffering, and not so much natural evil, since, as she rightly expresses, had there not been any
sentient beings who are affected by things such as hurricanes or tsunamis, there would be no
cause to raise question about the evils that occur in nature. Even with respect to moral evils, that
which we are most concerned with is the suffering that results from the moral actions of human
creatures.60
Pain, then, can be construed in one of two ways: physical pain and mental pain. Physical
pain, as I take it, has to do with our physical equipment and it can occur on a variety of levels or
degrees. For example, pricking my finger does not amount to the same sensation of discomfort as
breaking my leg. Both experiences result in pain, but not of the same sort or degree.
Mental pain, on the other hand, has to do with those pains that are more emotionally or
psychologically oriented. A person can experience mental pain without having any physical
sensation whatsoever. Modern day lepers are examples of people who experience mental anguish
brought on because of their physical deformities, rejection by the people around them, or their
inabilities to accomplish certain daily tasks, yet, they feel no bodily pain. Surgeon and leprosy
specialist, Paul Brand, recounts a story of a young girl named Tanya, whose rare genetic defect,
commonly known as “congenital indifference to pain,” resulted in her eventually having both
legs amputated, the loss of most of her fingers, a lacerated tongue due to an obsessive habit of
chewing on it, constant dislocated elbows, and chronic sepsis caused by ulcers on her limbs and
appendages. At one point in his book, The Gift of Pain, Brand tells a story of Tanya’s mother
finding her as a young child doodling on a piece of paper with what seemed to be red liquid. But
to her shock and horror, Tanya had bitten off the tip of her finger and was making designs out of
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her own blood, while all the time going on as if nothing had ever happened to her.61 Tanya, and
many like her, cannot feel pain physically. Their nerve receptors do not function properly. When
they do damage to their bodies, they are often not aware of it, resulting in certain deformities
because of infection and gangrene, which requires the removal of the person’s limbs or
appendages. Yet, their inability to have the physical sensation of pain, nevertheless, causes much
mental anguish. In his years of working with lepers, and others with nerve related complications,
Brand has concluded that life without physical pain can bring about just as much suffering as a
life with it. On this point Brand says, “If I held in my hands the power to eliminate physical pain
from the world, I would not exercise it. My work with pain-deprived patients has proved to me
that pain protects us from destroying ourselves.”62 This is not to trivialize the horrible effects of
physical pain. Physical pain, if unchecked, “saps physical strength and mental energy, and can
come to dominate a person’s entire life.” 63 Yet, for most people, says Brand, we live our lives
somewhere between the two extremes of painlessness and chronic illness.64
Despite its often debilitating effects, it would seem, then, that pain has a significantly
important role in the way that we live our lives daily, without which we would not function
properly in the world. Take, for example, something as seemingly trivial as shifting one’s weight
while standing. Those whose pain receptors are working optimally shift their weight often while
standing or they change up their patterns when walking. Such shifting and changing are brought
on by minor physical discomforts that the person experiences. Failure to make shifts while
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standing or to change one’s pattern while walking can result in serious bodily complications,
which is what happens to lepers when they do not consciously change their walking patterns or
shift their weight when standing. There are, however, other reasons to think pain is only prima
facie bad. As Eleonore Stump argues:
Furthermore, even pain is bad only prima facie, other things being equal; and other things
are not always equal. To see this, consider that, for a variety of reasons, human beings
voluntarily submit themselves to pain they could otherwise avoid—that is, pain that is not
necessary for life or health. Perhaps the most obvious case in our culture has to do with
athletics, where the best athletes put themselves through agonies in the interests of athletic
excellence. We might suppose that in cases of this sort pain is only a necessary
accompaniment to something that we would be glad enough to have without the pain if we
could. But even if, contrary to appearances, this is true as regards athletics, not all cases in
which people voluntarily accept pain they could forgo can be similarly explained away.
Many women refuse anesthetics in childbirth, for example, although the baby would be born
without the mother’s pain just as well as with it.65
Yet, when people willing submit themselves to certain pains, we often do not consider such as an
evil, as Stump continues,
We are not inclined to raise the problem of evil in connection with the voluntarily accepted
pains of childbirth, not only because the sufferer has in some sense chosen the pain, but also
because it seems that, at least in the view of the women who have chosen to forgo
anesthetics, the experience of so-called natural childbirth (that is, childbirth with its
attendant pain) is, somehow, a great good.66
While the experience of childbirth can be extremely painful, it does not seem that such pains,
when voluntarily chosen apart from anesthetics, are the kinds of pains that would raise the
problem from evil, nor does it seem that it warrants some kind of justification or explanation.
It may be the case that both physical and mental pain might lead to suffering, but not all
suffering is a result of pain. At the heart of suffering, Stump argues, is the notion of what a
person most cares about. There is both an objective and subjective side to it; but not only that,
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the nature of suffering itself is two-sided.67 Regarding the objective side, “Every human person,”
says Stump, “has some care about what kind of person she is and about her flourishing as that
kind of person. For that reason, part of what it is for her to suffer is for her to be kept, to one
degree or another, from flourishing.”68 The subjective element, however, has to do with the
desires of a person’s heart. On this Stump says, “Although a thing that is a heart’s desire for
some person may (or may not) have considerable intrinsic value, the very great value it has for
that person is a function of her commitment to it.”69 The value of a person’s heart’s desire is
derivative from one’s care and love for it. Suffering results when we lose or when we are denied
those things that are most desirable to our hearts. Essentially, what is bad about suffering,
according to Stump, can be formulated in the following way: “What is bad about the evil a
human being suffers is that it undermines (partly or entirely) her flourishing, or it deprives her
(in part or in whole) of the desires of her heart, or both.”70
Stump thinks that making a connection between what a person most cares about and
suffering helps to explain, for example, why a person who voluntarily goes through certain
instances of pain, such as in the case of a woman going through childbirth apart from anesthetic
or an epidural (though she has it available to her), does not seem to be an instance that would
raise questions pertaining to the problem from evil. As Stump explains, ordinarily pains
associated with childbirth do not undermine a mother’s flourishing; moreover, if a mother so
chooses voluntarily to give birth apart from medication or some other pain-reducing means,
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enduring such pain does not take away from her that which she cares most about. What makes
suffering bad, then, “is that it undermines or destroys what the sufferer centrally cares about, her
own flourishing or the desires of her heart or both.”71 However, it may not always be obvious to
the sufferer that she is indeed suffering or that she even knows what her heart’s desire is. On the
other side of it, she may not be aware that she is indeed flourishing or that she has obtained her
heart’s desire. Stump has us imagine a person who thinks that she is perfectly healthy, only to
come down with an illness and suddenly die. Yet, there may be a person who has had cancer.
This person may have gone through treatment, while the whole time thinking that she still has
the cancer, only to find out some time later that she is now cancer-free. The period between
treatment and finding out she is cancer-free she thinks that she still has the cancer, when in fact
she is healthy. Such does not mean that a person never knows when she is flourishing or when
she has the desires of her heart; rather, all it implies is that a person’s views on her own
flourishing or when she has the desires of her heart are not infallible. Stump’s conclusion
regarding suffering is that it is more like ill health than it is like pain.72 On this last point she
says, “Unlike pain, the state of our bodily health is not a matter that is invariably known to us by
introspection or to those around us by ordinary observation. In the same way, neither
introspection nor observation is invariably sufficient to recognize suffering. Suffering can have
an opacity that pain typically does not.”73
Suffering, then, as I will be using it in this project, is concerned with that which occurs in
human creatures (and, perhaps, angels, too); it is that which depletes the soul, keeping a person
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from flourishing or from having the desires of his heart. The suffering of a person may be
connected to pain, either physical or mental; however, that need not be the case. If suffering has
to do with a lack of flourishing or the obtaining of the desires of one’s heart, there are certain
types of suffering, then, that are in no way tied to pain.

Summary of Chapters
Having provided some working definitions in this chapter, it will now be helpful to give a
short survey of where this project is heading. Chapters Two through Six will examine and
evaluate four major metaphysical systems’ responses to evil in the world. I argue that of the four
metaphysical systems, theism provides the best explanation for understanding the phenomenon
of evil in the world and the best explanation for what God can do about evil. I will also take
space in Chapter Six to begin arguing for expanded theism, particularly why Christian theism,
which understands God as tri-personal, provides a more robust theistic response to evil in the
world than other theistic views.
In Chapter Seven I focus on the nature of the Trinity and the doctrine of perichoresis,
both of which play a key role in the theodicy proposed in the following chapter. Along with the
Trinity and perichoresis, several other important Christian doctrines—creation, imago Dei, fall,
gospel, church, theosis, and kingdom of God—are considered. Finally, I begin to argue, but work
out more extensively in Chapter Eight, that God had specific intentions in creating, which must
be taken into consideration when offering a theodicy. I will argue that from the beginning what
God wanted to bring about in creation is the kingdom of God—a kingdom which resembles
God’s own perichoretic life. If the kingdom of God was the telos of creation, then God did not
need evil in order to accomplish His goals in creating; rather all that it required was for humans
(and, perhaps, other creatures, too, such as angels) to have a certain function within the created
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order, along with certain capacities (particularly human libertarian freedom), challenges, and so
forth, in order for God to bring such a kingdom about through them. Yet, given the finite nature
of anything that is not God, evil was bound to come about, particularly if such creatures were
given libertarian freedom. The manifestation of evil was no surprise to God. Even before
creating God made provisions, particularly through the plan of the atoning work of the Son and
through the life-renewing work of the Holy Spirit. All of this lays the ground work for an attempt
at proposing a theodicy in Chapter Eight, to which I now turn.
I begin Chapter Eight by comparing three prominent theodicies: (1) Free-will
theodicy/defense; (2) Soul-making theodicy; and (3) ‘O Felix Culpa’ theodicy. While each of
these theodicies have certain benefits and should be worked into a response to the problem from
evil, none provide a full answer to the question of evil in the world. Having worked through each
of the theodicies, I then offer, what I have dubbed, “the Trinitarian Perichoretic Theodicy” (TPT)
as a possible candidate. After working out TPT, I argue that God is active in the world, working
and fighting against evil. Central to God’s work in the world is through that of human agency.
Humans, particularly those who are united with Christ in the Spirit, are enabled to do God’s
work in defeating evil by means of the Son’s work in His incarnation, death, and resurrection,
and through the empowering ministry of the Holy Spirit in the life of the church. I will then
emphasize that it is because of God’s work that Christians have hope in conquering evil, not only
in the world to come, where there will be no more sorrow or suffering and all things made new,
but also in the here and now. In this way, TPT not only provides a response to the
philosophical/theological problem from evil, but also to the religious/existential problem. Having
worked out a proposed theodicy, the final chapter concludes the work, wrapping up all that has
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been said and gives consideration to two objections surrounding the coherence of the doctrine of
the Trinity.
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CHAPTER 2: METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND EVIL PART 1
NATURALISM

The problem of evil in the world is often couched as a religious or theological issue.
Doubtless such is the case, but the problem of evil is also a metaphysical problem. According to
Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman, the task of metaphysics, as a philosophical discipline,
is to “get behind all appearances and describe things as they really are.”1 What we want to know
is whether evil is a real feature of our world. Why is it here (if this can be explained)? Why is it
the way that it is? Why is there so much evil in the world? What best explains the phenomena of
evil? But for theological systems, this becomes complicated in a different way. We want to
know, given God, why evil? What is God doing about evil, if indeed God is doing or can do
anything about evil? Yet, evil in the world is also a moral problem. Given a person’s worldview,
how should one respond to evil? Is there a moral obligation to respond to evil? Since theists are
not the only ones who raise questions about the phenomenon of evil in the world, it would seem
reasonable to presume that all worldviews or metaphysical systems2 must contend with evil in
the world (if there is indeed evil in the world).
In the next five chapters I compare and contrast four possible worldview responses to
evil: naturalism, pantheism, panentheism, and theism.3 For this chapter, specifically, I consider

Peter van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman, eds., “Introduction: What is Metaphysics?,” in
Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 2.
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I recognize that there are various ways of classifying worldviews. Here, I am classifying worldviews
based on their metaphysical commitments on God and God’s relationship to the world. Hence the terms
“worldview” and “metaphysical systems” are used interchangeably.
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Why these four and not others? Anytime that one takes on a project such as this, one must make choices
between alternatives for economy’s sake. Surely various other worldviews could have been considered, such as
polytheism, henotheism, finite godism, and deism, just to name a few. There are two general reasons why I chose
these four over others. First, each of the four worldviews considered in these chapter provides a unique perspective
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naturalism. But before going forward in comparing each metaphysical system’s response to evil,
I lay out the ground rules for evaluating metaphysical systems. Once the ground rules are in
place, I then consider each of the metaphysical systems separately. Compared to the other
metaphysical systems, I argue theism provides not only the best explanation for the phenomenon
of evil in the world, but it also provides an overall thicker worldview response. Lastly, I consider
the limitations of generic theism and argue that in order to provide a robust answer to the
problem of evil—both the intellectual and existential problems—one must move from restricted
(generic, bare, etc.) theism to expanded theism, particularly Christian theism. There is good
reason to make this move, especially as one considers the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. As I
will argue in later chapters, generic theism is lacking in explaining how God can be essentially
loving—a requirement for being essentially good—and yet a necessary eternal being.

Evaluating Metaphysical Systems
In Chapter One I put forth my argumentative strategy to answering the problem of evil as
two-fold. Following C. Stephen Layman, I begin with the comparative response. From there I
move on to present a theodicy. This chapter will focus on the former.
As I understand it, the comparative response need not argue that theism explains all evils
well; rather, all that is required is that theism on the whole explains evil as well as (or better
than) its metaphysical rivals. But what would showing that theism explains evil as well as (or
better than) its metaphysical rivals accomplish? According to Layman,
on God’s relationship to the world and ultimate reality. Naturalists obviously deny that any god or gods exist. For
the naturalist, the physical space-time universe is all that there is. If something does exist beyond the space-time
universe, as proposed by various multi-verse theories, it would have to be more of the same. Metaphorically
speaking, there is nothing outside the machinery of nature. The other three contenders—pantheism, panentheism,
and theism—are theological systems, yet, each has a unique perspective on God and God’s relationship to the
universe. Second, all four worldviews are broad metaphysical systems, accommodating for multiple perspectives
within each. For example, the three major monotheistic religions all fall under theism, yet, there is room within
theism to accommodate for all three perspectives.
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Minimally, showing this would undermine the assumption that the problem of evil is a
problem for theists only. For example, if naturalism explains evil no better than does theism,
then if evil is a problem for theism, evil is a problem for naturalism too. Furthermore, if
theism explains evil as well as naturalism does, then the phenomenon of evil does not
provide a reason for accepting naturalism over theism. Finally, if theism explains evil better
than naturalism does, then the phenomenon of evil might actually provide a reason to accept
theism over naturalism.4
The comparative approach, as I will employ it here, is something akin to, or perhaps, a form of
inference to the best explanation (IBE), a type of abductive reasoning often used in law courts,
forensics, AI, history, and archeology.
Abductive reasoning differs from both deductive and inductive reasoning. Abduction
does not guarantee that the conclusion follows logically and formally from the premises if they
are true, like deductive arguments do; rather, it is more like induction in that the conclusion is
warranted, though not guaranteed. However, unlike induction, which emphasizes a movement
from the particulars of some set to a generalization (as understood by Aristotle) or statistical
probability (as understood in a modern sense), abduction is concerned more with plausibility. 5
IBE seeks to choose the best hypothesis from a pool of possible alternatives to describe
some phenomenon in question. David Baggett and Ronnie Campbell describe the argument
pattern in the following way:
We begin with a set of data points—states of affairs or established facts, the aforementioned
phenomena in question—and construct a pool of possible explanation candidates. On the
basis of a principled set of criteria we winnow the list down to the best explanation among
the possibilities, and then hopefully achieve sufficient warrant to infer to it as the likely true
explanation. The inference does not settle the matter, but produces new opportunities to
subject the explanation to critical scrutiny to assess its effectiveness at providing further
explanation of additional observations. Three important components of such an inference
pattern, then, are (1) the set of salient facts requiring explanation, (2) the list of explanation
4
C. Stephen Layman, “Moral Evil: The Comparative Response,” International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 53 (2003), 1-2.
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candidates, and (3) the criteria by which we reduce the candidates down to the one that is the
best.6
In our case, then, the salient facts or state of affairs include, not only the types and kinds of evil
in the world (moral and natural), but also the quantity and intensity of such evils, or, at least, how
such evils appear to us, something of the phenomenology of encountering putative instances of
evil. As noted, the candidates for explanation I consider include naturalism, pantheism,
panentheism, and theism. No doubt others could have been chosen, but for economy’s sake,
these four hypotheses have the most potential as live possibilities for explaining evil in the
world. Each was chosen based on (1) how the metaphysical theory provides a unique perspective
on God and the God-world relation and/or ultimate reality, and (2) the broadness of each
metaphysical system, especially in how each can accommodate a variety of other perspectives
that fall under those broader categories. Regarding this second criterion, if the broader
metaphysical system fails in explaining the phenomenon of evil as well as or explains it less well
than its metaphysical rivals, then so too do those perspectives that fall under it.7 Lastly, there are
criteria by which to choose between alternative hypotheses. Let us consider such criteria,
especially in relation to evaluating metaphysical systems as hypotheses or theories.
A metaphysical theory is a type of theory such that it sets out to provide an explanation or
response to a metaphysical question. Metaphysical theories function much like how scientific
6
David Baggett and Ronnie Campbell, “Omnibenevolence, Moral Apologetics, and Doubly Ramified
Natural Theology,” Philosophia Christi 15, no. 2 (2013), 338-339.

For if all B’s make up a subset of A, and if A fails, then so too do all B’s. So, for example, if theism, as a
metaphysical system, explains less well the phenomenon of evil in the world than its metaphysical rivals, then it
fails, and so too do all individuated perspectives (e.g., Christianity or Islam) falling under theism as an overall
metaphysical system. But all things considered, even if, say, theism fares less well than naturalism at explaining the
phenomenon of evil in the world, it does not mean that theism fails as an overall system. One might have other
reasons for thinking that theism is true. Furthermore, one should recognize, however, that there are certain
combinations that rise above these four major worldview distinctions, such as something like Christian panentheism.
We should, then, understand this principle only as a general principle of sorts and avoid reductionism in our thinking
about worldviews.
7
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theories work, seeking to unify our experiences and make them understandable.8 Philosopher
William Hasker provides three important criteria for evaluating metaphysical theories: factual
adequacy, logical consistency, and explanatory power.9
Concerning factual adequacy, like any given scientific theory, metaphysical theories, too,
are falsifiable, that is to say, such theories can be shown to be false. Moreover, just as scientific
theories are built on the data that one knows to be true, so too are metaphysical theories. The
problem, then, is this: when evaluating metaphysical theories, what are the facts that everyone
agrees upon? For a first approximation, consider Hasker’s idea in this regard. Hasker suggests
that the facts used to construct a metaphysical theory “must be consistent with what you know by
other means to be true, and a theory which is inconsistent with what everybody knows (if there is
anything which is known to everyone!) cannot be acceptable to anyone.”10
Hasker’s second criterion, logical consistency, suggests that a theory cannot propose two
logically inconsistent statements. While some inconsistencies are easy to spot, others are not
always easy to identify. An example of logical inconsistency may be that God is both timeless
and, yet, knows what is occurring now in the world, or that a loving God seemingly does nothing
to stop evil from occurring in the world. To some, these may seem only prima facie
inconsistent.11
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Explanatory power, the last of Hasker’s criteria, is important for any metaphysical theory
in that it brings unity to the data. While all of the data may be correct and in proper order, such is
meaningless without some kind of explanation. Thus when comparing metaphysical theories, it is
not enough to have the data and logical consistency. Explanatory power is what helps the
metaphysician to evaluate the various theories.12
There are additional criteria not mentioned by Hasker, but that are, nonetheless,
important. For instance, there is explanatory scope, which refers to how broad a theory reaches in
explaining the data. Another criterion is the amount of ad hoc-ness present. The less ad hoc, that
is to say, the less “artificial” or “contrived” some theory is, the better.13 A further criterion is
plausibility. Plausibility is evaluated by two questions: (1) how plausible of an explanation is the
theory in itself? and (2) how plausible of an explanation the hypothesis is relative to the other
hypotheses?14 The last criterion is that of livability. What good is a theory if, after having shown
that it explains the data well or that it is logically consistent, it proves not to be hypothesis that
one can live consistently with from day-to-day.
What does the process of comparing metaphysical rivals look like? As we have already
noted, comparing metaphysical theories is much like comparing scientific theories. British
philosopher Basil Mitchell compared examining metaphysical systems or worldviews to the task
of critical exegesis or history.15 The exegete, historian, scientist, or metaphysician does not stop
with the first piece of information or evidence that confirms her theory; rather, she keeps looking
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for additional data. In this regard, metaphysical theories are falsifiable, since new information
can always be added that disconfirms a theory. Yet, the more confirmation that one has the more
probable or plausible the theory becomes.16 Thomas Morris provides the following illustration:
Suppose we are in a windowless room and we are considering two rival hypotheses: It is
raining outside and it is sunny outside. There are many events that would be expected to
occur if the rain hypothesis were true, such as: water beating on the roof, a friend coming in
soaked, water running in the street, etc. Suppose we hear the sound of water beating on the
roof (an observation of one of the above events). This observation confirms and raises the
probability of the rain hypothesis. Do we then know that the rain hypothesis is true, that it is
raining outside?17
The obvious answer is “no”, since there could always be other possible explanations for the
data.18 For all we know someone may be standing outside with a water hose spraying the roof.
Let’s suppose further that we were to observe other phenomena, such as a friend walking into the
house soaking wet or the sound of cars swishing by on what seems to be wet roads. Taken
separately, each event might have an independent explanation. The person with a water hose may
have sprayed our friend and the sound of water swishing on the road may have been caused by a
street sweeper having just washed the street. Independently, each event may provide
confirmation to the rain hypothesis, but not decisively. However, if each of the events were taken
together, says Morris,
their cumulative effect would be to raise the probability of the rain hypothesis so high that
we would be fully justified in believing that it is raining outside. The belief can be said to be
a justified subjective response to and result of the cumulative probability given to the rain
hypothesis by the three confirming observations.19
16

Ronald H. Nash, Faith and Reason: Searching for a Rational Faith (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan,

1988), 63.
17

Thomas V. Morris. Francis Schaeffer’s Apologetics: A Critique (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1976), 96.

18
I am not here claiming that certainty is required for knowledge. One might just as easily arrive at
knowledge through non-deductive means of inquiry (e.g., induction and abduction).
19

Ibid.

40

And this, we believe, can lead to knowledge.
It should be noted, however, that such a formal procedure, says Morris, is not the kind of
thing that takes place on a day-to-day basis. He continues:
[W]e do not go through such a formal procedure of consciously making and categorizing
observations for which we consider rival explanations, just to decide whether it is raining
outside. But we do naturally react to the individual and cumulative effects of sights and
sounds (etc.) in determining what is and what is not going on around us in our environment
(broadly speaking). This is how we live daily. There is a human capacity to naturally
respond to evidences, confirmation, and probability without necessarily ever being
consciously aware that this is what is going on. Such a response is basic to every act of
responsible decision making, whether decisions of physical action or of belief.20
Morris’s point is well taken. Things such as experience and one’s overall character disposition,
as well as a variety of background beliefs, all play a crucial role in the formation of a person’s
worldview. The natural capacity to respond to evidence and the like, as Morris explains, often
takes place without our ever being aware of it. That being said, even when formally discussing
worldviews or metaphysical systems, not everyone will naturally begin on the same page. There
will be disagreements over starting points or on what criteria should be included or excluded. As
C. Stephen Layman says, “one unavoidably makes controversial assumptions about a series of
issues, e.g., the nature of explanations, how best to formulate theism and its rivals, the nature of
good and evil, and so on.”21 However, as Layman continues, “That the assumptions are
controversial is not, I take it, a good reason to reject the Comparative Response.”22 Any wellargued philosophical position will come up against opposition, employing controversial premises
not held by everyone. “This being so,” argues Layman, “both theism and its rivals will
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unavoidably make use of controversial premises. Therefore, in the absence of a case to the effect
that theism employs more controversial premises than its rivals do, the observation that theism
employs controversial assumptions is without force.”23

The Classification of Evil
Having considered method, it will be helpful to take a further look at how evil will be
understood in this chapter. In Chapter One I defended the classical Christian understanding of
evil as privation of the good. In the sense that I argued for, evil as privation may not only include
privation of the good of some “thing,” but also the privation of some good in God’s created
order, particularly the moral order. When analyzing metaphysical systems, the above
understanding of evil will not do, since it is too specific to theism, especially Christian theism.
As Michael Peterson suggests, “the attempt to offer a specific definition at this point frequently
ladens the meaning of evil with preconceived ideas and thus hinders objective discussion.”24
Following Peterson, then, this chapter will not presuppose the definition argued for in Chapter
One; rather, it will consider evil in a much broader way, consisting of the kinds of things we
generally call evil.25
What sorts of things might one include in such a “broad” and “commonsense”
understanding of evil? Peterson suggests the following: “The set of commonly recognized evils
includes, at the very least, such things as extreme pain and suffering, physical deformities,
psychological abnormalities, the prosperity of bad people, the demise of good people, disrupted
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social relations, unfulfilled potential, a host of character defects, and natural catastrophes.”26
Such items on the list are commonly considered as evil, without having the negative effect of
“prejudicing” the discussion. The list, suggests Peterson, indicates all of the things to which the
term “evil” applies (extension), without specifying all that the term implies (intension).27
Most philosophers giving consideration to the problem from evil recognize two kinds of
evil in the world: moral evil and natural evil. As explained in Chapter One, moral evils are those
evils that come about through moral agency. The phenomenon of moral evil can be broken down
into subcategories, which include (1) human wrongdoing, (2) suffering caused by human
wrongdoing, and (3) the total amount of suffering that comes about through human
wrongdoing.28 Natural evil, on the other hand, includes those kinds of evils or suffering that are
not caused by a moral agent; rather, such evils are brought about by things such as animal
attacks, hurricanes, tornados, floods, landslides, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, famines, and
disease; however, it should be noted that such events are not themselves evils.
Furthermore, one must consider that the line between natural evil and moral evil is not
always clear. Some evils are brought about by human negligence, such as pollution, the failure to
evacuate during a natural disaster, or the spread of infectious diseases. As Layman notes,
“Foolishness is a moral vice, any suffering or loss that results in such cases is at least in part a
moral evil.”29 In those cases where humans are cruel to animals or inflict pain and suffering upon
an animal without morally sufficient reason, such would be a moral evil. Yet, things like animal
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predation of a human would count as natural evil.30 Lastly, it must be noted that sometimes
disease can cause humans to lose function of certain cognitive abilities, inhibiting them from
making morally responsible choices.31
Having given consideration to methodology and a general understanding of evil, I now
turn to the naturalist’s response to evil. I offer a brief description of naturalism, following by a
look at how naturalism explains the phenomena of evil in the world. In subsequent chapters, I
then consider the other three metaphysical systems, followed by a comparison and contrast of
each of the systems according to the criteria for evaluating metaphysical systems.

Naturalism and Evil
Among metaphysical alternatives in the West, perhaps naturalism is the greatest rival to
theism. But what is naturalism? How should one understand the naturalistic conception of
reality? To what extent does naturalism explain evil in the world? How does naturalism as an
overarching Weltanschauung respond to evil in the world?
Nailing down a definition of naturalism is not an easy task; this is in part due to how one
thinks of the word nature. As Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro suggest, one might take in
the older, broader sense of everything having a nature as being “natural.” We may speak of
humans, rabbits, rocks, angels, or God as all having a nature.32 But that is not, of course, how
most people in the West take the words “nature” and “natural” today, unless one is steeped in
philosophy or has studied theology. Much of recent Western thinking has been shaped by the
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enterprise of scientific thinking, which has, in turn, shaped how we in the West have come to
think of nature.
Science has become for many the primary tool by which we come to understand the
world. Philosopher John Post outlines this train of thought well:
According to a number of influential philosophers, the sciences cumulatively tell us, in
effect, that everything can be accounted for in purely natural terms. The ability of the
sciences to explain matters within their scope is already very great, and it is increasing all
the time. The worldview this entails, according to many, is naturalism: Everything is a
collection of entities of the sort the sciences are about, and all truth is determined ultimately
by the truths about these basic scientific entities.33
All naturalists, to some extent, place a high emphasis on scientific inquiry; however, some
naturalists, more so than others, take science to be not just one of many ways of understanding
the world, but the primary or only means by which we come to know things about our world.
Such an epistemology has come to be known as scientism.
Philosophers have rightly distinguished between methodological naturalism and
philosophical or metaphysical naturalism. Too often the two have been conflated, which is a
mistake, since a conflation of the two leads to the false assumption that all naturalists are
atheists. Methodological naturalism primarily concerns itself with a certain epistemology—a
way of knowing the material world grounded in science; whereas metaphysical naturalism, while
accepting the epistemological view of methodological naturalism, goes beyond to accept certain
metaphysical commitments and implications about the nature of reality. A methodological
naturalist may hold to belief in God; yet, she is deeply committed to scientific exploration and
inquiry, while rejecting scientific design arguments such as those put forth by adherents of
Intelligent Design (ID). Further, a methodological naturalist may or may not be committed to
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materialism.34 Nevertheless, scientific explanation, by its very nature, naturalists say, leaves out
any appeals to the supernatural or religious; all explanations appeal to the purely physical. 35
While a worthy discussion in and of itself, our primary concern is not methodological naturalism
but metaphysical naturalism (henceforth naturalism), to which we shall now turn.
Metaphysical naturalists accept the conclusions of methodological naturalism but go
beyond by concluding that physical reality is all that there is—a view known as “physicalist
materialism,” “physicalism,” or “materialism.”36 Regarding materialism, naturalistic philosopher
John Searle has this to say:
There is a sense in which materialism is the religion of our time, at least among most of the
professional experts in the fields of philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and other
disciplines that study the mind. Like more traditional religions, it is accepted without
question and it provides the framework within which other questions can be posed,
addressed, and answered.37
The universe, or nature (read: all physical reality), according to the naturalistic point of view, is a
closed system of cause and effect. There is no ultimate cause for the universe, such as a god,
gods, ground of being, or underlying force; rather, the universe as we know it is self-sufficient
and arrived to where it is now through a series of blind, purposeless natural processes. Mental
states, suggests Searle, if they do have real existence, “must in some sense be reducible to, they
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must be nothing but, physical states of some kind.”38 As Post suggests, such physicalist
materialism reduces “all the properties of things to the properties of the basic physical entities.”39
Following Layman, then, I take naturalism to mean the view that there is a material
reality that is essentially physical, that exists either necessarily, eternally, or by chance, that is
self-organizing—that is to say, it is not organized by a deity or force of sorts—and that every
ultimate explanation is inanimate.40 But to what extent can naturalism account for evil? How
plausible is evil given naturalism?

Naturalism and Life
If naturalism is to succeed at explaining evil, then it seems that naturalism must, at least,
be capable to explain life.41 The naturalistic understanding of life begins with the Big Bang, by
which the entirety of the universe, including all space, time, and matter, exploded into existence
some 13.5 billion years ago. Resulting from the Big Bang, galaxies, stars, and planets all formed.
On one small planet—earth—life emerged from non-life out of a pre-biotic soup through
evolutionary processes. As philosopher J. P. Moreland describes it,
the process of evolution, understood in either neo-Darwinian or punctuated equilibrium
terms, gave rise to all the life forms we see including human beings. Thus, all organisms and
their parts exist and are what they are because they contributed to (or at least did not hinder)
the struggle for reproductive advantage, more specifically, because they contributed to the
tasks of feeding, fighting, fleeing, and reproducing.42

38

Ibid.

39

Post, Metaphysics, 11.

40

Layman, “Moral Evil,” 7.

41
I am following closely certain aspects of Layman’s format and method when considering all four views,
though Layman only contrasts naturalism and theism.

J. P. Moreland, “The Ontological Status of Properties,” in Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, eds. William
Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (New York: Routledge, 2000), 76.
42

47

Given naturalism’s grand story, how surprising is life? As Stephen Layman argues, there
can be no life unless the universe has been “fine-tuned” for life to exist.43 Layman is referring to
the “anthropic principle,” which states that the universe has certain fundamental features that if
they were slightly different, there could be no life in the universe as we know it.44 But how likely
should we expect the anthropic principle to be, given naturalism? It does not seem likely. If the
universe came into existence at a finite point in time, as the Big Bang model of cosmology
suggests, then one might always ask why the laws of nature turned out as they did. Why these
laws? Why this universe?45 Perhaps, one might reply by saying that there was something in place
prior to the Big Bang? But as John Barrow and Frank Tipler suggest with respect to the Big Bang
singularity, “At this singularity, space and time came into existence; literally nothing existed
before the singularity, so, if the universe originated at such a singularity, we would truly have a
creation ex nihilo.”46 In other words, there was no mechanism in place prior to the Big Bang that
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would assure the laws to turn out just as they did in our universe. As a self-organizing reality, the
universe surely could have existed in a variety of forms.47 Without something in place, it seems
highly improbable that the universe just churned out such principles and regularities that are
necessary for the existence of life in our universe. Robin Collins gives the following example of
just such a principle:
The force of gravity is determined by Newton’s law F = Gm1m2/42. Here G is what is
known as the gravitational constant¸ and is basically a number that determines the force of
gravity in any given circumstance. For instance, the gravitational attraction between the
moon and the earth is given by first multiplying the mass of the moon (m1) times the mass of
the earth (m2), and then dividing by the distance between them squared (r2). Finally, one
multiplies this result by the number G to obtain the total force. Clearly the force is directly
proportional to G: for example, if G were double, the force between the moon and the earth
would double.48
Collins goes on to explain:
[S]ome calculations indicate that the force of gravity must be fine-tuned to one part in 1040
in order for life to occur. What does such fine-tuning mean? To understand it, imagine a
radio dial, going from 0 to 2G0 where G0 represents the current value of the gravitational
constant. Moreover, imagine the dial being broken up into 1040—that is, ten thousand,
billion, billion, billion, billion—evenly spaced tick marks. To claim that the strength of
gravity must be fine-tuned to one part in 1040 is simply to claim that, in order for life to
exist, the constant of gravity cannot vary by even one tick mark along the dial from its
current value of G0.49
The example given here by Collins is just one of many recognized constants.50
Not all naturalists agree that the Big Bang is the final stop. In order to explain the
anthropic principle, some naturalists have turned toward multiple universe theories. Such
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theories stress a multitude of distinct physical universes that exist (or could have existed), and,
for all we know, there could be (have been) an infinite number of such universes.51 One such
model is the oscillating big bang model, by which the universe, at random, expands and
contracts, perhaps ad infintum. If such a process of exploding and collapsing has been going on
for all eternity, then eventually we should expect the coming about of such a fine-tuned universe
as our own. While such a theory may increase the probability of one or more universes
eventually producing life,52 it nevertheless complicates the naturalistic hypothesis by adding a
further feature, going merely from a self-organizing reality to a mechanism that generates a large
(perhaps an infinite) number of universes at random.53
The oscillating model is, by no means, the only model available. There are a variety of
other multiverse scenarios. Despite the model taken, as physicist Paul Davies suggests, the
multiverse hypothesis merely shifts the problem elsewhere. Such a theory requires “many
assumptions.” He explains:
First, there has to be a universe-generating mechanism, such as eternal inflation. This
mechanism is supposed to involve a natural, lawlike process—in the case of eternal
inflation, a quantum ‘nucleation’ of pocket universes, to be precise. But that raises the
obvious question of the source of the quantum laws (not to mention the laws of gravitation,
including the causal structures of spacetime on which those laws depend) that permit
inflation. In the standard multiverse theory, the universe-generating laws are just accepted as
given: they don’t come out of the multiverse theory. Second, one has to assume that
although different pocket universes have different laws, perhaps distributed randomly,
nevertheless laws of some sort exist in every universe. Moreover, these laws are very
specific in form: they are described by mathematical equations (as opposed to, say, ethical
or aesthetic principles). Indeed, the entire subject is based on the assumption that the
multiverse can be captured by (a rather restricted subset of) mathematics.54
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Even if one were to couple the multiverse scenario with something like string/M theory, explains
Davies, such mathematical specifications must be accepted as a given. But even here there could
be other different unified theories, such as N theory, that one could propose. Davies questions
such theories. Often theorists choose theories based on their elegance. He goes on to argue, “But
this is to import a new factor into the argument—questions of aesthetics and taste. We are then
on shaky ground indeed. It may be that M theory looks beautiful to its creators, but ugly to N
theorists, who think that their theory is the most elegant. But then the O theorists disagree with
both groups. . .”55

Naturalism and Consciousness
Despite the difficulty of the presence of life given naturalism, there are still yet other
problems with the naturalistic paradigm as it relates to the question of evil. Such difficulties
include the notion of consciousness, the metaphysics of good and evil, and human responsibility.
We begin with the problem of consciousness.
If naturalism is to explain either moral or natural evil, then it must also be capable of
explaining the presence of sentient creatures that are capable of suffering. Yet, in order to do
this, it must also explain the presence of creatures with consciousness. How successful is
naturalism in this respect?56
Granting something like evolutionary theory, naturalists have reason to expect life. But
what of life with consciousness? Surely there are all kinds of creatures without consciousness,
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such as plants and certain lower-level life forms. And given the way in which evolution works,
things could have gone quite differently from how it did. We could have been stuck in a world
with single-cell organisms, or a world that consisted primarily of plants and lower-level life
forms. How is it that life transitioned from life apart from consciousness to life with
consciousness, according to the Darwinian schema?
Philosopher Thomas Nagel, who is himself not a theist, finds “physico-chemical
reductionism” in the field of biology “hard to believe.”57 In his book, Mind and Cosmos, Nagel
sets out to build a case against materialism based on the difficulties of consciousness coming
about from within a purely materialist understanding of reality. For physicalists, consciousness
reduces to chemical reactions within the brain. Though a bit outdated, philosopher Bertrand
Russell paints a portrait of the physicalist conception of the connection between the human body
and mind:
Of this physical world, uninteresting in itself, man is a part. His body, like other matter, is
composed of electrons and protons, which, so far as we know, obey the same laws as those
not forming part of animals or plants. There are some who maintain that physiology can
never be reduced to physics, but their arguments are not very convincing and it seems
prudent to suppose that they are mistaken. What we call our “thoughts” seem to depend
upon the organization of tracks in the brain in the same sort of way in which journeys
depend upon roads and railways. The energy used in thinking seems to have a chemical
origin, for instance a deficiency of iodine will turn a clever man into an idiot. Mental
phenomena seem to be bound up with material structure. If this be so, we cannot suppose
that a solitary electron or proton can “think”; we might as well expect a solitary individual to
play a football match. We also cannot suppose that an individual’s thinking survives bodily
death, since that destroys the organization of the brain and dissipates the energy which
utilized the brain tracks. 58

57
Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost
Certainly False (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

Bertrand Russell, “Why I Am not a Christian” in Why I Am not a Christian, Ed. Paul Edwards (New
York: Touchstone, 1957), 49-50.
58

52

It is exactly this type of understanding of physico-chemical reductionism that Nagel questions.
For Nagel, any attempt at equating the physical with the mental ultimately fails. One such
strategy is conceptual behaviorism, which attempts to identify mental phenomena with
“behavior” or “behavioral dispositions” or “forms of behavioral organization.”59 Other attempts,
claims Nagel, are primarily verificationist in nature, in that, all that could be said about the
content of a mental statement is that which could be confirmed, warranted, or verified about it by
some observer. “In one way or another,” says Nagel, “they reduce mental attributes to the
externally observable conditions on the basis of which we attribute mental states to others.”60
While there is no doubt that there is a vital connection between “mental phenomena” and
“behavioral manifestations,” such theories are inadequate and insufficient in analyzing the
mental, since
they leave out something essential that lies beyond the externally observable grounds for
attributing mental states to others, namely, the aspect of mental phenomena that is evident
from the first-person, inner point of view of the conscious subject: for example, the way
sugar tastes to you or the way red looks or anger feels, each of which seems to be something
more than behavioral responses and discriminatory capacities that these experiences.61
In other words, the physical processes cannot adequately explain the subjectivity of our
experiences.
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Yet, Nagel finds untenable even those nonanalytic attempts that suggest mental
phenomena are truly something inside of us, such as J. J. C. Smart’s psycho-physical identity
theory. Psycho-physical identity theories equate some mental event, such as a pain or taste
sensation (Φ), with a corresponding physical event (Ψ). In other words, mental events are
identical (theoretically, not analytically) to their corresponding physical events: Ψ = Φ much like
Water = H2O. However, this raises a serious question for the materialist: “What is it about Φ that
makes it also Ψ?” 62 In order for the identity to be a scientific truth, rather than a conceptual one,
the property that Ψ has must be such that it is conceptually distinct from those “physical
properties that define Φ.”63 In an effort to avoid dualism, says Nagel, materialists must retreat
back into some form of analytical behaviorism, whereby “[w]hat makes the brain process a
mental process . . . is not an additional intrinsic property but a relational one—a relation to
physical behavior.”64 There are, nevertheless, problems with this kind of theory. Again, Nagel
argues, something seems to be missing. Just as with the behavioral theories before them, such
explanations do little by way of explaining subjective appearances. Furthermore, Nagel suggests
that these kinds of solutions proposed by identity theorists suffer from Saul Kripke’s critique that
whereas “Water=H2O” is a necessary truth, the relation between Ψ/Φ is contingent in nature.
When one has H2O one needs nothing more to have water. The physical components H-2-O are
sufficient for having water. It remains what it is apart from any kind of perceptual experience.
But is this the case for the relation between Ψ and Φ?65 It would seem not, as Nagel explains:
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So if Ψ really is Φ in this sense, and nothing else, then Φ by itself, once its physical
properties are understood, should be sufficient for the taste of sugar, the feeling of pain, or
whatever it is supposed to be identical with. But it doesn’t seem to be. It seems conceivable,
for any Φ, that there should be Φ without any experience at all. Experiences of taste seems
to be something extra, contingently related to the brain state—something produced rather
than constituted by the brain state. So it cannot be identical to the brain state in the way that
water is identical to H2O.66
Based on a purely naturalistic understanding of the world, the physical sciences seem to
be quite incapable of explaining the connection between mind and body, and thus seem
incapable of providing a clear explanation as to how mental events arise out of purely physical
processes. Mental events, while no doubt connected to physical experiences, nevertheless seem
to be something quite different in nature.67 Naturalism as a Weltanschauung does not give us
reason to expect conscious life arising from purely physical processes.

Naturalism, Good, Evil, and Responsibility
But what of the metaphysics of good and evil? Furthermore, how should we understand
human responsibility from a naturalistic perspective? If naturalism is to explain evil, particularly
moral evil and certain forms of natural evil, then it must, at least, provide some basis for judging
whether some action is evil or not. For a naturalist, what structure is in place to judge some
action as being right or wrong, just and unjust?68
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A naturalist has available to her at least four options. First, she could opt for some kind of
anti-realism, such as emotivism, according to which there is no such thing as moral facts but only
human emotional responses. Anti-realism, coupled with naturalism, would lead one to doubt
whether naturalism could explain moral evil at all. It would not explain it so much as explain it
away. Not wanting to go the way of the anti-realist, the naturalist could, secondly, adopt
something along the lines of Platonism, the idea that moral truths exist independently of physical
reality, or thirdly moral supervenience (moral naturalism), the understanding that moral truths in
some sense supervene on conscious intelligent moral creatures. Of these three options, antirealism may or may not find support from naturalism, but as noted, it does not do much by way
of explaining evil, as we are considering evil in this chapter. Platonism and supervenience, on the
other hand, in and of themselves, do not seem to be a given from naturalism. We would not
expect either given naturalism. Platonism appeals to non-natural properties and objects, and
supervenience sounds a bit like a promissory note, and assertion more than an explanation. In
addition, both options would be an addition to the naturalistic hypothesis.69 There is a fourth
option for the naturalist, however. Perhaps evolution itself is the key to understanding values?
According to Richard Dawkins, the sense of “right and wrong” can be traced back to our
“Darwinian past.”70 If we are to understand the origins of morality, then it must be the byproduct of natural selection. While natural selection explains aspects of our species’ survival,
such as, “hunger” or “sexual lust,” why do human beings have the “powerful urge” to contribute
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to relief efforts or to take care of widows and orphans? Dawkins believes that these powerful
urges are founded in our genes. He goes on to explain:
The logic of Darwinism concludes that the unit in the hierarchy of life which survives and
passes through the filter of natural selection will tend to be selfish. The units that survive in
the world will be the ones that succeeded in surviving at the expense of their rivals at their
own level in the hierarchy. . . . The whole idea of the selfish gene, with the stress properly
applied to the last word, is that the unit of natural selection (i.e. the unit of self-interest) is
not the selfish organism, nor the selfish group or selfish species or selfish ecosystem, but the
selfish gene. It is the gene that, in the form of information, either survives for many
generations or does not. Unlike the gene (and arguably the meme), the organism, the group
and the species are not the right kind of entity to serve as a unit in this sense, because they
do not make exact copies of themselves, and do not compete in a pool of such selfreplicating entities. That is precisely what genes do, and that is the – essentially logical –
justification for singling the gene out as the unit of ‘selfishness’ in the special Darwinian
sense of selfish.71
The way genes insure survival is to program the organism toward selfishness. There are times,
says Dawkins, when our genes make sure of their survival by “influencing” the organism “to
behave altruistically.”72 Two ways that genes program an organism toward altruism are: 1)
“kinship” and 2) “reciprocal altruism.”73 When an organism takes care of its offspring or
“genetic kin,” it becomes more likely that the genes will survive through several generations.
The concept of reciprocal altruism is akin to our notion of “I’ll scratch your back if you’ll scratch
mine.” Reciprocal altruism may even occur between species. Nevertheless, this practice is
prevalent among human beings and may explain why there are consequences for those who do
not fulfill their end of the deal.
Resting on the Darwinian notions of kinship and reciprocation are some “secondary
structures.” For example, “reputation,” explains Dawkins, is important to human society. One
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individual might have a reputation for kindness while another individual might be known for his
conniving. Reputation is a way that an individual might foster reciprocation among one’s
species, thus preserving one’s genes. One other example, argues Dawkins, is “conspicuous
generosity.” By this, Dawkins means that an individual among a species may participate in “risktaking” or “ostentatious generosity” in order to “buy mates” or to “buy success.” 74 Dawkins
believes that these four reasons are “good Darwinian reasons”75 why individuals behave
altruistically. Hence our moral behaviors, like other behaviors necessary for survival, are “byproducts” from our evolutionary past.76
Having dismissed morality grounded in the character of God or divine revelation,
Dawkins argues for something like a “consensus” for morality.
How, then, do we decide what is right and what is wrong? No matter how we answer that
question, there is a consensus about what we do as a matter of fact consider right and wrong:
a consensus that prevails surprisingly widely. The consensus has no obvious connection with
religion. It extends, however, to most religious people whether or not they think their morals
come from scripture. With notable exceptions . . . most people pay lip service to the same
broad liberal consensus of ethical principles. The majority of us don’t cause needless
suffering; we believe in free speech and protect it even if we disagree with what is being
said; we pay our taxes; we don’t cheat, don’t kill, don’t commit incest, don’t do things to
others that we would not wish done to us.77
He goes on to propose that humans should adopt something akin to a “New Ten
Commandments.” “Don’t cause harm” or “Do not do to others what you would want them to do
to you” just to name a few of the proposed commandments.78 He believes that a list, such as the
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one he duplicates, could be produced by any “decent” individual living today; however, such a
list, while not set in stone, exemplifies the spirit of the age (Zeitgeist) in which we live. For
instance, the modern world has moved beyond slavery or racial and gender inequality, such
offensive and oppressive treatment that is condoned by the Bible.79 This “shift” of moral
conscience is, Dawkins believes, in a positive direction.80 It is an improvement from times
before. What was acceptable, even generations ago, is no longer acceptable by today’s standards.
Such things as derogatory language or racial slurs, while still going on today, are looked down
upon by the majority of the world. Even regarding the way in which war is approached today,
says Dawkins, the aim is to have as few casualties as possible.81 But what is the cause of this
shift? Ultimately, it is not clear what the cause might be, claims Dawkins, but
[f]or my purposes it is enough that, as a matter of observed fact, it does move, and it is not
driven by religion – and certainly not by scripture. It is probably not a single force like
someone’s website. Most of the commandments on the list he could agree with, while nuancing some or adding a
few of his own. The point, then, argues Dawkins, is not that this particular list should be the complete list, but rather
the list exemplifies some of the major moral agreements that exist among people. It would seem that, in order to
have a true “consensus”, one would have to observe all cultures—something that, from what I can tell, Dawkins has
not done. Furthermore, given Dawkins’ proclivity toward science, his observations are by no means empirical in and
of themselves. One would think that with such a bent toward science, one would provide the appropriate data to
support one’s conclusions. None is given. Perhaps Dawkins is blind to the significant impact the Judeo-Christian
worldview has had upon Western thinking? Even outspoken atheist Jürgen Habermas recognizes the immense debt
recent discussions on human rights owes to the Judeo-Christian worldview: “Christianity has functioned for the
normative self-understanding of modernity as more than just a precursor or a catalyst. Egalitarian universalism, from
which sprang the ideas of freedom and a social solidarity, of an autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the
individual morality of conscience, human rights, and democracy, is the direct heir to the Judaic ethic of justice and
the Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of continual critical
appropriation and reinterpretation. To this day, there is no alternative to it. And in light of current challenges of a
postnational constellation, we continue to draw on the substance of this heritage. Everything else is just idle
postmodern talk.” See Jürgen Habermas, Time of Transitions, ed. and trans. Ciaran Cronin and Max Pensky
(Cambridge: Polity, 2006), pp. 150-51.
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Dawkins, in reading of the Christian Bible, or any other sacred text for that matter, does so without any
hermeneutical sophistication, nor does he provide any interaction with key interpreters of Scripture from the three
major Christian traditions. But beyond that, again it seems that Dawkins is oblivious to the key role that the
Christian Scriptures and worldview have played in social reform, particularly in the fight over such issues as slavery
and inequality.
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gravity, but a complex interplay of disparate forces . . . . Whatever its cause, the manifest
phenomenon of Zeitgeist progression is more than enough to undermine the claim that we
need God in order to be good, or to decide what is good.82
Dawkins has presented what he thinks is a clear model, which serves as a substitute for any kind
of morality based on the character of God or divine revelation. But Dawkins’ model is far from
clear.
Can natural selection provide for us a proper basis for moral choice? It would seem not.
In his two-fold theory, Dawkins posits two separate theses:
(1) our genes determine our urges, and
(2) humans have freedom to reject such urges.
Regarding (2), Dawkins has this to say:
We have the power to defy the selfish genes of our birth and, if necessary, the selfish memes
of our indoctrination. We can even discuss ways of deliberately cultivating and nurturing
pure, disinterested altruism – something that has no place in nature, something that has
never existed before in the whole history of the world. We are built as gene machines and
cultured as meme machines, but we have the power to turn against our creators. We, alone
on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators.83
But (1) and (2) are contradictory. Given the naturalistic worldview coupled with evolutionary
theory humans are to be understood in strictly physicalist terms. If we are to understand human
morality from a naturalistic evolutionary standpoint, is there room left for any kind of libertarian
or contra-causal “free choice” in how humans are to behave. In the words of David Berlinski: “If
evolutionary psychology is true, some form of genetic determinism must be true as well. Genetic
determinism is simply the thesis that the human mind is the expression of its human genes. No
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slippage is rationally possible.”84 Similarly, Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro make the point
that
while Dawkins enthusiastically promotes a naturalistic, reductive explanation of the
development of morality and values, he believes that we now have morality and values to
justify resisting our biological urges and natural impulses. The natural world has, in a sense,
produced beings that are in a position to critique the natural world.85
On the one hand, Dawkins has gone out of his way to show how altruistic moral choices are the
by-product of Darwinian evolution, yet, on the other, he wants to affirm that humans have the
ability to accept or reject those altruistic moral choices of our genes.
Furthermore, Dawkins has failed to answer two critical questions: how human beings
are to decide right and wrong (i.e., how to come up with this proposed consensus) and why
human beings “ought” to act morally. Concerning the first question, Dawkins promotes an
agnostic approach as to how humans are to decide between right and wrong. All that is important
for Dawkins is that a basic consensus exists.86 By making this move, Dawkins is able to sidestep
the issue and move from his Darwinian explanation for the origin of morality to his notion of
consensus and the moral Zeitgeist. Why should there be a consensus at all? Why should we think
that such a consensus corresponds with moral truth? How is it that Dawkins effect the shift from
moral epistemology to moral ontology? Furthermore, why is there a progression in moral
conscience? Are these progressions of moral behavior the telos of natural selection? It would
seem not. According to natural selection, it is not guaranteed that we were supposed to turn out
the way that we have, or that the species, Homo sapiens, would have ever existed in the first
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place. As J. Budziszewski makes clear, “Darwinism is not a predictive theory.”87 Budziszewski
goes on to say that “[a]n evolutionary ethicist of this . . . sort does not claim that Darwinism itself
provides the foundation for ethics. What it does tell us, he thinks, is the general features of
human nature that ethics must come to terms with.”88 Budziszewski’s point is significant. All
that evolutionary biology can give us about ethical standards is a description of how humans
behave as a result of their genetic predispositions. Furthermore, as Goetz and Taliaferro point
out, ultimately, Darwinianism cannot condemn evil:
If naturalistic determinism is true, then all the evil that has occurred was determined to occur
by naturalistic causes. Deterministic naturalists may be deeply committed to fighting
injustice – indeed, there is no doubt that many self-described naturalistic determinists are
profoundly committed to promoting justice and other virtues . . . . But while theists maintain
that evil is an aberration, an unnecessary violation of the natural goodness of the cosmos and
its purpose, deterministic naturalists see evil as an essential part of nature, a necessary
feature of reality and not at all in violation of the purposes of the cosmos.89
How does Dawkins answer the second question of why we ought to act morally? He does not.
On the one hand, Dawkins readily admits that absolute moral standards need not exist for us to
act morally, yet, on the other hand, he has provided no reason why we ought to act morally at
all.90 All he has provided is a description of “positive” behavior. As Arthur Holmes asks, “how
can empirical facts (or anything else that ‘is,’ for that matter) impose duties or obligations on
us?”91 As the Humean dictum goes, one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is”. Darwinian
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determinism ultimately reduces the “ought” to causes rather than to give commands for how we
should live.92 It would seem, then, that Naturalism as a metaphysical system is incapable of
explaining both the metaphysics of good and evil and human responsibility.
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CHAPTER 3: METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND EVIL PART 2
PANTHEISM

Having considered naturalism and evil, I now turn to pantheism as an overall worldview
response to evil. It will be important to consider, first, how the pantheistic picture of the world
differs from the naturalistic understanding, and second, to what extent pantheism can explain the
presence of evil. As with naturalism, four areas will be considered: life, consciousness, the
metaphysics of good and evil, and human responsibility. Lastly, and quite differently from
naturalism, as a theological system, how does the God of pantheism respond to evil in the world?
What is God doing? What can the God of pantheism do?1
As with any metaphysical system, it is important, at the risk of reductionism, to recognize
that there is more than one variety of pantheism,2 and that pantheism can fit with a variety of
ontologies.3 But this should not keep us from arriving at a basic understanding of pantheistic
teaching.
Erick Steinhart suggests that pantheism affirms, minimally, that “(1) all existing things
are unified; and (2) the maximally-inclusive unity is divine.”4 Similarly, philosopher Michael P.
Levine defines pantheism as the view that

1
Though throughout this chapter I engage various pantheistic thinkers, my primary interlocutor is Michael
Levine, who has done more in recent years to put forth a systematic work on pantheism. His Pantheism: A Nontheistic Concept of Deity is the definitive work on the pantheistic worldview from a modern philosopher of religion.
2

Norman Geisler and William Watkins identify six varieties: absolute, emanational, developmental, modal,
multilevel, and permeational. See Perspectives: Understanding and Evaluating Today’s World Views (San
Borodino, CA: Here’s Life Publishers, 1984), 71.
3
For example, Erick Steinhart suggests that there are at least three live possibilities for ontologies among
pantheists: (1) materialism; (2) Platonism; and (3) class-theoretical Pythagoreanism. See “Pantheism and Current
Ontology,” Religious Studies 40 (2004): 63.
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there exists an “all-inclusive unity” that is “divine.”5 John W. Grula defines pantheism as “the
doctrine that God is not a personality or transcendent supernatural being but that all laws, forces,
manifestations, and so forth of the self-existing natural universe constitute an all-inclusive divine
Unity.”6 According to Paul Harrison, pantheists hold that the Universe and Nature alone should
receive the “deepest reverence.”7 For the pantheist “all things are linked in a profound unity.”8
There is a deep interconnection and interdependence among all things, among which, humans are
an inseparable part.9 While pantheists do not always agree on the extent of unity and divinity
involved, both factors are, nevertheless, central.
Pantheistic thought can be found in a diverse group of forms, such as scientific
pantheism, New Age thought, deep ecology movements, Taoism, Zen Buddhism, Hinduism,
ancient stoicism, and natured-oriented paganism.10 Some pantheists refuse to use “God”
language, so as to not confuse their understanding of the divine with theistic conceptions, while
others find no problem saying things like “the Universe is God.”11 Certain Hindu forms of
pantheism are multileveled in that they are also polytheistic. The gods are all part of the allencompassing “Absolute.” Take, for example, this passage from The Bhagavad Gita, whereby
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the Hindu god, Krishna, who is the incarnation of Brahman, allows the ancient warrior Arjuna to
capture a glimpse of “the supreme mystery of the Self.”12 Arjuna responds,

15.

16

17

18
19

20

O Lord, I see within your body all the gods and every kind of living creatures. I see
Brahma, the Creator, seated on a lotus; I see the ancient sages and the celestial
serpents.
I see infinite mouths and arms, stomach and eyes, and you are embodied in every
form. I see you everywhere, without beginning, middle, or end. You are Lord of all
creation, and the cosmos is your body.
You wear a crown and carry a mace and discus; your radiance is blinding and
immeasurable. I see you, who are so difficult to behold, shining like a fiery sun
blazing in every direction.
You are supreme, changeless Reality, the one thing to be known. You are the refuge
of all creation, the immortal spirit, the eternal guardian of eternal dharma.
You are without beginning, middle, or end; you touch everything with your infinite
power. The sun and moon are your eyes, and your mouth is fire; your radiance
warms the cosmos.
O Lord, your presence fills the heavens and the earth and reaches in every direction.
I see the three worlds trembling before this vision of your wonderful and terrible
form.13

One can gain a clear depiction from this passage of how all things, ultimately, despite their many
manifestations, belong to one “supreme, changeless Reality.”
Pantheists give the “Universe” or “Nature” the same primacy that theistic religions give
to their conception of God. It is the “Universe” or the “All” or the “One” or the “Ultimate” or the
“Unity,” rather than a theistic deity, that awakens within people a sense of awe, wonder, love,
and acceptance, and hence the Universe should be revered.14 It is this reverence toward the
Universe, which is also divine (in some sense), that separates pantheists from naturalists. Yet,
there are at least two ways in which pantheists distinguish their views of the divine from those of
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theism. First, unlike the god of theism, a being that is ontologically transcendent and separate
from the universe, God in pantheistic thought is radically immanent (at least ontologically).15
Second, God for pantheists is non-personal.16 God does not act or will or want or desire. Such
thinking about God is anthropomorphic and is avoided, at least by most pantheists.
One of the more notable Western pantheists is Benedict de Spinoza. Like many other
forms of pantheism (e.g., as the passage above from the Bhagavad Gita represents), though not
all,17 Spinoza’s brand of pantheism is monistic—the view that there is only one Being and that
all other parts of reality are in some way identical with this Being, or, at least, modes of it are. 18
The following passage clearly represents Spinoza’s notion of monism:
I do not know why matter should be unworthy of the divine nature, since . . . outside God no
substance can exist from which the divine nature could suffer. All things, I say, are in God,
and everything which takes place takes place by the laws alone of the infinite nature of God,
and follows . . . from the necessity of His essence. Therefore, in no way whatever can it be
asserted that God suffers from anything, or that substance extended, even if it be supposed
divisible, is unworthy of the divine nature, provided only it be allowed that it is eternal and
infinite.19
For Spinoza, substances are independent existing entities. He agreed with theists that God is an
infinite substance and that no contingency exists in God. But if it is the case that God is an
infinite substance, he argued, then there could be no such thing as independent substances;
rather, all individual things are extensions or “modes” of the attributes of God. If God is
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infinite—an infinity that includes the world—and if there is no contingency in God, then there
would also be no contingency in the world. Spinoza’s brand of pantheism is highly deterministic,
as are most forms of pantheism.20
Robert Corrington, in discussing his particular version of pantheism, makes a distinction
between natura naturans (nature naturing) and natura naturata (nature natured). Such a
distinction is fundamental to his own “Deep pantheism.” Both natura naturans and natura
naturata are “dimensions of and in nature, not separate orders one in and one out of nature.”21 Of
the two, natura naturans is the more difficult to explain. Corrington describes it as “nature
creating itself out of itself alone.”22 There is no “extra-natural creator”; rather “[n]ature is eternal
and continually self-renewing,” says Corrington. Nature naturing refers to “the dimension of
nature churning with potencies, potencies that spawn innumerable orders of the world.”23
Natura naturata, on the other hand, is better defined with respect to “the orders of the world,”
similar to what Christians call “creation.”24 Rather than there being some kind of “order of
orders,” there are, instead, “innumerable orders” within nature nurtured, some of which are
“powerful sacred orders” or “sacred folds” or “numinous orders” “central to human religious
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experience.”25 These sacred folds, in some way, find their origin in natura naturans. Corrington
goes on to explain: “nature contains deep unconscious depths from which sacred powers
emerge” and such “sacred folds, semiotically dense, have neither internal consciousness nor
intentionality.”26 Corrington, however, hesitates to say that all of nature is itself sacred. He
reserves the term “sacred” for those “numinous orders” within nature. Yet, human encounter
with such sacred folds brings about a religious experience such that it “shakes the self to the core
of its being and conveys something of the power of nature.”27 Corrington summarizes his view of
Deep Pantheism as follows:
Deep Pantheism is a form of pantheism in that it affirms that nature is all that there is and
that there is no divine agency located somehow outside of nature. It is ‘deep’ in the sense
that it recognizes a churning unconscious depth of nature from whence all orders, sacred or
otherwise, come. The gods and goddesses we encounter in sacred folds are all ejects from
the primal potencies of nature naturing. They combine power and meaning, as Tillich would
say, but in ambiguous ways that do not have a teleological cumulative force. So I would say
that the sacred is in and of nature and that nature per se is neither sacred nor non-sacred.28
Corrington’s view of pantheism diverges from the Hindu and Spinozistic variants on one
central point. Unlike the Hindu and Sponozistic versions, there is no one overarching divine to
which all things ultimately belong; rather, there are various divine touching points or, as
Corrington calls them, “sacred folds” throughout nature. There is not one thing which orders all
of the other orders; rather, in some sense, the various orders work together to “combine power
and meaning” without some ultimate direction or telos in view. So, for Corrington, the divine or
sacred is found within nature, but it is not all-encompassing. Such encounters with various sacred
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folds (“gods and goddesses”) bring about awe and wonder. In this sense, Deep Pantheism is
considerably religious.
So, given the diversity of pantheistic thought, how ought one to define pantheism? There
seems to be at least seven major strands that make up pantheistic thought:
(1) All things are interconnected and deeply unified
(2) This all-inclusive unity is divine (in some sense)
(3) The all-inclusive divine unity is the self-creating and self-organizing cause of all things
(4) The all-inclusive divine unity is either eternal or necessary or both
(5) The divine is non-personal
(6) The divine neither transcends the world nor is it ontological distinct from the world
(7) The divine unity is the object of one’s ultimate concern, worship, and pleasure
I take pantheism to mean the view that there is a reality such that all things are unified and that
this all-inclusive unity is divine (in some sense); that the non-theistic concept of the divine is
neither personal nor ontologically distinct from the world (as compared with theistic conceptions
of God); and that the all-inclusive divine unity is the self-creating and self-organizing cause of
all things, eternal and/or necessary, and the object of one’s ultimate concern.

Pantheism and Life
How does pantheism as an overall metaphysical system explain the phenomenon of evil?
To account for evil, pantheism, like naturalism, must be able to explain life, but in order to
explain life it must be able to explain the existence of the universe as it is. Pantheists of all
stripes recognize that something like the “Universe,” “Nature,” “God,” “All,” “One,” or “allinclusive divine Unity” (henceforth AIDU) is either eternal or necessary. As noted already,
pantheists reject anything like a transcendent god of theism, who exists apart from the space-time
universe, creating the heavens and the earth. Paul Harrison, in critiquing the Thomistic
Cosmological Argument (TCA), finds no reason, given our having “no problem imagining an
infinite future,” as to why there cannot also be a chain of causes that extend infinitely into the
70

past.29 Furthermore, Harrison thinks that the TCA is logically flawed, namely, because it takes
as its key premise that everything requires a cause for its existence. Yet, the theistic God himself
exists apart from any cause. If something can exist apart from a cause, then why could not that
thing be the Universe itself?30 Harrison goes on to argue,
When we say that something has a cause, we mean that something preceded it which
brought it about – cause precedes effect. But by definition the Universe includes all time and
space, and no time could have preceded it. It seems unreasonable to ask for the cause of a
totality that includes all space and all time. The only answer theists provide to this argument
is to modify the premise to say “Everything except the first cause requires a cause.” But to
skeptics this merely seems like an evasion, not an answer.31
Given there is no external creator, one is left pondering where it all came from. Harrison
suggests two options: (1) the universe is self-created; or (2) the universe has existed eternally.
According to Michael Levine, the creation of the universe is something of a mystery.
Most pantheists reject anything like a creation ex nihilo, as theists hold. But, Levine says creation
ex nihilo does not necessarily conflict with the central tenets of pantheism. Nevertheless,
pantheists have other options. One might simply take creation as “brute fact”, as most atheists
and naturalists do; however, Levine opts for something more like emanationism—if one were to
take some doctrine on creation from a pantheistic perspective, that is. Emanationism is the view
that “creation” is a flowing forth from God, rather than God, in some sense, making, forming, or
fashioning the world. Such a view recognizes that God is “in” the world and the world is “in”
God.32 Regarding emanationism as a form of creation, Levine says the following:
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[E]manationism appears to provide a doctrine which—if not an explicit ground on which to
base pantheism—is at least one that is seen as congenial. As a doctrine of creation, it may
even provide a partial basis for pantheism—as it has (arguably) for Plotinus, Eriugena, and
even for Spinoza where “God” is the immanent cause of all things. The view that God is the
“immanent cause” of things is a kind of creation doctrine for Spinoza and a basis for Unity.
So far as Lao Tzu has a doctrine of creation it too is emanationist. “The Tao engenders one,
One engenders two, Two engenders three. And three engenders the myriad things” (Tao Te
Ching, XLII). The Tao is “the primordial natural force, possessing an infinite supply of
power and creativity. Not only does the Tao create things—it is responsible for, or makes
possible, their growth. “It nourishes them and develops them . . . provides for them and
shelters them” (Tao Te Ching, LI).
Emantionism tends to affirm rather than deny a common ontological, substantial and
evaluative base among everything that exists (e.g. whatever it is which creatively emanates,
it is “Good”). It is therefore seen as in keeping with the central tenets of pantheism, and
where pantheists adhere to a doctrine of creation it tends to be emanationist. Since Unity
must partly be explained evaluatively, the fact that emanationism is often linked to the
“Good” provides further reason for supposing it consonant with pantheism.33
Perhaps, then, if pantheists were to have a doctrine of creation, something like emanationism
might hold to be the best option.34
In addition to being eternal and self-existent, the all-inclusive divine unity is selforganizing. Most pantheistic systems are compatible with something like neo-Darwinian
evolution, especially those pantheistic systems which place a high view on science and nature.35
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Even those that do not emphasize evolution, they nevertheless understand life existing as a series
of cycles of birth and rebirth. All life is intricately connected and interdependent.
Let us begin by considering the claim that AIDU is necessary. For something to be
necessary, it must be the case that it exists in such a way in all possible worlds. There is no
possible world in which it exists differently—in its essential nature—from the way it does.
Theists generally claim that God is a necessary being, that is to say, that which makes God what
God is (God’s essential nature) must be the case in all possible worlds. It could not be otherwise.
But can a pantheist claim that the divine is necessary? The idea of necessity raises a significant
problem for pantheists. Many pantheists hold that the world is either in some sense identical to
the divine or, at least, an expression of the divine, that is, creation flows forth out from the
divine. Yet, in any case, this would prove to be incompatible with the idea that the divine is
necessary and self-existent, particularly if we think that there is any kind of contingency in the
world. For the “All” or the “Ultimate” or “God” to share being with the world would result in its
being limited by the world.36 Further, as H. P. Owen put it, “Alternatively, if the world is (as it
manifestly is and must be) contingent, and if it is part of God, he cannot be necessary.”37 To say
that some being is both necessary and contingent results in a contradiction, which Owens likens
to saying that some “figure is both a circle and a square.”38 Especially if one were to take
Spinoza’s brand of pantheism, one in which there is no contingency in the universe, then one
would have a highly deterministic universe. For some forms of pantheism, creation flows by
necessity from God. This stands in stark contrast to theistic views that recognize that God creates
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ex nihilo out of His free decision. But as David Clark and Norman Geisler suggest: “Now there
is nothing inherently incoherent with viewing creation as necessary. . . . If God creates
necessarily, then God must create. If creation is necessary, then God cannot not create.”39
Whether the universe is an extension of God, as in Spinoza, or the universe flows from God, as
with Levine, such a universe would have significant implications for human responsibility and
evil in the world (which we will consider below).
But let us consider the claim that AIDU is eternal. What does it mean to say that
something is eternal? At minimum, to say that something is eternal means that it has no
beginning or ending. In theism, this is known as the everlasting view of eternity, in which God
exists without a beginning or end.40 This everlasting eternal view of the world seems to be the
view that most Hindus and Buddhists41 hold and the view that Harrison and Corrington favor.
Though, like most pantheistic views on nature and the universe, it is difficult to pin down just
exactly what it is that one believes. Harrison finds as a live possibility something like the
multiverse hypothesis or Stephen Hawking’s suggestion that space-time curves back on itself
much like that of a sphere.42 For Hindus, the cosmos has expanded and retracted many times
(which sounds much like certain forms of the multiverse hypothesis). Buddhists, too, hold that
there is no ultimate beginning to the world.43 Whichever is the case, there would be no true
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beginning or end. As considered in our discussion on naturalism, there are some significant
problems with the idea of the multi-verse, particularly in view of the anthropic principle. I will
not rehearse those here. Rather, I will consider some difficulties with the notion of an infinite
past.
As noted earlier, Harrison sees no problem with the idea of an infinite past. After all, we
can imagine a limitless future (though, this too, has some issues of its own, as we will see), so
why cannot the same be true of the past? When assessing the TCA, Harrison suggests that there
must be another cause—something that caused God. If God is the final stop, then why could the
universe itself not also be the final stop? He argues:
The argument for a creator God also has a very serious logical flaw. It is based on the
premise that everything requires a cause – and yet theists accept that one thing does exist
without a cause: God himself. This tends to undermine the basic premise of the argument.
God is thought to exist without a cause. But if one thing can be self-existing, why can this
one thing not be the Universe itself?44
Part of the problem with Harrison’s argument, like many others who misunderstand TCA, is that
Thomas is not primarily concerned with arguing for a temporal cause—he actually held to the
possibility of infinitely long temporal regress of causes and effects within the space-time
universe—rather, the ultimate cause exists as a prior cause logically, which would not need a
cause for its existence—such a cause would be necessary. Here we might follow Stephen Davis
and make a distinction between “linear causation” and “hierarchical causation,” where linear
causation has to do with causation in a temporal or linear fashion and hierarchical causation is
concerned with causes that are logically related to some object.45 Let us suppose that some object
x is the temporal or linear cause of some object y. We can imagine y remaining in existence even
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if x were to cease to exist. For example, a shoe depends on its being formed by a shoemaker. The
shoemaker could cease to exist while the shoe remains. In this case, the shoe is dependent only
temporally or linearly on its formation from the shoemaker; however, the shoe can remain in
existence despite what happens with respect to the shoemaker. But how might we understand the
notion of hierarchical causation and logical dependency? Perhaps Greek mythology can lend us
an example. In Greek mythology there is a character known as Atlas who eternally holds the
world on his shoulders. If Atlas were to cease to exist, then the world would no longer be
sustained. In this case, the world is dependent on Atlas for its continually being sustained in
existence. The dependency is not in any way temporal or linear (or, at least, not merely so);
rather, it is a logical kind of dependency. For Aquinas, God not only created the world, but God
sustains the world in existence. If God were to cease to exist (which is impossible), then so, too,
would the world. If God were to remove his sustaining power, then the world would cease to
exist. It is this kind of dependency—logical dependency—that Aquinas had in mind with respect
to causation in his second “Way.”
But how is it that we can have something like a linear regress but not a hierarchical one?
Unfortunately, Aquinas does not tell us. Stephen Davis suggests two possibilities. Aquinas, says
Davis, was opposed to the idea of an actual infinite. In the world, there cannot be an infinite
number of members of any one thing. For example, it would be impossible to have an infinite
number of, say, dogs, cats, people, or atoms in existence all at once or at the same time.46 Davis
goes on to say, “Now if there were an infinite number of linear causal ancestors of some
presently existing thing—some human being, say—those ancestors would not all have to be
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existing right now. . . . Most of them would presumably be dead and gone. No actual infinite
would be required to exist all at once.”47 Rather, what we have in the world is a potential
infinite—the idea that the world is ever increasing toward an infinite without ever reaching it.
But why couldn’t this be the case with respect to hierarchical causation, in which the effect
depends on the continued existence of its cause? Here Davis responds: “the effect cannot exist
unless all its hierarchical causes simultaneously exist.”48 In other words, “if there were an
existing human being who had an infinite number of hierarchical causes, that would require the
existence all at once, here and now, of every one of them—an actual infinite,”49 which for
Aquinas, would be impossible.
The objector might obviously retort back by asking: “Why couldn’t there be something
like an infinite temporal regress in the world?” or, at least, “Why couldn’t the past extend
backwards infinitely?” In response to such questions, theistic philosophers, pace Aquinas, have
argued that it is impossible for infinite temporal regress to exist in the world, since such would in
reality be an actual infinite. In their formation of the Kalam cosmological argument, William
Lane Craig and James D. Sinclair have put the argument against the actuality of an infinite
temporal regress in the following way:
2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist.
2.12 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
2.13 Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.50
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But why think that an actual infinite could not exist in the world? Craig and Sinclair provide a
variety of thought experiments illustrating the kinds of absurdities that result from the
instantiation of an actual infinite in the world. The primary example is that of Hilbert’s Hotel,
which goes as follows. Suppose we have a hotel with a finite number of rooms, and none of
those rooms has a vacancy. If a guest were to show up, the doorman would have to kindly turn
the guest away, since all of the rooms are currently occupied. Now let’s suppose that, rather than
the hotel having a finite number of rooms, it contains an infinite number of rooms, with each of
the rooms currently occupied by a guest. But in this scenario, if a guest was to show up, the
doorman could easily accommodate him. “Sure,” says the doorman, “we can make room.” The
doorman proceeds to move each guest over one room. The guest in room #1 he moves to room
#2, the guest in room #2 to room #3, and so on ad infinitum. Having moved all of the guests over
one space, room #1 now becomes vacant. The doorman checks the guest in and all rooms are
now once again occupied. Things get stranger, suggest Craig and Sinclair. Suppose an infinite
number of guests show up at the desk. Just as what happened with the one guest, the doorman
now shifts each person over. But rather than moving all of the guests only one room over, he
places each person in a room twice his own, such that the person in room #1 goes into room 2#,
the person in room #2 goes into room #4, the person in room #3 goes into room #6, so on ad
infinitum until all of the even rooms are now occupied, leaving vacancies in all of the odd
numbered rooms for the guests, and thus all of the guests would be accommodated.51 These are
just two examples of the kinds of bazaar occurrences that would take place if an actual infinite
existed in reality.
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Per 2.12, then, an infinite temporal regress of events would constitute an actual infinite.
Such would also mean that a beginningless set of past events or moments would constitute an
actual infinite. But do Craig and Sinclair’s thought experiments automatically rule out the notion
of an infinite set of past events? Stephen Davis suggests that these kinds of thought experiments
argue only against the notion that an infinite series of a set can exist at any given time. In order to
demonstrate this, Davis gives the example of a library. Rather than an infinitely large library
containing an infinite set of books all at once, suppose that the library was a smaller one with an
emphasis on the longevity of it rather than its size. Suppose further that this particular library
only contains one book in its collection at a time, and each year the librarian destroys the book
and then replaces it with a new one. While a book’s life is only a year in the library’s collection,
the library itself has existed an infinite number of years.52 Davis goes on to argue:
Here then truly would be a library with an infinitely large collection of books, but it would
seem that Craig’s paradoxes no longer apply. Taking away one book at any given time
would reduce the collection in size (to zero); adding ten books would increase the size of the
collection (to eleven), etc. If I am right, the critic . . . can argue that there is no incoherence
in the idea of an infinite number of past events. As long as past time is infinite, the infinite
number of past events can occur in serial order, one at a time (or any finite number at a
time); at no one time do an infinite number of events occur.53
If this kind of objection is correct, then, perhaps, the pantheist has good grounds for thinking the
universe is infinitely old.
It is important to note that the kind of argument Davis puts forth assumes an A-Theory of
time and something like presentism—the ontological view that the only temporal objects, items,
or things that exist are those that exists in the present.54 According to presentism, the past no
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longer exists and the future has not yet occurred? Whether presentism is true or not is not
something that I can consider here, but for our purposes we will assume that something like
presentism is true.
If something like presentism were true, would it allow for an infinite set of past events, as
Davis’s presumed critic might argue? It does not seem so. Craig and Sinclair provide an
independent argument based on the notion of successive addition. The argument goes as follows:
2.21 A collection formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite.
2.22 The temporal series of events is a collection formed by successive addition.
2.23 Therefore, the temporal series of events cannot be an actual infinite.55
This argument does not so much argue against the possibility of an actual infinite, as did the
previous one, but only against the notion that an actual infinite can be formed through successive
addition. By “successive addition,” Craig and Sinclair mean “the accrual of one new element at a
(later) time.”56 The crucial element in the process is the temporality of it. What they are
concerned with is the “temporal process of successive addition of one element after another.”57
No one would doubt the impossibility of an actual infinite by successive addition in the case that
there is a beginning point that is moving toward infinity. Suppose we have a finite number n. If
one were to make an addition to it, say, n + 1, then what we are left with is a finite number. But
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the problem is more complicated than that. Craig and Sinclair put the problem in the following
way:
The question then arises whether, as a result of time’s asymmetry, an actually infinite
collection, although incapable of being formed by successive addition by beginning at a
point and adding members, nevertheless could be formed by successive addition by never
beginning but ending at a point, that is to say, ending at a point after having added one
member after another from eternity. In this case, one is not engaged in the impossible task of
trying to convert a potential into an actual infinite by successive addition. Rather at every
point the series already is actually infinite, although allegedly successively formed.58
But this, too, is problematic. Here is why. If one cannot expect to count to an infinite, how can
one expect to count down from an infinite? Moreover, if one cannot traverse the infinite by
moving in one direction, then how can one expect to traverse an infinite going the other. Craig
and Sinclair continue:
In order for us to have “arrived” at today, temporal existence has, so to speak, traversed an
infinite number of prior events. But before the present event could occur, the event
immediately prior to it would have to occur; and before that event could occur, the event
immediately prior to it would have to occur; and so on ad infinitum. One gets driven back
and back into the infinite past, making it impossible for any event to occur. Thus, if the
series of past events were beginningless, the present event could not have occurred, which is
absurd.59
They further support this claim by providing a thought experiment. Suppose we have a person
named Tristram Shandy, who has set out to write his autobiography. It takes Shandy a full year
to write about one day’s worth of events. Shandy opines that at such a rate he will never finish
his autobiography. Sadly, since Shandy is mortal, surely he would die before finishing a year’s
worth of his life. But let us suppose that Shandy somehow comes by way of immortality. Would
not this change the game and allow him to complete his task? The great atheist philosopher,
Bertrand Russell, seemed to think so. Given an average of one day per year, all that one would

58

Ibid., 118.

59

Ibid.

81

need in order to write about an infinite number of days is an infinite number of years. Such
would be plenty of time for Shandy to accomplish his autobiography, provided that he is diligent
in his task. But Russell’s solution will not do. Despite Shandy’s best efforts, the opposite would
seem to be true. Rather than finishing the book, provided he lived forever and had an infinite
amount of time to complete it, Shandy would only get further and further behind. Each day that
he writes would only lead to another year of laborious work. But that is not the only difficulty. If
Russell’s argument was correct, why is it, then, that Shandy did not finish his autobiography
sooner, say, yesterday, the day before, or last month? After all, could not he have finished it at
any time in the past? But such would be absurd, since he has been writing an infinitely long
time.60 Thus one can conclude that a temporal series of events cannot become an actual infinite
through successive addition.
Given such arguments as the ones presented here by Craig and Sinclair, it would seem
that the pantheist does not stand on good ground for thinking that the universe is eternal; rather,
it would seem more likely that the universe began to exist at a finite time in the past, which
would align with standard Big Bang cosmology. If that is the case, then the universe cannot,
itself, be necessary; rather, it must be contingent and dependent on something else for its
existence. But that would raise a significant problem for the pantheist, since in some sense or
another, the universe is identical with God. But as H. P. Owens argued, “if God to any extent
transcends the world—if there is any element of his being that is not contained in the world—
pantheism, in the strict sense, is false.”61 This would seem to hold for those pantheists who argue
that the universe is in some sense a self-expression of or emanation out of God. Owen further
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argues, “Merely to speak of the world as a self-expression of the One is to imply that the One has
a separate nature to express.”62
Despite those immense difficulties that come with expressing how AIDU can be either
eternal or necessary, it does seem that, depending on the kind in consideration, pantheism has
one up on explaining the complexity of life in the universe. Unlike the turn in recent forms of
naturalism, which posits something like an eternal universe generator that perpetually or
eternally produces universes, the pantheist can chalk it up to the divine. Though not personal, the
pantheistic concept of deity functions as an eternal organizer of sorts. The various laws or forces
at work in nature are all encompassed in the divine Unity.
Assuming something like neo-Darwinian evolution, pantheists have a mechanism for
how life emerges on earth. Harrison believes that evolution is a “successful scientific explanation
of how design emerges in the most complex things” and that it is “a wonderful mechanism for
perfecting design, and like any great designer, it has both creativity and rigorous discipline.”63
Evolution is creative in the sense that it brings about new variations through random mutations
and sexual reproduction.64 The environment weeds out poor design, allowing those organisms
that are best adapted to thrive and those that are not to die off. Harrison further describes
evolution in pantheistic terms in the following way:
For pantheists, evolution is a universal force that works even on non-living things. From the
very instant of our universe, every individual thing has existed in the midst of other things,
and has had to adapt to the community of beings in which it finds itself. Evolution is at work
even in the realms of mind and society. Ideas, scientific theories, technologies and products
are tested against each other and the most effective survive.65
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Though, given the impersonal nature of the divine in pantheism, one may question Harrison’s
enthusiastic use of terms like “design,” “designer,” “create,” and “rigorous discipline.”
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When Harrison speaks of evolution as a “force,” he does not go into great detail about what he
means by that. Is such a force eternal? Is it necessary? Has it always been a part of the nature of
the universe? Is evolution one of many of the forces that are part of AIDU or is it the driving
force behind everything? All this needs fleshing out. But what is clear for Harrison, and for most
pantheists, is that the force cannot be personal in nature. It should be noted, however, that some
pantheists such as Plotinus and Spinoza do see something like a Mind at work in creation. It is,
as Norman Geisler describes it, an “immanent providence” at work.66 In his assessment, Geisler
recognizes that the providence takes place from within creation rather than over or beyond it, as
it does in theism, and it is the immanent nature of God that leads him to suggest that it is
pantheistic. If one accepts emanationist accounts of God,67 then the pantheistic view can
accommodate for a kind of Intelligence at work in the world, which is an improvement over a
purely atheistic or naturalistic understanding that all things came about through mindless or
purposeless chance.68

Pantheism and Consciousness
Despite the limitations of explaining either the eternality or the necessity of AIDU, and
assuming something like neo-Darwinian evolution, pantheism fares much better at explaining
life than does naturalism, but how well does it fare at explaining consciousness? As noted, an
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explanation of consciousness is required for providing an adequate explanation of evil in the
world, particularly any kind of suffering. Again, it would seem that pantheism fares better than
naturalism when it comes to the notion of consciousness. Pantheism has available to it a wide
variety of resources regarding consciousness. There are some pantheists who are also
physicalists. Interestingly enough, this tends to be a Westernized pantheism influenced by
naturalism.69 Such pantheists will run up against the same kinds of issues we saw that naturalists
face regarding the nature of consciousness. Thus I will not consider physicalist pantheism here.
Non-physicalist pantheists, however, may ascribe to something like panpsychism,
animism, idealism, or a general dualism in order to explain consciousness in the world. While
not a pantheist himself, philosopher Thomas Nagel has recently gravitated toward
panpsychism—the view that all things in the physical world are also mental—as a means to
explain not only consciousness, but also cognition and values, which, he argues, is something
that psycho-physical reductionist theories cannot do.70 Animism is the view that a living soul is
behind the organization and animation of the world, including plants, inanimate objects, and
natural phenomena. Idealist pantheists are monists, recognizing that the material world is maya
(illusion) and does not really exist. Mind or spirit is ultimate.71 Lastly, some pantheists are also
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dualists.72 It is a misconception that all pantheists are monists. For pantheistic dualists, the key is
not in understanding whether just one kind of substance exists or not; rather, emphasis is placed
on the Unity. Though pantheism does not entail any one of these options, all seem to fit well
within a pantheistic scheme, and each provide a possible explanation for consciousness in the
world.73

Pantheism, Good, Evil, and Responsibility
But what of moral responsibility and the metaphysics of good and evil? Before discussing
human responsibility, it may be helpful to consider whether pantheism has any basis for values.
A central tenet of theism is that God is perfectly good. When theists speak of God as “good,”
they mean that God is good both ontologically and morally speaking.74 Within the very nature of
God, there is no evil or badness, nor any sort of metaphysical deficiency. Furthermore, not only
is God himself good, from the theistic perspective, but God cannot perform any action that is
rightly deemed irremediably immoral or unjust or wrong or bad. By this is not meant that God’s
goodness is to be understood Ockhamistically, but rather, substantively; God, in the ultimate
sense, is constitutive of goodness itself. God is the Good, essentially, by which all other goods
find their source; and God always does that which is right. Theists generally draw a distinction,
here, between the Creator, who is infinite, and the creature, who is finite. Since the world is
ontologically distinct from and dependent on God ontologically, though originally created as
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good, it can be corrupted and flawed. Creation’s original goodness, or any other good for that
matter, is derivative from God and not so essentially. Such good things possess potentiality.
Pantheists, however, do not see things quite the same way. Rather than seeing AIDU as
supremely good or perfectly good as theists do, some strands of pantheism see God as neither
good nor evil; rather, the divine transcends such qualities. Consider the following passage from
the Bhagavad Gita:
One man believes he is the slayer, another believes he is the slain. Both are ignorant; there is
neither slayer nor slain. You were never born; you will never die. You have never changed;
you can never change. Unborn, eternal, immutable, immemorial, you do not die when the
body dies. Realizing that which is indestructible, eternal, unborn, and unchanging, how can
you slay or cause another to slay.75
This passage affirms that ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are false categories and ultimately an illusion. But
even for those Western pantheists who are more naturalistic in orientation, the categories of good
and evil seem to be nothing more than human invention. Regarding good and evil, Harrison
claims:
The focus of pantheist reverence is not a good God. The Universe is neither good nor evil.
The human categories of good and evil do not apply. It simply is. Again, this conception is
easier to square with reality than the idea of an omnipotent and perfectly good God who
allows or even causes devastating hurricanes, floods, epidemics claiming millions of lives—
actions that in human terms would usually be seen as monstrously evil. The question why
God would allow pain and evil to exist is one of the most difficult of all for theists to
answer. Pantheists do not have to answer it. The Universe is what it is.76
Furthermore,
[T]he Universe has provided us all with an indescribably beautiful home and a
consciousness with which to appreciate it. True, it could wipe us out tomorrow in a
hurricane or a meteor strike—as could the “loving” God of theist religion. But natural
disasters are easier to accept if you do not imagine there is a personal God sending them to
destroy the innocent and the guilty alike, or creating a world in which such things happen.
Nature does not plan or act out of anger or retribution: if a natural catastrophe strikes, it is
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simply the working out of the laws of nature on the social and physical structures of
humankind.77
For Harrison, like many pantheistic Hindus, it would seem that the categories of good and evil
are not the kinds of categories that one can ascribe to reality in any objective sense—they are
merely “human categories.” Yet, it is interesting that Harrison criticizes the actions of the God of
theism on what seems to be objective standards that hold true in all circumstances. If they are not
objective in nature, then why the big fuss? It seems that Harrison feels the existential pull and
weight of the injustice of such actions that he attributes to the theistic God. If there were such a
God, He should not act in such a way. But why think that some set of actions are “monstrously
evil” unless there is such a standard by which one can judge them? To claim that good and evil
are only human categories takes the bite out of Harrison’s objection. Why think these human
categories ought to apply toward God at all? Harrison does not say. But what of Harrison’s
argument that natural disasters are easier to accept for pantheists over against theism? We
cannot, here, deal with Harrison’s criticism of theism.78 For Harrison’s type of pantheism, the
same God whom the pantheist worships is the same God that can wipe them out in an instant.
Because AIDU is non-personal, it is indifferent to such tragedies. Furthermore, if one takes
Harrison’s line of thought, could we truly call such tragedies “evil” in an objective sense? That is
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of peoples or because of a certain sin. Such statements are unwarranted and are a matter of conjecture. There is no
reason to think that God’s use of nature to judge is a central part of theism. One cannot but help get the impression
that Harrison is throwing out a straw man argument in order to make the pantheistic view more palatable for his
readers.
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just the way things happen. If we are to accept the pantheistic God of Harrison and the Gita, then
the criticism of Michael Peterson et al is fitting of such an understanding of the pantheistic God
and evil:
Perhaps the most striking point to be made, however, is that the God of pantheism cannot
distinguish between good and evil. All actions performed in the universe are equally
manifestations of the power of God; the notion that some of these actions are in an ultimate
sense “good” and others “evil” must in the end be dismissed as an illusion. Pantheists may
be, and often are, extremely upright and scrupulous in their personal ethics, but in the
ultimate perspective good and evil—or, what we call good and evil—are transcended.79
The pantheistic God, though the power of being in all things, cannot and does not really do
anything about evil. Pantheists consider the divine Unity as the source of value in the world, yet
it can make no real distinction between “good” and “evil.”80
Not all pantheists, however, wish to deny that good and evil are objective categories in
the world. But what counts as “good” and “evil” for such pantheists? How do they handle the
concept of evil within their systems? According to Levine, the traditional “problem of evil” does
not apply to pantheists, since pantheists reject those aspects of theism that generate the problem
(e.g., that God is all-good and all-powerful and yet evil exists in the world; that such things as
gratuitous evils exist and that a Good and all-loving God does nothing about them; and so on);
rather, the problem from evil is “peculiar” to theism alone. For theists, says Levine, ‘“[e]vil’ is
essentially metaphysical rather than a moral concept; or it is a moral concept with a particular
theistic metaphysical commitment.”81 Nevertheless, pantheists have their own formulation of the
problem. He continues, “The pantheist may prefer, as most contemporary ethical theorists do, to
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talk of what is morally or ethically right and wrong. The term ‘evil’ could be retained and
applied to particular (usually extreme) instances of moral wrongness, but it would be understood
in a sense that divorces it from its original theological and metaphysical context.”82 With respect
to the divine Unity, pantheists do not claim that the divine Unity is all-good or omnibenevolent,
nor is the divine Unity a “perfect being” (or a being at all, for that matter). “In theism,” claims
Levine, “it is assumed that what is divine cannot also be (in part) evil. But why assume this is the
case with pantheism?”83 He continues, “[t]here seems to be little reason to suppose that what is
divine cannot also, in part, be evil. To say that everything that exists constitutes divine Unity (i.e.
pantheism’s essential claim) need not be interpreted in such a way that it entails that all parts and
every aspect of the Unity is divine or good. There can be a Unity and it can be divine without
everything about it always, or even sometimes, being divine.”84 Evil seems to be, then, for the
pantheists, primarily a moral issue, fundamentally connected to the pantheist’s conception
AIDU. To claim that some action is “evil,” it must be seen (in some sense) as a disruption of the
divine Unity. But what exactly is “evil” for the pantheist? What exactly is the “good”? Are we to
understand good and evil primarily in moral terms? Levine does not say. It is clear, however, that
he rejects the theistic understanding of evil as privation.85 It may be that “privation” applies to
pantheists in the sense that evil reflects a “disunity or the absence of whatever it is the pantheistic

82

Ibid. Though, it seems, here, that Levine is confusing categories. He is blurring the lines between the
“good” and the “right.” Issues of moral goodness have to do with axiological matters, while issues of moral
rightness are deontological in nature. For a helpful discussion, see David Baggett and Jerry Walls, Good God: The
Theistic Foundations of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 44.
83

Ibid., 208.

84

Ibid.

85

Ibid., 212-214.

90

Unity is predicated upon.”86 It is not at all clear what Levine means by this. But what of the
good? In his discussion on evil, Levine gives little attention to it. Should the notion of good,
then, be predicated on whatever brings about pantheistic Unity?87
Levine does, however, hold to a form of moral realism, which, as he claims, is generally
the case for pantheists (or at least the brand of pantheism that he is promoting). There are
objectively real moral facts in the world. Some things are ethically right or wrong independent of
human beliefs about them. According to Levine, pantheists do not equate moral properties with
natural properties, as some naturalists are wont to do. Such properties are not empirically
verifiable. Rather, the pantheist, like the theist, will find such moral facts as “X is wrong” in
something other than the natural; such facts are grounded in the non-natural.88 For theists, “X is
wrong” finds explanation and partial analysis in God’s will and nature. Pantheists, on the other
hand, find such facts explained and partially analyzed in “terms of (even if not reducible to) nonnatural facts about the divine Unity.”89 Like Spinoza, Levine finds a strong connection between
metaphysics and ethics. Regarding this point, Levine elaborates: “The belief in a divine Unity,
and some kind of identification with that Unity, is seen as the basis for an ethical framework (and
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‘way of life’) that extends beyond the human to non-human and non-living things. The divine
Unity is, after all, ‘all-inclusive.’”90
The close connection and intricate interrelatedness between the human, non-human,
earth, and divine Unity often lends to strong emphasis on environmental ethics. Pantheists often
find such interrelatedness as advantageous over other systems. On this point Levine explains:
“The pantheist’s ethic, her environmental ethic and her ethics more generally, will be
metaphysically based in terms of the divine Unity. It will be based on the Unifying principle
which accounts for an important commonality, and it will be the grounds for extending one’s
notion of the moral community to other living and non-living things. Everything that is part of
the divine Unity (as everything is) is also part of the moral community.”91 Here, Levine cites
Taoism as an example of how this may work. For Taoists, the Tao (the way) is the unifying
principle. What it means for one to act correctly is for one to act in accordance with the Tao.
Levine explains:
In the context of the Tao Tê Ching (Taoism’s primary “scripture”) what the Tao is and how
to act in accordance with it are explained in terms of one another. The Tao Tê Ching, like
most other primary sacred sources, is at one and the same time an ethical treatise on how to
live and a metaphysical treatise analyzing reality. One does not understand the Tao unless
one understands what it means to live in accordance with it. Ethics are intrinsically related to
the Tao, and “value” is associated with it at the most basic level.92
Another example available to the pantheist is the Hindu notion of karma, which can also be
interpreted pantheistically. One can act either in accordance with or in defiance of the “all-
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pervasive principle” found within the karmic system.93 The principle by its very nature is
“associated with value,” promoting the good.94
In working out his pantheistic understanding of ethics, Levine opts for something similar
to the divine command theory found in theism. He does not mean by “command” that AIDU
gives commands as such and that such commands are to be followed; rather, the notion of
commands have more to do with living in accordance to the Unity. For the pantheist, then, living
in accordance with AIDU is the “ethically good” thing to do, while living defiantly toward or
violating the Unity is “ethically wrong.”95 “What is right and wrong,” says Levine, “is to be
explained by reference, essential reference in some cases, to the divine Unity, just as what is
right and wrong for the theist is, in some cases, to be explained by reference to the nature of
God.”96
It seems, here, that Levine has provided a step up over naturalists and other pantheists,
such as Harrison, in providing a way of thinking objectively about the metaphysics of good and
evil and moral responsibility. Nevertheless, there are some difficulties with Levine’s system.
First, while Levine finds the notions of “good” and “evil” and “moral rightness” and “moral
wrongness” in relation to that which promotes or deviates from the pantheistic Unity, there is
ambiguity in regards to just what it is that makes up that Unity. Levine spends quite a bit of
space discussing what the divine Unity is not, but he never nails down just exactly what the
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divine Unity is.97 This is a common pattern among pantheists. If the pantheist expects his
understanding of the God-world relation to be taken seriously, then he would need to bring
greater clarity to just what he means by the divine Unity. Philosophically speaking, the way in
which pantheists describe the divine Unity leaves one to question whether it really makes much
difference if pantheism is true rather than if no God existed at all? As William Hasker says about
the divine Unity, “Considering what is known of the universe, it is hard to see how it is a unity in
any stronger sense than that it is a single space-time continuum in which things are interrelated
according to a single set of natural laws.”98
Second, while Levine is quick to argue that pantheism avoids the theistic problems of evil
and that pantheism has a problem of evil unique to its own system, he does not say just what
such a problem is. Levine defines evil ambiguously as that which disrupts the divine Unity.
However, to say that evil disrupts the divine Unity does not really tell us anything much about
evil itself. Moreover, Levine acknowledges that such a view of evil may count as a kind of
“privation,” yet he is adamant that the pantheistic system avoids the theistic notion of evil based
on a theistic metaphysic.99 But given that Levine holds to an objectivist view of moral rightness
and wrongness, he is acknowledging that there is a way that something ought to be—a moral
order of sorts (e.g., the Tao). But to suggest that something ought to be a certain way indicates
that something is just not quite right—a kind of privation of the good. If this line of thinking is
correct, then it is questionable whether Levine, and other pantheists, have fully escaped the
problem of evil claimed to be “unique” to theism. But of course, the God of pantheism escapes
For an extensive discussion on this issue, see Michael P. Levine, “Pantheism, Substance and Unity,”
International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 32, no. 1 (Aug. 1992): 1-23.
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the charge of the problem from evil in the sense that the pantheistic conception of God is neither
all-loving nor all-powerful. Furthermore, the God of the pantheist is not the perfect being of the
of God theism. But it should be noted that the God of pantheism is also non-responsive to evil in
the world. Supposing that something like the Tao is true, what can such a unifying principle do
about evil or the disruption of the divine Unity other than to suggest (if we can speak of a
principle suggesting) a way that one ought to follow? Moreover, what can the divine Unity itself
do? It would seem nothing more, at most, than to promote the good, and even that much is
suspect. In Levine’s form of pantheism, humans are the only moral agents in the world; yet,
humans are expected to do what the divine Unity itself cannot do—administer justice. What if
humans reject the good? What then? Such a view of the God-world relation leaves us to question
whether final justice will ever come about. Will the world’s wrongs ever be put to rights? We
might think that some eternal principle, such as karma, may bring about final justice for
atrocities performed by people. But how can a principle or force bring about justice? A force or
principle has no intentions nor does it have any intelligence.100 But moreover, the notion of final
justice could only be the case if there is such a thing as an afterlife. Levine, however, rejects both
personal immortality and the hope for an afterlife. It is hard to see, then, how final justice can
ever be fully brought about in such world.
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Concluding Matters
In the last two chapters I sought to accomplish two tasks. First, I sought to set out a
methodology for comparing how metaphysical systems explain the phenomenon of evil in the
world. Moreover, I sought to do so without assuming a particularly theistic understanding of evil,
but one that could be accepted by most everyone. Second, I then considered how well naturalism
and pantheism answered the question of evil in the world based on their own metaphysical
assumptions. I will hold off on comparing them until Chapter Six. Let us now consider in the
next two chapters panentheism and theism.
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CHAPTER 4: METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND EVIL PART 3
PROCESS PANENTHISM

Introduction
In the previous two chapters I began by comparing how well naturalism and pantheism
explain the phenomenon of evil in the world. In the next two chapters I continue the comparative
approach by giving consideration to panentheism and theism as possible candidates. Given that,
like pantheism, there are a broad variety of panentheists—even among many Christians—I will
focus attention primarily on Process panentheism. Having surveyed panentheism and theism as
possible hypotheses for explaining the phenomenon of evil in the world, I will then compare
those theories with the results from the previous chapters. Compared to the other systems, I
argue that theism provides not only a better explanation for the phenomenon of evil in the world,
but it also provides a more robust and overall thicker worldview response. Lastly, I consider the
limitations of generic theism and argue that in order to provide a robust answer to the problem of
evil, one must move from restricted theism to expanded theism, particularly Christian theism.
There is good reason to make this move, especially as one considers the Christian doctrine of the
Trinity. As I will argue, generic theism is lacking in explaining how God can be essentially
loving—a requirement for being essentially good—and yet a necessary eternal being.

Defining Panentheism
Like naturalism or pantheism, panentheism comes in many stripes and flavors. In its
basic sense, the word ‘panentheism’ means something like “all-is-God-ism”1 or that the world is
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in God. On the one hand, like pantheism, the entirety of the world is (in some sense) in God, but
God has an identity and unity all His own. Yet, unlike pantheism, this unity is not identical with
all of God’s finite parts.2 In this way, panentheism resembles theism in that God (in some sense)
transcends the world.
The operative feature of how one understands panentheism lies in what one means by the
word “in.” In a helpful typology, Niels Henrik Gregersen provides three possible forms of
panentheism: “soteriological panentheism,” “expressivist panentheism,” and “dipolar
panentheism.”3 Soteriological panentheism recognizes the “world’s being ‘in God’”4 is a gift and
by the redeeming grace of God, and it is not something that is automatic. Moreover, not
everything shares in God’s divine life, for example, sin and evil have no place in it. God
becomes “all in all” (1 Cor 15:28) at the eschatological redemption and culmination of creation
(Rom 8:18-21). On the other hand, expressivist panentheism is a form that follows Hegelian
thought, in that the Spirit moves out from God into the processes of world history, only to
eventually return back to God. Lastly, dipolar panentheism holds that God has two poles, one
that is infinite, eternal, unchanging, and abstract while the other is finite, temporal, relative, and
concrete. Gregersen identifies the process thought of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles
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Hartshorne, along with most other American process philosophers and theologians, with this
latter form of panentheism.5
Gregersen makes some further distinctions. He begins by qualifying what he means by
generic panentheism. There are two basic features: 1) God contains the world and the world is
(in some sense) in God; yet, God is also greater than the world; and 2) there are bilateral
relations between the world and God, though the world is a creature and returns to God (again, in
some sense). Regarding this latter point, the world affects God just as much as God affects the
world. Having laid out his understanding of generic panentheism, Gregersen differentiates
between what he calls “Strict (Dipolar) Panentheism” (henceforth SP) and “Qualified (Christian)
Panentheism” (henceforth QP). SP has two basic features. First, analogous to how a soul must
have a body, God, too, must have a world. It does not have to be this world. It could be any
number of worlds—but God must coexist with a world in order to become fully actualized.
Second, God and the world coexist and codetermine one another by metaphysical necessity. Not
only does God influence the world but all temporal experiences become part of God’s nature. By
necessity the world participates in divine life. QP differs from SP in that God could exist apart
from the world. The soul and body analogy functions as a helpful metaphor to show divine
immanence, but it does not require metaphysical necessity as does SP. Yet, QP, like SP,
recognizes that once God has created the world, which is an act of divine grace, the world
codetermines God, “so that temporal events may influence God and creatures share in the life of
God; all that is redeemed participates in divine life.”6 Both SP and QP differ from classical
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theism in that the relationship between the world and God is unilateral. While God affects the
world, the world in no way affects God. As Gregersen spells it out:
The real difference, according to Thomas, is that the natures and activities of the creatures
do not have a real feedback effect on God. There is, in other words, no return from the world
into God. As pure activity (actus purus), God is the eternal realization of all positive
predicates. Accordingly there is nothing God can “learn” in relation to the creatures, no
“challenges” to be met, no free acts to “wait for.” The world is utterly dependent on God for
its existence while the world cannot really affect the being or mind of God (Summa
Theologia 1.28.a.1). In short, Thomas rejects not the first but only the second tenet of
generic panentheism, as defined above.7
It is this aspect of God’s real relatedness to the world that panentheists have criticized classical
theism of rejecting and which sets them apart.8
Besides God’s real relatedness to the world, there are several other reasons that
panentheists gravitate to such a view on the God-world relation. Process philosopher and
panentheist David Ray Griffin finds atheistic naturalism inadequate. For instance, atheistic
naturalism, which equates the mind with the brain, cannot account for how the brain makes sense
of human experience, since matter itself is devoid of any such experience. Moreover, it cannot
account for the universal acceptance of religious experience, nor can it account for human
freedom.9 Griffin further points out that atheistic naturalism cannot explain “the apparent
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objectivity of mathematics and logic,” nor “the order of the universe.”10 Phillip Clayton lists a
variety of reasons some have accepted panentheism as a viable option, especially when
compared to theism: 1) Panentheism may be more fulfilling than traditional theism; 2)
panentheism is more compatible than traditional theism with recent findings in science; 3)
panentheism does a better job of making sense of certain religious beliefs, such as divine action;
4) panentheism provides a mediating metaphysical position between eastern and western
philosophy; 5) panentheism avoids certain objections to the problem of evil, which is a burden
for traditional theism; and 6) classical theism has certain ethical and political implications not
shared by panentheism.11
John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Ray Griffin, in their book, Process Theology, provide
additional reasons for rejecting traditional theism over process panentheism. Process
panentheism rejects any notion of a God who controls all things, who is a cosmic moralist, who
is unchanging and passionless, and male—all of which, according to the authors, is the classical
theistic perspective of God.12 When the authors speak of God controlling all things, they mean
that all events and all details within the world are determined by God. They also deny that God is
immutable as understood by classical theists. They have in mind Thomas Aquinas’
understanding of God as being “altogether immutable,” which he develops from his
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understanding of God as actus purus. 13 It follows that if God is immutable then God is
impassible, that is to say, God does not suffer in any sense—He is passionless. Their rejection of
God as a cosmic moralist has to do with the denial of an understanding of God as a lawgiver and
judge who has arbitrarily set laws in place. Such an understanding to the authors is a worst case
scenario. They also reject the notion that God’s primary concern for His creatures is that they
have certain moral attitudes. This, they think, is a secondary issue for humans, which, if such a
position were true, would have God making it a primary one. Lastly, God as male paints a
portrait of God as “sexually one-sided.”14
Having observed some major distinctions between panentheists and having given some
reasons as to why panentheists gravitate toward their understanding of the God-world relation, I
will now spell out the kind of panentheism that will be considered in this chapter. Here I want to
focus more on the SP and dipolar (and perhaps the expresivist) forms of panentheism
distinguished by Gregersen above. QP, while a form of panentheism, boarders closely to theism,
and especially the kind of theism that I am going to consider in Chapter Five.15 As specified, QP
does not require that God create a world. In this case, God is metaphysically primary, which is
similar to classical theism. The key qualifying difference between QP and classical theism is that
God, for QP, is really affected by His creatures and that the creatures, in some sense,
codetermine God, though Gregersen is unclear on what he means by “codetermine.” Theism can
sympathize with such a view, given that many modern theists have rejected the classical theistic
teaching that God is immutable in the absolute sense and, hence, not altogether impassible as
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theists such as Thomas Aquinas believed. But it may be argued, as many theists have done, one
can avoid panentheism by adopting something like theological essentialism, which I will
consider more extensively in Chapter Five. For now, we shall consider the philosophical and
theological process thought of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.

Alfred North Whitehead
Perhaps no thinker in twentieth century has done more to bring back metaphysics as a
respectable enterprise within theological circles than Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947).
Philosopher Stephen T. Davis has suggested that “Whitehead’s philosophical system is one of
the most brilliant intellectual accomplishments of the twentieth century.”16 He is one of the first
thinkers to formulate a systematic process philosophy,17 which is most fully represented in his
magnum opus, Process and Reality.18

Primary Categories
As with all process thought, central is the notion that everything that is “actual” is in
process. Whitehead calls his own system a “philosophy of organism”19 and Victor Lowe
expresses it in the following way: “Whitehead’s amazing philosophical achievement is the
construction of a system of the world according to which the basic fact of existence is
everywhere some process of self-realization, growing out of previous processes and itself adding
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a new pulse of individuality and a new value to the world.”20 Lowe further describes
Whitehead’s system as “pluralistic.”21 The reason for this has to do with Whitehead’s rejection
of the view that there is only one individual who is “ultimate.”22
Fundamental to Whitehead’s “philosophy of organism” is the postulation that
“creativity,” the “many,” and the “one” make up the “Ultimate.”23 This stands in stark contrast to
classical theism, which understands God as ultimate and all other entities that exist as contingent
and owing their existence to God. Moreover, the classical theistic understanding of God holds
that God is eternal, immutable, and impassible. God is not affected by anything outside of
Himself. This is not the case with Whitehead’s view, however.
In working out his speculative philosophy, Whitehead employed a variety of new terms
and concepts to articulate the contours of his overall system. There are three primary terms that
are critical for understanding Whitehead’s philosophy: “actual entities,” “prehension,” and
“creativity.”24 Actual entities, or “actual occasions” as they are sometimes called, refer to “the
final real things of which the world is made up.”25 Whitehead did not think that one can go
behind actual entities. All are uniquely different and are considered to be “drops of experience”;
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nevertheless, they are “interdependent.”26 He viewed actual entities as the ‘“cells’ of the
universe.”27 Lowe describes Whitehead’s notion of actual entities in the following way:
Each pulse of existence—Whitehead calls them “actual entities”—requires the antecedent
others as its constituents, yet achieves individuality as a unique, finite synthesis; and when
its growth is completed, stays in the universe as one of the infinite number of settled facts
from which the individuals of the future will arise.28
Thus unlike philosophical systems that stress “being” over “becoming,” actual entities do not
have sustained permanence over time. Each actual entity is, in the words of Charles Hartshorne,
“a momentary state or single instance of process or becoming.”29 But becoming does not have to
do so much with change, for actual entities are unchanging. Rather, becoming has more to do
with “addition” and not “subtraction.”30
According to Whitehead, each experience is not independent, but interrelated, dependent,
and inseparable from other experiences. Each momentary experience (actual occasion) is related
to previous experiences. He refers to such a relation as a “prehension.”31 As John Cobb and
David Griffin suggest in regards to prehensions: “The present occasion ‘prehends’ or ‘feels’ the
previous occasions. The present occasion is nothing but its process of unifying the particular
prehensions with which it begins.”32 The entire process of the unification of experience is known
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as “concrescence.”33 There are two aspects to every prehension, the first is the “objective
datum,” which has to do primarily with the “content” of the prehension, whereas the second, the
“subjective form,” refers to the thing that has been felt, and how it has been felt.34 Griffin gives
an analogy of how the two might occur. Say, for example, that a person sees a big dog walking
down the street; the “objective datum” is found in the content of the prehension. In this case, it
refers to the big dog as appearing to the person (the experience). The “subjective form,”
however, refers to the kind of emotion that is produced by the datum.35
Another important feature of Whitehead’s thought is “creativity.” It is for Whitehead the
central metaphysical principle of the universe—“the universal of universals.”36 Whitehead goes
on to say that “[i]t is the ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe
disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively.”37 According
to Hartshorne, creativity is Whitehead’s
“intuition” . . . of the act of existing. That this is not a single substance or a mere attribute
seems clear. It is not God, because each creature exists by its own act of existing, dependent
to be sure upon antecedent acts, including the antecedent actions of deity. But finally each
actuality exists by its own self-activity: it is creative, however trivially, of new
determinateness, thereby enriching reality as previously there, including divine reality as
previously there.38
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Thus, in some sense, because all that is actual is in process, including God, and because all that is
actual is interrelated and interdependent, creatures “enrich” or “enhance” and “contribute” to the
“divine life.”39 Moreover, because each actual entity is in the process of becoming, and because
such self-creation is necessary and not contingent—a fundamental aspect of reality—this raises
several implications about God and the God-world relation. If all actual entities possess the
ability of self-creation, necessarily, then such is, as Griffin says, “beyond all volition, even
God’s.”40

God and the World
As noted throughout, Whitehead rejects the Aristotelian view of God simply as the
“unmoved mover” that has pervaded classical Christian thought. God does not stand over and
against the world. Moreover, He did not create the world out of nothing, nor is God “before all
creation”; rather, God is “with all creation.”41 In Whitehead’s view, God is no exception to
metaphysical principles; “He is their chief exemplification.”42 Thus God and the world are
intricately connected. Not only does God affect the world, but the world affects God.
Whitehead understands God as having two poles which make up His essential nature. In
other words, God’s nature is “dipolar.”43 The first pole he calls the “primordial” pole. The
primordial pole of God is infinite and unlimited in regards to potentiality. Moreover, it is
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impersonal and “conceptual.”44 In regards to the primordial side of God’s nature, Whitehead
makes the following comment:
One side of God’s nature is constituted by his conceptual experience. This experience is the
primordial fact in the world, limited by no actuality which it presupposes. It is therefore
infinite, devoid of all negative prehensions. This side of his nature is free, complete,
primordial, eternal, actually deficient, and unconscious.45
God’s second pole, the “consequent” pole, is “personal,” “conscious,” and concrete. It “is the
realization of the actual world in the unity of his nature, and through the transformation of his
wisdom.”46 This side of God’s nature, says Whitehead, “originates with physical experience
derived from the temporal world, and then requires integration with the primordial side. It is
determined, incomplete, consequent, ‘everlasting,’ fully actual, and conscious.”47
For Whitehead, God is not the all-powerful sovereign who reigns over creation. His
power is not unlimited “controlling” omnipotence, but, rather, it is “persuasive.” The reason for
this has to do, not so much with a moral issue, or whether or not God limits His power, but
because it is impossible for God. On this point Griffin explains: “God does not refrain from
controlling the creatures simply because it is better for God to use persuasion, but because it is
necessarily the case that God cannot completely control the creatures.”48
Whitehead rejected Aristotle’s notion that God could not be aware of the world. Instead,
in his view, God knows and loves His creatures intimately. For God to be “moved” by His
creatures, demonstrates God’s ability to sympathize with them, or, in other words, to “love”
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them. Love is God’s chief attribute. Whitehead criticized Aquinas on this point. In the Thomistic
view, any relation that takes place between God and His creatures is only a real relation for the
creature, not for God. God is not affected by the creature. For Whitehead, only a God that can
sympathize with His creatures is a God worthy of worship.49
Because God’s primary means of interacting with the world is through persuasion, He
provides each actual entity with an “initial aim.”50 In providing the initial aim, God’s purpose is
that the subject will choose through the occasion the best option. However, whatever actualizes
is up to the subject. That which the subject chooses becomes the “subjective aim.”51 Cobb and
Griffin provide a helpful explanation of the outcome of God’s work in Creation:
The subject may choose to actualize the initial aim; but it may also choose from among the
other real possibilities open to it, given its context. In other words, God seeks to persuade
each occasion toward the possibility for its own existence which would be best for it; but
God cannot control the finite occasion’s self-actualization. Accordingly, the divine creative
activity involves risk. The obvious point is that, since God is not in complete control of the
events of the world, the occurrence of genuine evil is not incompatible with God’s
beneficence toward all his creatures.52
Thus the ultimate outcome for the shape of the world is not up to God, so to speak, but up to God
and the world, since each actual entity has within it the capability of self-creation and selfactualization.

Charles Hartshorne
Having examined several of the core categories and tenets of Whitehead’s philosophy, it
is now possible to examine and explicate more clearly the process theology of Charles
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Hartshorne. One central feature of Hartshorne’s system is his attack on classical Christian
theism. Like Whitehead before him, Hartshorne rejects many of the core tenets of classical
Christian theism. Hartshorne works out his own system by recognizing the inadequacies of the
classical Christian view while embracing the process metaphysics espoused by Whitehead. In
what follows, an examination of Hartshorne’s critique of classical Christian theology will be
considered, along with an examination of Hartshorne’s own conception of God.

Critique of Classical Theism
Too often, says Hartshorne, philosophers and theologians in the West have stressed
“being” over “becoming.” Greek philosophy often depreciated “becoming” and placed emphasis
on “being.” This is true of Aristotle who argued that God is the “unmoved mover.” Because of
Aristotle’s emphasis on the notion of God as immutable, he rejected that God could have any
real knowledge of a changing world. Christian theologians, especially during the Middle Ages,
adopted the Aristotelian understanding of the immutable and impassible God. Christian theists,
however, argues Hartshorne, are not willing to let go of the notion that God is aware of what is
happening within a changing world. This prima facie seems to be contradictory.53
This notion of immutability is also carried over to a view of God’s omniscience. On this point
Hartshorne says,
And indeed, immutable omniscience, implying the immutability of all truth, consorts ill with
the view that becoming is real. If there is novel reality, then to that extent the truth also must
be novel. To say of future events that they “are going to be” is to imply that their entire
character is a present fact, though a fact which, with our human limitations, we have not yet
reached. But there the fact is, waiting for us to reach it, or there it is offstage, waiting to
come on. In this view, genuine becoming is missing. The truth, the reality, is eternally there,
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spread out to the divine gaze, though our present experience, being localized in the eternal
panorama, cannot behold most of it.”54
If such a conception of immutable omniscience is the case, then it is hard to see how anything
can truly have freedom, even God Himself. “Whatever God is, that he could not fail to be: hence
if God is the decider who wills ‘let there be such and such a world,’ he could not have failed to
be that very decider. Wherein is the freedom?”55 Moreover, such a conception seems to make
God religiously unavailable to His creatures. Hartshorne believes that worship of “the infinity of
God’s power” is “idolatry.”56 This is a charge that he often brings against classical theists.

The Concept of God
What of Hartshorne’s own concept of God? In order to form a more adequate concept of
God and the God-world relation, Hartshorne lists five principles that must be in place. First, such
a philosophy must not place “being” over “becoming.” Second, such a philosophy must avoid the
notion that all of existence is contingent, since there are things that exist that clearly do not
depend on other things for their existence, namely mathematics and logic. Third, indeterminism
must be an aspect to such a view. Fourth, within such a theistic system, other subjects other than
God must share in creation. Fifth, such a system must emphasize relations that take place both
internally and externally, as emphasized on Whitehead’s theory of prehensions.57 Hartshorne
calls his own view “Neoclassical theism.” The reason for this is that for Hartshorne, the God of
PT is not merely “infinite” and “absolute,” nor is He the “uncaused cause”; rather,
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God is not on one side only of categorical contrasts; he is not merely infinite or merely
finite, merely absolute or merely relative, merely cause or merely effect, merely agent or
merely patient, merely actual or merely potential, but in all cases both, each in suitable
respects or aspects of his living reality, and in such a manner as to make him unsurpassable
by another. He is even both joy and sorry, both happiness and sympathetic participation in
our griefs.58
He does reject the notion, however, that God is both “goodness and wickedness.”59 Thus in his
Neoclassical theistic view, Hartshorne seeks to hold on to certain aspects of traditional theism,
while rejecting those aspects which go against any process or becoming in God. Like Whitehead,
Hartshorne’s conception of God is dipolar. This is the crux of his philosophical and theological
system.60 Hartshorne sees the importance of holding to the two aspects of God’s nature, which
includes “both sides of the metaphysical contraries.”61 It is not enough, merely to hold to one
aspect or the other; rather, it is important to emphasize that, even though there is contingency
within God, He is a perfect being. But Hartshorne does not mean perfection in the same way that
classical Christian theologians do. Traditionally, it has been thought that a perfect being cannot
grow in greatness nor can such a being decrease in metaphysical stature. However, according to
Hartshorne, God does not need to be “absolute”; rather, it is conceivable to think of a perfect
being that, while He cannot decrease in metaphysical value, He can, nevertheless attain and grow
in greatness. It is conceivable to think that God is, in this regards, the most perfect being.62
Hartshorne calls this dual aspect in God’s nature the “principle of dual transcendence.”63 By this
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he means that “God is, in uniquely excellent ways, both necessary and contingent, both infinite
and finite, independent and dependent, eternal and temporal.”64
Some have charged Hartshorne’s notion of the principle of dual transcendence with
contradiction. How can something have two contradictory aspects together at the same time? For
example, how is it possible that God is both timeless and temporal? Moreover, how can
something be unchanging and yet change. Hartshorne believes he escapes this charge by arguing
that someone or something can change in some respects but not in others.65 He goes on to say,
The world may be finite spatially and infinite temporally. God may be immutable in his
ultimate purpose but adopt new specific objectives in response to new acts by the creatures.
He may exist necessarily so far as his essence is concerned but contingently so far as
inessential qualities are in question. The two aspects are not on the same ontological level;
for the essence or ultimate purpose is abstract and the specific aims concrete. And we can
appeal to the Aristotelian principle that the abstract is real in the concrete. God may have
infinite potentialities but finite actuality. Potentialities are abstractions, only the actual is
concrete. Moreover, it is possibilities that are infinite; actuality is always a decision among
possibilities, excluding some from realization. Any possible state of the world would be
content of God’s knowledge if it were actual, but not even God can contradictorily enjoy all
possible world states as actual for there are mutually incompossible ones. Even the supreme
artist must have something undone. Moreover, his creatures so far as free must do so also,
and what they exclude is excluded even for God. God would have had me as doer of some
deed I might have performed, but since I did not perform it he now can never have that
possible me.66
Thus God is, on one hand, the “simplest,” while on the other, “the most complex.”67
By speaking of God in such a way, so as to stress both aspects of His nature, one can
truly say that “God is love.”68 In order to love, one must have the capacity to rejoice and to
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sorrow with others, which entails that one have the capacity to be influenced by others. Such is
not the case with the classical conception of God.

Process Panentheism and Evil
Having examined the process thought of Whitehead and Hartshorne, how are we to think
of the panentheism of process thought (henceforth PPT) and evil? Following the format in the
previous chapters, four areas that be considered: life, consciousness, the metaphysics of good and
evil, and human responsibility.

Process Panentheism and Life
After all, if PPT is to explain evil, it must also explain life—given that evil has to do with
the existence of sentient creatures who experience pain and suffering in the world. But, in order
to explain life, a metaphysical system must also be able to explain the existence and nature of the
universe.
When it comes to the nature of the universe, Process theologians reject creation ex nihilo,
opting for something more like the Platonic view that God created the world out of already preexisting matter (ex materia).69 In a helpful passage, David Ray Griffin provides a look at God’s
relationship to the world and the Process view of creation:
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According to process panentheism, God is essentially soul of the universe. Although God is
distinct from the universe, God’s relation to it belongs to the divine essence. This does not
mean, however, that our particular universe—with its electrons, inverse square law, and
Plank’s constant—exists necessarily. This universe was divinely created, evidently about 15
billion years ago. It was even created out of “no-thing” in the sense that, prior to the
creation, there were no enduring individuals sustaining a character through time (such as
quarks and photons), which is what is usually meant by “things.” With Berdyaev, therefore,
we can say that it was created out of relative nothingness. This relative nothingness was a
chaos of events, each of which embodied some modicum of “creativity,” which is the
twofold power to exert self-determination and then efficient causation on subsequent events.
Each event in this chaos, therefore, influenced future events after being influenced by prior
events, so that the creation of our universe was not the beginning of temporal relations and
hence of time. It was, however, the beginning of the particular contingent form of order that
physicists have been progressively discovering. Our universe began when God got this order
instantiated in what had previously been a chaotic situation consisting of extremely brief,
trivial, random happenings in which no significant values could be realized.70
It would seem, here, that Griffin has quite a few things going on that need unpacking.
First, like Whitehead, Griffin recognizes that God has a significant role in the formation
of the universe, much like the Platonic Demiurge. For Plato, the Demiurge infuses chaotic matter
with form.71 In that light only can He be called “Creator.” In much the same way, God, for
process thinkers, gets the whole process of our current universe going. God is not primary. God
is neither the source of the universe’s being nor is God the source of the built-in self-creativity
that makes up the underlying structure of the universe. But what is this self-creativity and why is
it the primary metaphysical principle (or, at least, one of the primary metaphysical principles)?
Furthermore, why think that the PPT view of the universe, along with its metaphysical
underpinnings, is the correct one?
As we have seen, self-creativity is a central feature of Whitehead’s metaphysics—
something that all process thinkers hold common in their view of the God-world relationship.
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Unlike theism, PPT recognizes that God’s modus operandi of activity in the world is, indeed, one
of persuasive activity rather than controlling activity. Some theists also embrace the notion of
persuasive over controlling activity; however, the theistic view is different in that God does this
out of God’s self-limitation. The reason is moral in nature. For defenders of PPT, on the other
hand, the reason for God’s persuasive activity in the world is metaphysical. In other words, God
has no power to control—only the power to persuade. It is a matter of necessity that God cannot
control anything outside of God’s self.72
The metaphysical category behind this necessity that we are now here concerned with is,
as we saw earlier, what Whitehead calls the “ultimate,” and, as noted, the ultimate involves three
elements: “creativity,” “many,” and “one.” According to Griffin,
‘Creativity’ (by which the many become one and are increased by one) is a universal feature
of actuality. It is inherent in actuality (AI 230). This does not mean that creatures derive their
creative power from themselves, or that they are not dependent upon God for their existence.
But it does mean that to be an actuality is to exercise creativity and that there is necessarily a
realm of finite actualities with creativity of their own.73
But this notion of the ultimate is precisely one of the peculiarities of this view. I would agree
with Stephen Davis on this point that Process ontology raises some troubling difficulties. For
Whitehead and other PT thinkers, there are no enduring substances; rather, what we have is
something more like enduring events. Events consist of real changes in a thing, or, at least,
relational changes between things. As Davis notes, this stands in contrast to the Aristotelian
view, adopted by classical Christian theists (we will follow Davis in calling this Aristotelian
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ontology), whereby a thing is said to be “an enduring object with properties, relations, and an
identity apart from other things.”74
Defenders of PPT are wont to reject any hint of Aristotelian ontology by denying that
entities have substances altogether. But denying substances is difficult to do, even if something
like actual occasions are true. Davis suggests that there are at least two reasons to think that
process thinkers do not escape Aristotelian ontology. First, if these events endure for any finite
amount of time, then such are, indeed, substances by virtue of being enduring property bearers.
To say that these events do not endure would lead us to think that they are nothing more than
mere limits or boundaries, much like Euclidian points. But why think boundaries can do things
like create or consist within reality? Second, if Aristotle was correct in thinking that a substance
persists through time, one can explain what a thing is without an event. However, the opposite is
not true. We cannot explain events without reference to or presupposing things. In other words,
things are individuated by their properties and relations; whereas events are individuated by
things. A thing can exist without an event. After all, we can imagine a possible world whereby
only immutable objects exist. Yet, it is difficult for us to imagine some event taking place apart
from some entity. Substances, then, are ontologically superior to events.75 If Davis’s arguments
are correct (and I believe that they are), then we cannot do without substances. But even the
more, this would cripple Whitehead’s view that creativity lies behind the basic structure of
reality, since events are not ontologically prior.
There is yet another difficulty that we run up against in Process metaphysics—a difficulty
that, as we saw in the previous chapter, pantheists, too, run up against. If God is not the primary
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organizing source in the universe, as important as God is to the process system of thought, then
what is? How can we explain the unity? In the Whiteheadian view of things, we have God and
the multiplicity of others, all of which work together to make a tight unified overarching system.
But how is this the case? W. Norris Clarke argues that Whitehead falls prey to the same
difficulty that Plato faced. He explains it as follows:
If there is to be any ultimate source of unity in the universe at all—which is dubious, just as
it was for Plato—it seems to be pushed back beyond even God to an inscrutable, faceless,
amorphous force of creativity, which is just there, everywhere in the universe, as a primal
fact with no further explanation possible—a kind of generalized necessity of nature, with
striking similarities to the ancient Greek Ananke.76
But the problem is further complicated. Creativity is not an actuality in-and-of-itself, says
Clarke; rather, it is “a generalized abstract description of what is a matter of fact instantiated in
every actual occasion of the universe. Creativity seems to be an ultimate primordial many, with
no unifying source.”77 Clarke describes this as an “irreparable deficiency” that any “dualism” or
“multiplicity” faces when not grounded in the “prior unity of creative mind.”78 Further, if such
creativity does not find its source ultimately in God, from whence does it come? “[W]hy,” asks
Clarke, “does this creativity continue to spring forth endlessly and inexhaustibly, all over the
universe, in each new actual occasion, from no actually existing source?”79 It would seem as
though such bursts of individual self-creativity, which bring about each and every actual
occasion, emerges ex nihilo, since there is no prior source. Some friends of PPT bite the bullet
and recognize the difficulty, suggesting that if one were to grant this first step all else follows.
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Clarke (and most other theists) finds such an enigma too high a price to pay and metaphysically
untenable.80
Lastly, regarding panentheism and life, it seems that process panentheists run up against
the same problem of infinite regress that both naturalists and pantheists face. I will not rehearse
those issues here, but will only stress that one must face the complications implicit in positing an
infinite universe (or multiverse).81 Furthermore, in positing something like evolution behind the
PPT portrait of the emergence of sentient life (or biological life in general), it would seem that
process panentheists have, as we will consider below, a better theory behind the process of
evolution than, say, naturalists do (since there is, at least, something—God—giving each actual
occasion an initial direction or aim); however, as specified earlier, defenders of PPT will need to
sort out just what lies behind Whitehead’s notion of creativity. Until they are capable of doing
so, it would seem that defenders of PPT are at a metaphysical disadvantage for explaining life
within the universe.
In what follows, I will consider in more detail how evolutionary theory dovetails with the
process theory of consciousness. This will also setup a discussion on the process view of the
metaphysics of good and evil.

Process Panentheism and Consciousness
Keeping in line with our approach, any metaphysical system that attempts to explain evil
must also explain consciousness. How does PPT fare with respect to consciousness?
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Consciousness is grounded in experience; yet while consciousness presupposes
experience, experience itself is not consciousness.82 For defenders of PPT, then, there is no
separation between an entity and experience, nor is there any dualism between entities that
experience and entities that do not experience. There are, nevertheless, different levels of
experiences among entities. In order to see this, one must grasp the central role evolution plays in
PPT ontology, along with the key process concepts of “concrescence” and “transition,” which
are central to the process view of creativity.83
The evolutionary development of our world is a manifestation of God’s work and
creative purposes in the world.84 Whitehead called each stage of the evolutionary process of the
universe “cosmic epochs.” Central to each epoch is a particular form of order. God’s purpose in
bringing order out of the chaos is to evoke certain intensities among the occasions by means of
persuasion. God sends each actual occasion an “initial aim.” It is up to the occasion to accept or
reject the aim. Order is needed to maintain the intensity among the various occasions, thus God
seeks to bring about and maintain order through each initial aim, which occurs through God’s
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embody the two forms of creativity, the two types of power, inherent in each actual occasion. The process of
concrescence embodies the occasion’s power of self-determination, its power of final causation. Although the
present occasions is largely determined by the power of the past upon it, it is never thus completely determined.”
Griffin, God, Power and Evil, 277-278.
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persuasive power. Each stage of the evolutionary process is gradual, bringing more and more
order out of chaos.
Actual occasions, retaining the datum from prior prehensions, begin to form into
societies, beginning with the most primitive of forms, such as the proton, neutron, or electron, on
to the atom and molecule, and finally up to more complex enduring entities such as the cell. With
each advancement, enduring entities increase in intrinsic value. It should also be noted that each
actual occasion has its own “mental pole.” This does not mean that every occasion has some
form of thought or consciousness; rather, “mentality” refers to the occasion’s ability to receive
and respond to data from other actualities.85 In this case, then, PPT is a form of “panpsychism”
or, more specifically, “panexperientialism,” as Griffin calls it.86 As actual occasions become
more complex structured societies, they increase in intensity and beauty, and hence in intrinsic
value. The “soul” or “psyche” is not, however, something ontologically different from other
things; rather, “[i]t is simply a higher-level series of occasions of experience.”87 Given the
Process notion of panexperientialism, consciousness, then, is not so much a function of the brain;
rather, it is a function of experience.88 It is, in the words of Griffin, a “very high-level form of
experience, enjoyed by relatively few individuals.”89
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The Process understanding of consciousness, compared with, say, materialism, is quite
impressive and novel, to say the least. Yet, the panexperientialism of PPT is not without its
difficulties. It suffers from many of the same difficulties as its older cousin, panpsychism.90 We
shall now turn to some objections to panexperientialism?
One of the central issues of the Process view of panexperientialism is, as we have already
discussed, the problem with Whitehead’s metaphysics and ontology. It is not at all clear that
experience stands as the fundamental ontological structure of reality, and it is hard to think that
Process thinkers believe that it is experience all the way down, either. To show this, let us
consider a passage of Griffins where this comes out:
Each event . . . is experiential from beginning to end, which means that, in distinction from
usage reflecting dualism, the physical aspect of the event is not devoid of experience, hence
the mental aspect is not uniquely associated with experience. An event’s mentality is simply
its experience insofar as it is self-determining. Whitehead emphasizes the experiential nature
of unit-events by calling them “occasions of experience.”91
Griffin is considered to be one of the ablest Process thinkers alive today, and I believe that he has
explained the above concept as clearly as one might be able. Yet, even with such clarity it seems
that he cannot but help fall into what sounds like substance language. In order to speak of both
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“experience” and “event,” he must employ words like “physical aspect” or “mental aspect,” even
if it seems that he is equating the mental with experience itself. Nevertheless, he cannot but help
speak of the event or experience apart from that to which it is happening. Now, it would seem
absurd to think that the experience is experiencing itself. But perhaps that is what Griffin and
other Process thinkers have in mind. Either way, I find such a view difficult to accept on
metaphysical grounds.92 Even more, it seems that much of Whitehead’s rejection of substance
had to do with a Cartesian understanding of substance, and not the classical notion, which
understood substance, in the words of W. Norris Clark, “as active nature imbedded in a network
of relations resulting from its acting and being acted on.”93 Lastly, there are problems, as we
have seen, with thinking that creativity is the primary metaphysical principle behind the fourdimensional space-time universe.
Even if one were to grant the Process metaphysical and ontological understanding of
reality (which I am unwilling to do), there is a further problem with panpsychism/
panexperientialism—a problem philosopher J. P. Moreland calls “the Combination Problem”
(henceforth CP).94 Moreland states CP in the following way:
There are different ways of stating the problem. For example, if each particle of matter has
its own unified point of view, how do they combine to form the same sort of unity when
they interact to form larger wholes, a unity that appears to be unanalyzable and primitive?
How do low-order experiences of ultimate atomic simples combine to form a single, unified
field of consciousness or a unified self in larger wholes? Some panpsychists hold that all
92
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composed objects above the level of atomic simples have their own unified consciousness
while others distinguish mere mereological aggregates without such a unity from “true
individuals” that have it. Those who make such a distinction face two additional problems:
How does one characterize the difference between the two? How could “true individuals”
arise from processes that are combinatorial?95
Moreland’s understanding of CP is largely set against the backdrop of panpsychism, but it seems
that he has something like PPT’s panexperientialism in mind, especially with respect to the
Process distinction between aggregates and “true” or “genuine” individuals. How might we
formulate CP specifically to PPT? Following Moreland here, it seems that there are three unique
questions that the defender of PPT will need to face regarding what we will call the
“panexperientialist combination problem” (henceforth PECP).
(1) How is it that actual occasions combine to form into larger societies?
(2) How do we draw the line between “aggregates” and “genuine individuals”?
(3) How could “genuine individuals” arise from such combinatorial processes?
Having stated PECP, I will begin with (2) and then take (1) and (3) together, since the answer to
(3) anticipates both (1) and (2).
Regarding (2), Griffin makes a distinction between mere “aggregates” and “genuine
individuals.” There are two kinds of genuine individuals—“simple” and “compound.” What is it,
however, that qualifies some entity a genuine individual? We have such things as animals,
human beings, single-celled organisms, viruses, molecules, and atoms, which all qualify as
genuine individuals. There are, however, certain qualities, that if an entity lacks them, then it
would not be counted as a genuine individual. For example, some items, such as ceramic cups,
safety pins, and pencils all lack “natural bodies” and an “evolutionary history,” and these would
not be counted as genuine individuals. Rocks would be disqualified by the fact that, as an
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aggregate, they have no overarching “organizing structure.” Trees, too, would not be considered
as genuine individuals, since they have structures that serve to merely “transport nutrients to
their constituent cells.”96 A central feature, then, that distinguishes genuine individuals from
aggregate individuals is in how those individuals can be organized. A rock, says Griffin, has no
experience of its own, and hence no power for response to its surrounding community; rather, the
highest level of experience is found in the billions of molecules that are found within it. The
organization into “aggregational societies” and “compound individuals” leads Griffin to call his
own position “panexperientialism with organizational duality.”97
Given this, certain criteria distinguish between aggregates and genuine compound
individuals. Whether this is adequate or not must be left up to the reader. But what of (1) and
(3)? In order to get at (3) we will need to consider (1), which is the central question of PECP, and
to which we now turn.
In Unsnarling the World Knot, Griffin makes an attempt at answering CP. He begins by
giving consideration to William James’s version of CP in his Principles of Psychology. James’s
argument goes as follows:
Where the elemental units are supposed to be feelings, the case is in no wise altered. Take a
hundred of them, shuffle them and pack them as close together as you can (whatever that
may mean); still each remains the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin,
windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There would be a hundredand-first feeling there, if, when a group or series of such feelings were set up, a
consciousness belonging to the group as such should emerge. And the 101st feeling would
be a totally new fact; the 100 original feelings might by curious physical law, be a signal for
its creation, when they came together; but they would have no substantial identity with it,
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nor it with them, and one could never deduce the one from the others, or (in any intelligible
sense) say that they evolved it.98
Here, Griffin suggests that James’s argument was pointed at a particular type of “compounding,”
one that does not touch his own Whiteheadian-Hartshornean view of compound individuals. The
intended target was a form of “pantheistic idealism,” which suggests that the emergence of the
collective experience is in some way logically identical to the individuated experiences of the
group. “James’s point,” suggests Griffin, “was that the more inclusive experience is a new
experience, numerically distinct from the more limited experiences it includes.”99 Griffin
continues, “James’s argument, then, counts only against the identist form of panpsychism,
according to which our unified conscious experience is supposed to be strictly (numerically)
identical with the much more restricted experiences of the billions of neurons in the brain.”100
Griffin would agree that such a view is unwarranted and “logically self-contradictory.”101 On the
Whiteheadian/Hartshornean view, rather than saying that the many are one, it would be more
accurate to say that the many become one, while also increasing by one. It is through his
acceptance of the “subjective” and “objective” modes of the existence of each occasion that,
Griffin believes, Whitehead avoids the self-contradiction. Take, for example, neuronic
experiences. When such occasions occur simultaneously, in their subjective mode they are many,
but in their objective mode, they are the “many becoming one.”102
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Despite Griffin’s response, it seems that the fundamental difficulty of the Process notion
of consciousness still runs up against CP, though the problem is not quite how Griffin has spelled
it out; rather, the problem is one of the continual subsistence of such combinatorial states. Let us
call this the “panexperientialist continual combination problem” (henceforth PECCP). To see
this, it is important to briefly rehearse how Process thinkers understand God’s role in the whole
ordeal.
God seeks to woo the various occasions into some directed aim, which I would take it to
be how PPT would explain (3). Given that each occasion has its own level of freedom to accept
or to reject God’s initial aim, then, metaphysically speaking, neither God nor anyone else can
cause them to do otherwise. This, it would seem, requires quite a bit of cooperation between the
various occasions as they form into societies, especially as this process has been going on since
the original chaotic state. But why do these various occasions move toward societies? Why
cooperate in the first place (in whatever capacity they can)? What keeps them together?
Furthermore, what keeps the whole ordeal from stopping and going back on itself? Perhaps the
defender of PPT will want to say that it is God who keeps the whole thing going by repeatedly
sending out initial aims. Given the sheer amount of occasions within the cosmos (and, perhaps,
beyond), how is it, one wonders, that God keeps up with it all (especially since God is part of the
mix)? Despite God’s intimate awareness of each genuine entity (whether “simple” or
“compound”) and God’s ability to send initial aims, seemingly, at instantaneous speed—all the
while providing the direction of the world through each initial aim—God can do nothing about
whether occasions will follow suit. There is, however, another issue. These occasions are to
make less than split second decisions. The decision making of occasions are meant to simulate
something similar to how people make decisions. But the way occasions make decisions are not
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always how people do. When humans make decisions, it often takes time and much thought.
There are instances where a person will have to make a split-second decision, but that is not
always the case. Yet, that is how it is for these occasions in every instance. There seems to be
something of a paradox involved, as Hasker explains:
Now even the simplest actions take more than a tenth of a second or so during which the
‘actual occasions’ are supposed to endure; furthermore, humans are capable of forming and
carrying out plans over periods lasting weeks, months, or years. Clearly, the process of
‘concrescence,’ in which the occasions selects its ‘subjective aim’ and is guided thereby in
the way it incorporates past experiences into the present, is modeled on the process of
decision making by actual persons as it is empirically observed. Yet the frame for an actual
occasion (which is never actually specified but can hardly be more than a small fraction of a
second) is far too brief for any meaningful decision making to occur.103
The novelty of the PPT view on consciousness does not seem to outweigh the difficulties that the
defender of such a view must take with respect to God’s role in sending out such initial aims and
the even bigger difficulty that the occasions must make such split-second decisions, while
maintaining unity within the various genuine societies, especially those which are of greater
complexity, such as the human soul. This, I take, to be the first leg of PECCP. The second leg
has to do with the nature of consciousness itself as an emergent property, to which I now turn.
“Consciousness” or “mind” or “soul” for Process thinkers remains, nevertheless, an
emergent feature, or, at least, a “true individual,” especially since it is grounded in prehensions
of a multiplicity of prior occasions. If consciousness is a society in-and-of-itself, then the
defender of PPT runs up against another problem. Moreland argues: “if an emergent property is
depicted as contingently linked to the base properties causing it to emerge, then apart from an
appeal to God’s contingent choice that things be so and to God’s stable intention that they
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continue to be so, there will be no explanation for the link or its constancy.”104 But this applies
equally to CP, as Moreland further explains:
If a sui generis emergent property or a new “true individual” is acknowledged and its
appearance is correlated with a certain set of circumstances formed by combinatorial
processes acting on myriads and myriads of subvenient entities, then apart from an appeal to
God’s contingent choice that things be so and to God’s stable intention that they continue to
be so, there will be no explanation—naturalistic, panpsychist, or otherwise—for its
appearance or constancy.105
Here, I think, is the key weakness of the panpsychist/panexperientialist view of consciousness,
which is the second leg of PECCP. But it is also a key weakness of process ontology in general.
There is nothing that requires or causes the various societies—aggregational or genuine—to
persist. As we saw, God, according to PPT, does not do this, nor could God ever do this. It is
metaphysically impossible for God to do so. It is doubtful that something else lies behind the
structure. Creativity is a central feature of PPT, but it is more of a description of what is taking
place within the universe at all times, rather than functioning as some kind of force (as one
might see in pantheism) that controls, causes, or even sustains all things within existence.
PPT, by postulating panexperientialism is, it would seem, one-up on reductionisitic
materialism for explaining consciousness, since the notion of “mental” is already a metaphysical
fact of the universe. It avoids the complications of naturalistic viewpoints that posit that mental
properties are in some way a new and novel part of the universe. Nevertheless, such a view fails
to fully explain consciousness, in part due to CP, but more specifically PECCP, the version
argued for, here.
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Process Panentheism, Good, Evil, and Responsibility
Having explored life and consciousness, we now turn to the PPT view on good, evil, and
freedom. Griffin suggests that there are two dimensions to something that is intrinsically evil.
These two dimensions are the opposite of the two criteria for intrinsic goods. For Whitehead,
claims Griffin, goodness is related to beauty, and hence the two criteria for intrinsic goodness are
aesthetic in nature. The first is “harmony” and the second is “intensity.” To say that some
experience is good is to say that it is both harmonious and intense. The opposite of harmony is
“disharmony” or “discord.” Disharmony occurs through the clashing of elements within an
experience, bringing about a “feeling of mutual destructiveness.”106 The opposite of intensity is
“triviality,” which includes things such as boredom or lack of excitement.
At times there is tension between harmony and intensity, which may endanger one or the
other. For example, when there is an increase in intensity there is also an increase in complexity.
The more complex that an experience may become, the more it may upset the harmony that has
already been achieved. In order to maintain harmony, it (harmony), too, must become more
complex. According to Griffin, there are two ways that an experience may be considered as
“complex,” both of which contribute to its intensity. The first has to do with the amount and
variety of elements belonging to the experience in question.107 Griffin explains it as follows:
Each experience begins by appropriating data from previous experiences. For example, an
occasion of human experience receives influences from its own past experiences, from its
body, and from God. The act by which an occasion of experience absorbs data from other
experiences is called a “feeling” or a “positive prehension.” What is excluded are some of
the feelings that were combined in the previous experience.108
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An occasion has the ability to combine the received data either positively or negatively. A
positive prehension of the data leads to the occasion accepting and accommodating it; whereas a
negative prehension leads to its exclusion.109 Griffin continues:
To be able to appropriate the data means to be able to bring it together into effective
contrasts. Some data which a more complex occasion would integrate into contrasts will
constitute incompatibilities for a less complex occasion. Hence, the less complex occasion
will negatively prehend feelings which a more complex occasion could have integrated into
a more complex and thereby more intense harmony. Hence, the growth of complexity in his
first sense means the growth in the intensity of experience.110
The second kind of complexity has to do with the occasion’s ability to simplify. Once the
complex occasion has sifted through the variety of data, it can then rid itself of unwanted or
unnecessary data in order to integrate “a greater intensity of experience.”111 As we will see,
complexity as a condition for intensity is a central feature of the process view of evolution.
Griffin further distinguishes between discord and triviality. Discord differs from triviality
in the sense that it is “absolute” or “noncomparative,” that is to say, “it is evil in itself, apart from
any comparison with that which might have been.”112 Triviality, on the other hand, is
comparative in the sense that some experience is more “trivial” than it need have been.
Whitehead (and Griffin, too, for that matter) rejects a “metaphysical” view of evil, one whereby
something is considered “evil” simply by nature of it being finite.113 That is not exactly what the
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adherent of PPT means when he speaks of triviality, either. It is evil not because it is trivial;
rather, it is evil only relative to what it could have been.114 Griffin thinks that having forms of
experience emerge that are more intense and more discordant is not “necessarily inconsistent
with moral goodness.”115 Hence, the two kinds of evil—discord and triviality—cover the full
range of intrinsic evil. Discord refers to the main kinds of evil that is often considered in these
types of discussions: physical and mental suffering. Triviality, on the other hand, covers a kind
of evil that is often overlooked—the loss of a higher experience for a lower one.116
Discord and triviality are the two forms of evil that prevent maximum enjoyment. Thus to
speak of a morally responsible person is to speak of a person who seeks those things that are
intrinsically good. Stated negatively, such a person would avoid or prevent any unnecessary
triviality or discord that she could. This requires a certain amount of freedom. Incompatibilist
freedom is a central feature of Whiteheadian/Hartshornean metaphysics. Whitehead’s entire
notion of “creativity” requires that every actual occasion have a certain amount of freedom. The
higher the complexity the greater the freedom. Besides God, the pinnacle of freedom is displayed
in those creatures with a “soul,” “mind,” or “consciousness,” namely humans.117
For Process thinkers, in a real sense God is responsible for all the evil in the world, yet,
God is not indictable or blameworthy of such evil. In God’s effort to lead the world to perfection
out of triviality and chaos through persuasive activity, discord has appeared. Though, it should
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be made clear that God is not totally responsible for the horrors that appear in the world, since
creatures have a certain level of freedom for self-determination and other-determination.118
Griffin has suggested that critics have raised questions about God’s moral goodness on
three levels. First, the God of PPT is morally deficient for primarily seeking goodness that is
essentially aesthetic in nature. Second, the God of PPT is morally deficient since evil is
overcome through God’s experience. Third, the God of PPT is morally deficient for leading the
world out of chaos and, yet does not have the power to prevent discord or horrendous evils. Let
us take each of these in order.119
Regarding the first level of criticism, Griffin believes that the critics of PPT have
misunderstood what Whitehead meant by speaking of good and evil in primarily aesthetic terms.
They assume that aesthetic goodness somehow excludes notions of “physical” and “moral”
qualities. But if one were to take physical pain, for instance, there is sense in which pain
represents a kind of “dis-harmony” or “discord.” With respect to moral goodness, such things as
“rightness of conduct” are a kind of beauty in-and-of-themselves. The kind of beauty that God
seeks, say Griffin, is one that includes moral goodness, not one that is indifferent to it.120
As for the second line of attack, it would seem that critics have again misunderstood
Whitehead. Whitehead did hold that events that are intrinsically evil “are transformed or
transmuted as they are received into the divine experience,” says Griffin, but “evil never loses its
character of evil so that the divine experience would be . . . ‘pure bliss’” for God.121 Rather,

118

Griffin, God, Power, and Evil, 300.

119

Ibid.

120

Ibid., 300-301.

121

Ibid., 303.

133

Whitehead thought ascribing pure happiness to God was a “profanation” and, instead, believed
God’s happiness always to coincide with “sympathy and tragedy.”122 When speaking of God
overcoming evil through good, Whitehead meant “that God, in responding to the evil facts in the
world, provides ideal aims for the next state of the world designed to overcome the evil in the
world.”123
How do defenders of PPT address the third line of attack from critics? Here, Griffin
believes, critics have failed to see that discord is not the only kind of evil in the world. One must
also come to terms with unnecessary triviality, which is also a kind of “genuine evil.” If God is a
morally perfect being, then such a being would want to stop all genuine evil so far that it can be
done. Since unnecessary triviality is a genuine evil, God could not leave things as they were in
the original chaotic state. Another important consideration is that God is sympathetic toward the
world. According to PPT, God is not the God of Classical theism, impassive and unconcerned
with the world; rather, in bringing creation up out of the initial chaos, God is the great
sympathizer sharing with creation in all of its suffering, pain, and sorrows. God suffers with
us.124 “Since the world always contains a mixture of good and evil, beauty and ugliness,” says
Griffin, “the divine beauty is always tragic beauty.”125 Risks for creation are also risks for God.
As God stimulates the world toward greater intensity, God too risks the potential for a greater
intensity of suffering.126
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So, how are we to think of the PPT view on the metaphysics of good and evil and on
moral responsibility? One of the advantages of the PPT view is that it is far reaching. If PPT
metaphysical and ontological perspectives on creativity and process are correct, then there is an
explanation for why evil (understood in Process terms) affects all of reality, including not only
human creatures, but also other areas of creation. God is at work moving all of creation out of the
chaos of triviality toward greater enjoyment. Granting such metaphysical and ontological
commitments, it would seem that PPT provides both explanatory power and explanatory scope
for the reality of evil in the world. Though, as we have seen, there are reasons to call into
question the very notions of creativity and process as the underlining principles of all reality.
Besides this, there seem to three other problems with the PPT view on good, evil, and moral
responsibility:
(4) The problem of redefining good and evil
(5) The problem of a limited God
(6) The problem of eschatological pay off
Let us take each one of these in order.
Regarding (4), it would seem that Process thinkers have redefined good and evil. As
shown earlier, criteria for intrinsic goodness includes harmony and intensity. God’s perfect
goodness is seen in the attempt to bring about the world out of triviality and chaos, through
discord, into greater harmony and intensity. The PPT view stands in stark contrast to the
traditional theistic view and how most everyone understands good and evil, which is in moral
categories. For theists, the criteria for moral goodness is found in God’s moral nature. But as
Michael Peterson suggests, the problem is that now “good” and “evil” are understood in
primarily aesthetic terms, instead of moral ones. Peterson, following Stephen Fry, objects to the
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Process view that divine goodness would seek to bring about greater intensity and harmony in
the world. By doing so, God may break a number of moral principles along the way. As we saw,
Griffin addresses such a criticism. He argues that Whitehead’s view on aesthetics includes both
“physical” and “moral” aspects. In other words, aesthetic aims include moral aims. Peterson
thinks that this will not do, since moral values should be seen in their own right and not
subordinate to aesthetic values. If the Process view were correct, then it would seem to make our
ordinary moral principles illusory and it would make it difficult to see God’s goodness in any
kind of way as recognizably good.127 But the problem is even more difficult, as Peterson
suggests:
Process thinkers hold that God’s efforts to evoke beauty in temporal experience are not
simply for the finite actualities involved, but ultimately to provide appropriate data for His
own unified and comprehensive experience. In the Whiteheadian scheme, then, the suffering
and difficulties, as well as the pleasures and achievements, of finite beings become material
for God’s aesthetic composition, i.e., for fitting inclusion in His consequent nature. But the
previous question simply recurs at another level: Is it morally permissible for deity to risk
evil in order to enrich its own experience?128
That God uses the experiences of creatures to maximize the divine experience calls into question
whether God is worthy of all worship.129
How are we to understand (5)? Process thinkers recognize that their understanding is of a
limited God. That God does not control all things, nor could God ever control all things, is a
central feature of Process thought. Metaphysically it is impossible for God to coerce or control
creatures. Furthermore, for PPT, it is impossible for God to exist apart from a world. God in this
sense is not necessary, that is to say, though God may be, in some sense, everlasting, the nature
Michael L. Peterson, “God and Evil in Process Theology,” in Process Theology, ed. Ronald Nash
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of God’s existence and God’s becoming are contingent features of the world, depending on the
existence of a world. It may not be this world, but there must be a world nevertheless. This,
again, stands in contrast to the theistic understanding whereby God is unlimited in nature. The
theistic understanding is such that God has the power to bring about a world or to refrain from
creating a world. God in no way depends on a world for His existence. Moreover, theists have
understood God to have the power to control all things both “actually” and “potentially.”130 But
it is at this point of God having the power to control all things (whether actually or potentially)
that Process thinkers have issues.
In his critique of the classical view of omnipotence, Griffin makes the following claim: “if
the world is understood as actual, the traditional idea of what is entailed by ‘omnipotence’
involves a fallacy, and hence cannot be used as a standard by which to consider imperfect the
power of God as conceived in a non-traditional way.”131 It is not exactly clear here what Griffin
means by “actual,” but it seems that he means something like this: if the world is actual, then it is
actual in the sense that it consists of entities that have self-determining freedom that is over
against God. Griffin takes this as a metaphysical principle, which would require that such a state
of affairs be what it is by necessity.132 Griffin brings up the principle on multiple occasions.133
But, as Stephen Davis rightly suggests, Griffin never gives us any reason for thinking that such a
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metaphysical principle is true.134 Rather, it is simply assumed and asserted without argument
throughout. Why should the theist (or anyone else for that matter) accept this principle as true?
Why think that the world “contains a multiplicity of beings with power” is a metaphysical
necessity? Griffin’s objection turns on the assumption of process metaphysical and ontological
commitments, which traditional theists would no doubt reject. Traditional theists would want to
argue that the world is contingent, even if the world were in some sense everlasting. It would still
depend, logically, on God for its existence. Since the world is ipso facto contingent, per the
classical theistic view, then any power that the world has depends on God. But this does not
mean that God gives no creatures power of their own to do otherwise in certain circumstances,
especially if one holds to something like human libertarian freedom.135
Griffin recognizes that Plantinga and others, in putting forth their responses to the logical
problem from evil, have argued for such a view that God gives creatures a certain amount of
power and freedom, but he thinks that such views simply will not do. The free-will defense has
some difficulties. First, such a view opens up the possibility that God could, on occasion, violate
human creaturely freedom, if He so chooses to do so in order to thwart some horrible evil.
Griffin argues, “Of course, in those moments, the apparent human beings would not really be
humans, if ‘humans’ are by definition free.”136 This is a non sequitur, however. One instance of a
violation of a creature’s freedom does not mean that the creature would no longer have freedom
in other instances. If my child was playing in the back yard and I stopped him just before
stepping into a bee’s nest, it does not follow that by violating his freedom to step in that one
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place at that one particular time that he no longer has the freedom to do otherwise. After all, our
criminal systems are often designed to do exactly what Griffin thinks that God could not do by
thwarting some evil action without also changing that person’s metaphysical stature. When a
criminal has broken the law, depending on the crime, she might be thrown in prison. This type of
punishment may be given as a consequence of the use of her freedom and, perhaps, in order to
thwart other such crimes that the criminal may perform later on down the road. But the
impingement of such freedoms does not mean that she can no longer exercise her ability to
choose. She still remains, ontologically speaking, who she is, but now with just certain
limitations. In the same vein, God’s interaction does not change who or what a person is
ontologically.
Griffin gives a second objection. Could not the a-theist suggest that it would be more
preferable to bring about world with “happy beings who are just like us, except that they are
predetermined always to do right” than a “world such as ours with genuine free will but also with
all its correlative evils”?137 There are some problems with such an objection. First, the theist may
respond that to have creatures who are predetermined to always do the right would entail a world
in which the creatures would not be “just like us.” There would be a significant ontological
difference between those creatures and us, viz. that they do not have libertarian freedom and,
hence, are not free in any kind of morally significant way. But even more, a theist might respond
that happiness itself may require some kind of freedom in the libertarian sense. Some naturalists
have described a human person as a meat-machine. Like a computer or some other processor, the
brain downloads information that is input into it. Computers and the like are programmed to do
certain things by the person who programs them. They are, in a sense, predetermined to perform
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and operate a certain way. If the human being is similar to some computational system or the
like, programed to respond in such and such a fashion, then it is hard to see how she can be
described as “happy.” After all, when I think of my computer, I might consider it to be running
efficiently or that the programs are uncluttered and operating in some kind of optimal capacity.
But I doubt that I would call my computer “happy.” I take it, and perhaps many other theists
would as well, that without libertarian freedom, or something in this vicinity, we might think of
our general overall stature as human beings as running efficiently or optimally, but it is unclear
that we can call it happiness. Happiness, as understood by Aristotle, and many of a religious
persuasion, does not mean pain-free living or that no suffering is involved. Quite the contrary.
Some of the greatest joys of life come from or in the midst of great trials and struggles. Such an
understanding of happiness that Griffin provides here is a deflationary, hedonistic understanding
of happiness, which may be nothing more than pleasure. However, there are many pleasure
seekers who are not happy. Happiness for finite creatures, however, requires something of risk
(though not evil itself) and moral significance that can only come about if there is such a thing as
genuine agency.
Griffin provides a third argument that if one limits creaturely freedom to humans, then
some other principle must explain all of the evil in the “subhuman world.” He believes that all
such attempts are unsatisfactory. One might extend the free-will defense and posit something like
Satan and his cohorts as behind much of the evil in the natural world not directly related to
human moral agency,138 but he finds such a view somewhat implausible in our day and age.
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Though I myself find such a view limited in explanatory power and wanting, it should be noted
that just because something is unfashionable by today’s standards does not make it false.
Furthermore, there are a number of responses to the problem of natural evil since before the
reprinting of God, Power, and Evil in 2004; yet, Griffin does not interact with any of those.139
There are other reasons, however, for rejecting the notion of a limited God. It would seem
that such a God as that of PPT would not be worship-worthy. Though God may be the greatest
conceivable being (in Hartshorne’s understanding of Anselm), it would seem that such a God
would be quite impotent—and God according to PPT, says Stephen Davis, must be “sufficiently
impotent”140 in order for God not to be blameworthy of the horrendous evils in the world. “God,”
continues Davis, “must be weak enough to be incapable of unilaterally preventing evil from
existing.”141 The God of PPT can seek to persuade actual entities to do this or that, but there is no
guarantee that it will ever happen. Furthermore, the kind of persuasive power that the God of
PPT has is partial and in need of supplementation. Michael Peterson, following Nancy
Frankenberry, suggests that “presenting to creatures purely ideal logical possibilities is a rather
sterile kind of persuasive effort.”142 He continues,
[I]t is not clear that any notion which locates persuasive power in the subliminal, almost
subconscious experience of creatures is fully adequate. The standard concept of moral
persuasion denotes much more conscious and rational activity than the process concept of
subconscious urges, experiential nudges, or lures for feeling. Persuasion is characteristically
understood as a process of argumentation in which each party attempts to find premises
139
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which the other accepts and which leads to the desired conclusion. Traditionally, the
morality of persuasion has been mutual respect for the other’s rational dignity and thus not
seeking consent on less than reasonable grounds. Ironically, process thinkers, who loudly
decry the immorality of coercion, typically describes their rendition of persuasion in terms
which do not even sound remotely similar to those of classical moral persuasion.143
Peterson’s argument is on point. It is doubtful that actual entities, given the Whiteheadian notion
of “mentality,” especially in lower forms, can discern anything like a rational understanding of
what is and is not the best through the initial aims sent by God. What makes up the content of
such nudges that God gives to His creatures. Davis is surely correct in saying that we may
admire such a being for the hard work of bringing the world to the point where it is.
Nevertheless, evil runs rampant within the world and there is no guarantee that it will ever get
better. Griffin and other PPT defenders have responded that traditional theists have fallen into
the worship of omnipotence. But as Davis rightly points out, it is not that omnipotence is to be
worshiped. We might think, here, of an evil omnipotent demon, powerful as it might be, but not
be worthy of worship. Rather, omnipotence/power is only one of the criteria for saying that some
being is worship-worthy.144 There are many other qualities, as well, such as being morally
perfect or eternal, just to name a few.
Besides not being worship-worthy, it would seem that such a God would also be
religiously inadequate. By “religiously inadequate,” we mean that the God of PPT is incapable of
answering certain kinds of petitions, such as petitions of prayer or deliverance from certain
instances of evil. Any God that cannot answer such petitions is religiously inadequate. But I
would agree, here, with Davis that there is another way to think of some being as religiously
inadequate, viz. that such a being cannot accomplish its own purposes. In other words, if God is
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to be religiously adequate, then God must be able to bring about God’s own purposes and
desires. It may be, in the end, that the God of PPT will pull through but there is no guarantee,
which leads us to (6).
On the PPT hypothesis, God has gotten this whole process started, but there is no
ultimate assurance that God will bring about His purposes in the end. Despite all of God’s efforts
to persuade, struggle for, and suffer with the creatures in this world, we are left wondering
whether God has the power to ultimately succeed. It would seem that God took a great risk in
creating the world. If in the end God does not accomplish His aims, then it would seem that God
is still indictable for the horrendous evils in the world.145 But even more damaging is that all
hope of ultimate resolution is lost.
Having examined PPT and evil, we now turn to theism. How well does theism fare? To
what extent does theism answer the question of evil compared to the other three worldviews?
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CHAPTER 5: METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND EVIL PART 4
THEISM

Introduction
In the history of Western thought, perhaps the most influential worldview has been
theism. Philosophers generally speak of theists in a “broad sense” and in a “narrow sense.” A
theist in the broad sense of the word refers to someone who holds to the belief that some sort of
divine being or reality exists; whereas, a theist in the narrow sense is someone who places
emphasis on certain attributes of a divine being, such as, a being who is an “omnipotent,
omniscient, eternal, supremely good being who created the world.”1 Paul Tillich would be an
example of a theist in the broad sense and Thomas Aquinas would be an example of a theist in
the narrower sense. When speaking of theism in this chapter, we are going to focus more on the
narrower sense of the word, especially since some might classify pantheism, deism, polytheism,
or panentheism as forms of theism.2
Here, I take theism to mean that exactly one God exists who is non-physical, perfect
moral goodness, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, necessary and creator of all things.3 Christian
theists have often held to a variety of other attributes, such as, pure actuality, immutability,
impassibility, timelessness, simplicity, and omniscience.4 I will not pursue these attributes, here,
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unless our discussion requires such interaction, but will give further consideration to some of
these in Chapter Six. In this chapter I want to stick with as bare a variant of theism (in the narrow
sense) as possible, since I am not at this point arguing for one specific brand of theism.
Before moving on, it would be helpful to consider each of these definitional points in
order. By saying that only one entity exists, I mean that only one God exists, excluding anything
like a cosmic dualism of beings or the polytheism of ancient Greek, Roman, Egyptian, or Norse
religions. This God does not have a body, nor is the world God’s body, as some pantheists and
panentheists hold. Further, being a non-physical being, God is in no way constrained by the laws
of physics that govern the universe.5
When theists say that God is good, they mean that God is perfectly good. God’s perfect
goodness might be taken in two ways. First, we might understand God’s goodness as wholly
good. By this, theists mean that goodness is such that there are no defects in God’s character or
God’s actions. Taken negatively, God never does any action that could be considered as evil.
That God is necessarily good is a second way that theists have understood God’s perfect
goodness. This claim is stronger than the first, in that, it entails that goodness is such a part of
God’s nature that it would be impossible for God to have any kind of flaw or blemish.6 In the
words of Thomas Morris, “[t]o claim that God is necessarily good is to claim that he is utterly
invulnerable to evil.”7
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To say that God is omnipotent is to say that he has maximal power. This does not mean,
however, that God can do just anything that He so chooses. Omnipotence is limited by certain
logical restrictions. For example, God could not create a square circle or make a married
bachelor. Furthermore, when considering the problem from evil, I take it that, if God grants his
human creatures something like libertarian freedom, then it is not possible for God to actualize
just any world that He so chooses. Alvin Plantinga defines libertarian freedom as follows:
If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that action and
free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine
that he will perform the action, or that he won’t. It is within his power, at the time in
question, to take or perform the action and within his power to refrain from it.8
If something like libertarian freedom is true, then it is solely up to the individual to perform or
refrain from some action. If God were to cause some person to do or refrain from an action, then
the person would not be free in the libertarian sense. This does not mean that God is incapable of
causing someone to do some action—God has the power to do so—but God, in His choosing to
create free creatures, has given them certain powers of their own. Now, what God can do, with
respect to power, is to create a world, but how that world turns out, if creatures are free in the
libertarian sense, is partly up to the creatures. Such a world would be a weakly actualized world,
as opposed to one that is strongly actualized. While it might be logically possible for God to
create a world in which creatures always did that which is right, it would be logically impossible
for God to cause such a world to exist, since how the world turns out is partly up to the creature.
Furthermore, along the lines of God’s power, theists have held that God has maximal knowledge.
There are differences of opinion among theists as to whether or not God could know the future
free actions of His creatures. I take it that He can, but some theists, particularly Openness theists,
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argue that it is logically impossible for God to know the future free acts of His creatures. For
those theists who believe that God knows the future free actions of His creatures, they hold to
something like simple foreknowledge or middle knowledge (Molinism).
When theists speak of God as eternal, they mean, minimally, that God has always existed.
Some theists have taken God’s eternality to mean that God’s temporal mode of existence is
timelessness, that is to say, God’s temporal mode of existence is such that God has no temporal
location or extension. Generally, the timelessness view goes along with a number of other theses,
viz. that God is immutable, impassible, and simple. The total combination of such a view is
known as eternalism.9 Other theists have held that God is omnitemporal or everlastingly eternal,
that is to say, God is temporal in some sense. Such a view does not mean that God is bound by
the four-dimensional space-time universe. Nor does it require God to be in some way limited by
the laws of nature.10 These thinkers believe that God transcends all created time, but is, perhaps,
temporal by virtue of being in a causal relationship to the universe.11 In some ways, this is an “in
house” debate, which I will not take space to discuss here. I will only mention that a good
argument can be made for the coherence of either position, though, not without some theological
costs on either side.12
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Regarding necessity, there are two important ways that theists understand the proposition
that God is necessary: de dicto necessity and de re necessity. Take, for example, the following
propositions:
(7) Necessarily, God is good
(8) Necessarily, God is omnipotent
(9) Necessarily, God is omniscient13
Each of these propositions are expressions of de dicto necessity. There can be no being that
counts as God who does not also have such properties as omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect
goodness in each and every world in which such a being exists. Each property is a conceptual
requirement for deity. We may understand de re necessity, on the other hand, by considering the
following propositions:
(4) God is necessarily good
(5) God is necessarily omnipotent
(6) God is necessarily omniscient14
Such propositions tell us something that is essential about the individual involved. In this case,
God is essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient, and essentially good. The Being who in
fact is God has such properties in this and all possible worlds.15 Hence, when we say that some
entity E has property P essentially, we mean that that E has P in every possible world that E
exists. In other words, there is no possible world in which E exists that E does not also have the
property P. Furthermore, if E has P essentially, then there are no worlds in which E has the
complement ~P.16 Here, we must also distinguish essential properties from contingent properties.
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A contingent property is a property P such that an entity might have it in one world, but have its
complement ~P in another. Contingent properties are such that they do not alter the essence of
the person in question. There are some possible worlds where I became a barista or a rock star
instead of an academic. But becoming a rock star or a barista does not change who I am
essentially. There is, however, one additional claim that theists make when speaking of God as
necessary. Theists believe that any individual who is God exists in every possible world. There
are no possible worlds in which God does not or could not exist. It is impossible for God not to
exist. This is known as necessary existence.17
Lastly, theists believe that God is the creator of all things. Unlike process theists, who
hold to creation out of pre-existing materials, theists believe that God created all things out of
nothing (ex nihilo), including the entirety of the four-dimensional space-time universe. By
“nothing,” theists mean that no prior thing existed other than God. All created entities are
contingent and dependent on God for their existence. Furthermore, theists believe that there is a
clear ontological distinction between God and creation, which theists call the Creator/creature
distinction. God is infinite and unlimited whereas creatures are finite and limited. Theists
recognize that any being or power that creatures have is given to them by God, who continually
upholds and sustains them in their existence. Yet, unlike deists, who hold to a radical
transcendence, theists argue that God is both transcendent and immanent. God is transcendent in
the sense that God, as the creator of all things, exists apart from and is not in any way dependent
on His creatures for His own existence. God is immanent in the sense that He cares for the world,
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intervenes through miraculous interaction, sustains it in its existence, and is religiously available
to his creatures in a variety of capacities.

Theism and Evil
As with the other three metaphysical systems, there are four areas that test the theistic
hypothesis to explaining evil: life, consciousness, the metaphysics of good and evil, and human
responsibility. To each of these we now turn.

Theism and Life
If theism is to explain evil in the world, then it must be able to explain life. In order to
explain life, theists must explain the existence of the universe. According to the theistic
hypothesis, God created the entire space-time universe a finite time ago in the past. In
postulating a created universe, theists avoid certain dangers seen in the three other worldviews
considered thus far, namely, the brute fact that the universe has always existed. Theists do not
run up against the problem of infinite regress, since the universe has a first cause for its existence
who is also a necessary being. Furthermore, the finite existence of the past seems to be
confirmed scientifically by the Big Bang, which suggest that the universe exploded into
existence some 13.8 billion years ago from infinite density. As we saw in Chapter Two, in order
to counter the conclusions from the Big Bang, some naturalists have postulated something like a
multiverse, according to which the universe is just one of an infinite number of universes. I will
not rehearse the complications of such a view, here. Suffice to say, even if something like the
multiverse hypothesis was true, there is still the difficulty of infinite regress that a defender of
such a position must consider. But even if we were to find out that, indeed, something like the
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multiverse is true, there are still resources within the theistic worldview that would allow for
such an option without damaging the theistic hypothesis.18
But what of the development of life in the universe? Theists have long held that God is
the originator of life in the universe. Recently theists have put forth powerful arguments
demonstrating the fine-tuning of the universe. Philosopher Robin Collins has suggested evidence
for fine tuning comes from three areas: laws of nature, constants of nature, and initial conditions
of the universe. Regarding the laws of nature, Collins argues that if certain laws or governing
principles, such as that of gravity, the strong nuclear force, or the electromagnetic force, did not
exist, or, at least, if they were not replaced with a similar principle that serves the same function,
“complex self-reproducing material systems could not evolve.”19 The same goes with certain
constants of physics, such as the constant of gravity, which I considered in Chapter Two, and the
initial conditions of the universe. If these constants and conditions were slightly different, then
the basic structure of the universe would be quite different and life as we know it would not
exist. Collins provides the following helpful analogy:
Imaginatively, one could think of each instance of fine-tuning as a radio dial; unless all the
dials are set exactly right, life would be impossible. Or, one could think of the initial
conditions of the universe and the fundamental parameters of physics as a dart board that
fills the whole galaxy, and the conditions necessary for life to exist as a small one-foot wide
target: unless the dart hits the target, life would be impossible. The fact that the dials are
perfectly set, or that the dart has hit the target, strongly suggests that someone set the dials or
aimed the dart, for it seems enormously improbable that such a coincidence could have
happened by chance.20
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The fine-tuning argument, taken with other theistic arguments, such as certain versions of the
cosmological argument, provide the theist with the resources needed for thinking that the
universe is caused and that an intelligent mind is behind the existence of life in it. If other
naturalistic hypotheses fail, as I have argued so far, then the theist is on good epistemic grounds
for thinking that God designed the universe.
Granted, not everyone will accept this line of reasoning. Perhaps one objection to the
theistic hypothesis from naturalists is the “Who designed God?” argument. Such an argument,
popularized by Richard Dawkins in the God Delusion,21 is also found among some
philosophically astute thinkers, such as J. J. C. Smart. Smart reasons: “If we postulate God in
addition to the created universe we increase the complexity of our hypothesis. We have all the
complexity of the universe itself, and we have in addition the at least equal complexity of God.
(The designer of an artefact must be at least as complex as the designed artefact.)”22 According
to this line of thinking, postulating a designer does not really solve the issue; rather it moves the
apparent design of the universe back one more level. There are, at least, three lines of response
the theist can give to this argument.
First, the theists might respond that postulating the designer to be more complex than the
design is not, necessarily, obvious. Nevertheless, as Collins suggests, there is something intuitive
about the critic’s belief, here, namely that when we see such organized complexity in the world,
it generally is produced from systems that also demonstrate such complexity. Collins believes a
there is a better, second response to the critic’s objection. The critic’s argument stands only if the
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design argument in question claims that every instance of organized complexity in the world
needs explanation and that the theist suggests that God is the ultimate explanation for such
complexity in the world. But not all design arguments require this; rather, all that the design
argument needs to show is that the fine-tuning of the universe be more probable given theism
than naturalism. In this way, the requirements have been met, says Collins, even if it turns out
that God “exhibits tremendous internal complexity.”23 Hence, even if the theist were to grant the
critic’s point that God is as least as complex as the artifact, the fine-tuning argument would still
provide reason to prefer the theistic hypothesis over the naturalistic one.
Third, the critic’s challenge based on the complexity of God assumes that God is like the
universe, or, at least, the individual things found within the universe, that is to say, that God at
some time came into existence. But that is precisely where the critic misunderstands the theistic
hypothesis. According to the variety of theism understood here, God is both eternal and
necessary. Regarding God’s eternality, there was never a point when God came into existence.
God was never created nor could God ever be destroyed. Furthermore, as a necessary being,
there are no possible worlds in which God does not exist. God instantiates those properties that
are essential to Him in every possible world. On what basis do theists believe that God is a
necessary being in the sense described above? First, theists arrive at this conclusion based on
“perfect being theology” (PBT). According to the medieval philosopher and theologian St.
Anselm of Canterbury, God is by definition “that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought.”24
Most theists take something like Anselm’s notion of perfect being as a proper method for
thinking about God. Based, then, on PBT, theists recognize that there are many things within the
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universe that are contingent—things that are fragile, vulnerable, and tenuous in their existence;
things that move in and out of existence; and things that could have been, but never exist. But
there is a greater mode of existence imaginable than what we see in contingent things. We can
conceive of a being of which whose existence is such that it never ceases to exist or that it never
came into being “from nothing.”25 As Thomas Morris argues, such a being’s “anchorage in
reality is so great that it is not even possible for the being to have failed to exit.”26 Morris
continues, “[s]urely it is only this necessary existence, this firmest possible foothold in reality,
which is appropriate for a maximally perfect being.”27 There is a second way that theists arrive at
God’s necessary existence—from their understanding of creation. If God is conceived of as the
creator of and ultimate cause for the existence of all things that are distinct from himself, then it
follows that God must be conceived to exist in all possible worlds. If God does have necessary
existence, as theists believe, then God is not in any sense cobbled together from various parts.
Some critics have argued against the theistic hypothesis by suggesting that evolution
removes the need for a creator. Such an objection is faulty from the start. While I myself am
sympathetic to something more akin to intelligent design, I do not find such an objection to hold
for two reasons.
First, if it turns out that evolution is true, as most naturalists and a growing number of
theists hold, there is no contradiction between evolutionary theory and the existence of God.
Some theists may argue that while there is a good amount of support for evolution, it is doubtful
that one can understand it in any mechanistic manner. It would be more plausible to see it as
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guided. Further, as we saw in Chapter Two, critics of physicalism, such as Thomas Nagel, find it
implausible that something such as consciousness could come about through evolutionary
processes alone. Other theists may concur with all of the scientific conclusions of evolution, and
yet question whether or not it could provide any ultimate explanation. Mechanical explanations
and design are not, necessarily, at odds. It may be the case, argue such theists, that evolution is
the process or mechanism by which God brings about His ultimate purposes for human life.28
There is a second response that the theist may give based on the incompatibility of
evolution and naturalism. Both Thomas Nagel and Alvin Plantinga have advanced such
arguments. Plantinga, in Where the Conflict Really Lies, has argued that there is deep conflict
between naturalism and science, and particularly between naturalism and evolution. Plantinga’s
argument centers on our cognitive faculties—faculties such as memory, perception, a priori
intuition, and sympathy—and their reliability. Theists believe that our cognitive faculties are
reliable since God has made humans in His image and likeness (or something of the like).
Naturalists, on the other hand, understand our cognitive faculties as a direct result of coming
together by the processes of evolution and natural selection. Given the reliability of our cognitive
faculties, which, asks Plantinga, seems more plausible? Evolution, it would seem, at best
guarantees that we humans behave a certain way. Evolution, understood by naturalists, promotes
such things as survival or reproductive success. Our cognitive faculties, however, are not geared
toward producing true beliefs; rather, they are geared toward contributing to the specie’s
survival.29 On this point, following non-theist Patricia Churchland, Plantinga says, “What
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evolution underwrites is only (at most) that our behavior is reasonably adaptive to the
circumstances in which our ancestors found themselves; hence it does not guarantee mostly true
or verisimilitudinous beliefs. Our beliefs might be mostly true or verisimilitudinous. . . ; but there
is no particular reason to think they would be: natural selection is interested, not in truth, but in
appropriate behavior.”30 Naturalistic evolution gives us reason to doubt that: (a) the purpose of
our cognitive faculties is to supply humans with true beliefs and (b) that such faculties, do,
indeed, supply us on most occasions with true belief. Plantinga continues by arguing that when
they are not malfunctioning, we all tend to rely or our cognitive faculties. We all, naturalists and
theists alike, tend to go through life assuming that such faculties are reliable and that they
produce true beliefs. But why should the naturalist think this? Plantinga believes that the
naturalist is “rationally obliged” to give up such an assumption, if the naturalist holds to
something along the lines of our underlying neurology as being products of adaptive behavior.31
Plantinga explains:
And here’s the question: what reason is there for supposing that this belief content is true?
There isn’t any. The neurology causes adaptive behavior and also causes or determines
belief content: but there is no reason to suppose that the belief content thus determined is
true. All that’s required for survival and fitness is that the neurology cause adaptive
behavior; this neurology also determines belief content, but whether or not that content is
true makes no difference to fitness.32
The whole scientific and naturalistic program rests on the ability to know and understand the
world in a rational way. But on what basis is there for thinking that the world, as we understand
it, is true? Why think that we have a grasp of the basic structure of our world? Why think that the
contents of our beliefs are true? Given naturalism, at best, we can be agnostic. Hence lies the
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conflict between naturalism and evolution. If such is the case, as Plantinga has argued, given the
reliability of our cognitive faculties and their ability to lead us to true belief, evolution would
seem more probable given theism than naturalism.
If, as theists argue, the universe has an ultimate cause and design behind it, and if God
serves as a suitable candidate for such an ultimate cause and design, then, it would seem, there is
good reason to suppose life given theism. But what of consciousness?

Theism and Consciousness
If theism is to explain evil, it must also be able to explain consciousness, given that much
of the evil that we see in the world does not result merely from pain but also from suffering,
which requires one’s ability to reflect on one’s pain. Theists believe that consciousness is the
result of something like the Judeo-Christian view that God created humans in His image and
likeness. I am not saying, here, that every theism will hold to this view; rather, that various
theisms may hold to something similar to this view, especially certain Christian, Jewish, and
Muslim theistic views. The imago Dei, as Christian theists call it, suggests that God has endowed
His human creatures with certain capacities to perform acts, to be intentional, to have beliefs, and
to be relational. In order to function in such a way, it would seem that such creatures would
require something like consciousness—an ability to not only understand themselves and their
environment, but also to reflect on, ponder, and respond to it in such a way that goes beyond a
mere instinctual kind of response. So far, so good. It would seem that something like
consciousness might be expected given theism. But the theistic view of consciousness is not
without its own problems, especially when considering the mind/body problem.
As we have seen, the mind/body problem is something that each worldview must work
through. This is true of theism nonetheless. With respect to human nature on the mind/body
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problem, theists hold to a number of different views. Most theists fall into one of two categories:
physicalism or some form of dualism. In Chapter Two I argued against physicalism. It is my
contention that theistic physicalism is susceptible to some of the same dangers that naturalistic
versions face. I will not revisit physicalism here. Rather, I will focus on dualism as a viable
option for explaining consciousness, which is, at any rate, the more common position among
theists.
When considering dualism, there is more than one variety. There is substance dualism as
well as emergent dualism. Among substance dualisms, there is the Cartesian variety as well as
the Thomistic sort. Cartesian dualists focus on mind as distinct from the body, which is an
externally related entity that is causally related to the body. Thomistic dualism takes it that mind
is a function of the soul. The soul serves as the primary integrating feature of the person, by
which it has certain capacities for both biological and mental functioning.33 In what follows, I
will not discuss each kind and variety of dualism. All that the theist needs to show is that at least
one variety of dualism explains consciousness. My focus here is not to argue for one specific
form of dualism; rather, I will only put forth a general argument for mind/body dualism.
What do theists mean when they speak of dualism? If theists believe that there is an
ontological distinction between God and the rest of creation, then, at minimum theists are
dualists of sorts. God is considered by theists to be something like an unembodied, uncreated
mind or entity, without any physical body. With respect to human nature, and perhaps the natures
of some animals too, dualists recognize that there is some entity that is distinct from the body or
brain. Property-event dualists believe that there is a significant distinction between mental
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properties and physical properties. Mental events such as thoughts, sensations, beliefs, or desires
are all distinct from brain states or events. Substance dualists take this further and recognize that
what one calls the “soul,” “self,” “I,” or the “mind” is a distinct entity from the body. 34
Substance dualists, suggest J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae, are committed at minimum “to the
claim that the soul is an immaterial entity that could, in principle, survive death and ground
personal identity in the afterlife.”35 There is, yet, one more important distinction that substance
dualists make—a distinction between functional holism and ontological holism. Functional
holism recognizes (1) that the soul is in some sense in the body; (2) that the body and soul
function as a unity that is both complex and deeply integrated; and (3) that the soul can exist
without the body and survive death. Functional holism can work with either Cartesian or
Thomistic dualisms. Ontological holism, on the other hand, suggests that the body and soul are
so tightly integrated that the soul depends on the body, and when it dies, so, too, does the soul.
Disembodiment is impossible. In this case, ontological holism is consistent with property-event
dualism, but not with Cartesian or Thomistic versions.36 I take it something like functional
holism to be the case, as I will argue below.
What evidence, then, is there for thinking that something like dualism is true? There are,
at least, three lines of evidence for thinking that dualism is true: (1) the paradigm-case argument;
(2) NDE’s and Post-death visions argument; and (3) the unity-of-consciousness argument. Let us
take each one of these arguments in order.
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In their book, Body and Soul, J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae introduce what I will call the
Paradigm-Case Argument. According to this argument, God and, perhaps, angels are paradigmcase persons. Their argument goes as follows:
If God and, perhaps, angels are paradigm-case persons and since they are immaterial spirits,
then it is at least consistent that something be both a person and an immaterial spirit. But
more than this, if the paradigm-case persons are immaterial spirits, then this provides
justification for the claim that anything is a person if and only if it bears a relevant similarity
to the paradigm cases. Arguably, the relevant similarity between other (kinds of) persons
and the paradigm cases is grounded in something all persons have in common and that
constitutes that which makes the paradigm cases to be persons in the first place, namely,
personhood. Personhood is constituted by a set of ultimate capacities of thought, belief,
sensation, emotion, volition, desire, intentionality and so forth.37
What benefit is there to such an argument? It at least shows that the concept of an unembodied
soul is not unreasonable given theism. After all, the chief exemplar of such a notion of person is
God, whom theists believe to be something like an unembodied mind. But such a view is not
without its critics. Some theistic physicalists will want to argue that personhood is not so much a
nature as it is a function of a complex organism realized by the individual. The defender of
dualism will answer such a charge by arguing that God is often understood as thinking, feeling,
acting, and the like, and that such are descriptions of attributes of God and not some functional
states that are in some way external to Him. But there is a second reply. As Moreland and Rae
put it, “if various mental states are really functional states whose description is neutral to whether
the entity realizing that state is a spirit or a brain, then just exactly what is the content of ‘spirit’
when we say that God is a spirit?”38 This seems to be an issue that theistic physicalists will have
difficulty answering if they are adamant about functionalism.
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The second line of evidence for dualism comes from the overwhelming data on neardeath experiences (NDEs) and post-death visions.39 For now, I will only be able to cover, briefly,
NDEs, though there are some compelling data on post-death visions.40
People reporting near-death experiences (NDEs henceforth) generally provide several
similar experiences, such as leaving, floating above, and seeing their lifeless bodies. Such
experiences are called out of body experiences (OBE). Others claim to have been met by an
angel or some other kind of heavenly being, to have encountered a barrier of sorts or a bright
light, or to have met deceased loved ones.41 While not the norm, there have also been some
“hellish” cases.42
Many NDE reports, while they may be true for all we know (and thus epistemically
possible), are not the kinds of experiences that can be empirically verified, and thus provide little
or no import as to an explanation for or reasons to believe that there is such a thing as a soul or
an afterlife. After all, as some skeptics claim, many who report NDEs generally interpret their
experiences in such a way as to fit their specific cultural and religious biases, for example,
Christians claim to have met Jesus or an angel while Hindus report seeing their deities, and so
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on.43 According to one critic, Michael Marsh, NDE researchers need to be more critical of
reports given that “NDE accounts are non-identical, non-uniform, and hence personally
idiosyncratic.”44 Other skeptics claim that such experiences are nothing more than the firings of
synapses in the brain gone wrong or that the persons having said experiences are, in reality,
hallucinating.45
While the majority are non-evidential, there are a number of such accounts that are
veridical and provide empirical evidence for the existence of the soul and an afterlife. But what
kind of evidence counts? According to Terence Nichols, there are four lines of evidence that
NDE researches put forth: (1) people are capable of describing events that they could not have
known beforehand or otherwise; (2) meeting dead loved ones or people not previously known to
have died; (3) change in life perspective; and (4) a vast amount of testimony that transcends
gender, age, class, and ethnicity, all of which goes beyond that which can be explained by
materialist explanations.46 For our purposes, I will only examine the first kind of evidence.47
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With respect to the first type of evidence, a variety of collaborative accounts can be
adduced.48 Cardiologist Pim van Lommel provides a veridical account of a man in his forties,
who, when he arrived at the hospital, was comatose. The coronary-care-unit nurse on duty
reported taking the man’s dentures out of his mouth and placing them on a ‘crash car’ in order to
“intubate” the patient. Upon seeing the nurse a week later, the man responded to her, “Oh, that
nurse knows where my dentures are.”49 He proceeded to tell her, “Yes, you were there when I
was brought into the hospital and you took my dentures out of my mouth and put them onto the
car, it had all these bottles on it and there was this sliding drawer underneath and there you put
my teeth.”50 From the nurse’s perspective, she “remembered this happening while the man was
in deep coma and in the process of CPR.”51 After questioning the man further, she reported, “it
appeared the man had seen himself lying in the bed, that he had perceived from above how
nurses and doctors had been busy with CPR. He was also able to describe correctly and in detail
the small room in which he had been resuscitated as well as the appearance of those present like
myself.”52
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One NDE that was significantly evidential involves a woman named Pam, who had a
brain aneurysm, and who had to have two extraordinary medical procedures back-to-back.
During the second procedure, nicknamed “standstill,” her body was cooled to 60 degrees and the
blood was drained from her head. At this time, her heart was stopped and she had no brain
waves.53 According to cardiologist Michael Sabom, three clinical tests are administered to
determine whether a person experiences brain death. He explains that, “her
electroencephalogram was silent, her brain-stem response was absent, and no blood flowed
through her brain.”54 Pam had met all three criteria. Sabom, who lays out the medical procedure
in detail, reports that Pam, claiming to have had an out of body experience, was able to describe
the events of her operation providing specific details, such as the odd shape of the bone saw used
on her head and certain conversations had by the medical team. Her descriptions were then
corroborated by the medical records from the operation.55 One interesting aspect of Pam’s story
is that, while she was not brain-dead at the time of her OBE (though she would be during the
second procedure, during which she continued with her NDE), it seems implausible that she
could see or hear anything, since her eyes were taped shut and her ears had speakers in them
giving clicking sounds, which measured her brainstem activity.56
The cases given here only scratch the surface of the many NDEs reported throughout the
world. But some question as to whether these NDEs really do occur or whether there is some
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naturalistic explanation for NDE phenomena. Though critics have put forth a number of
naturalistic explanations, two are prominent: hallucinations and anoxia.57 Problems attend each
of these. Regarding hallucinations, there are some reported cases of people who have had NDEs
and who have also experienced drug-induced hallucinations. In such cases, though, serious
differences obtained between the two accounts. Further, those who have had hallucinations
report that after the fact it was clear that they were experiencing hallucinations. That is not the
case with NDEs. Generally, unlike hallucinations, the NDEs are ordered and reality is not
distorted, as is often the case with hallucinations. One other significant fact is that when people
experience hallucinations, there is no overall life change. But the opposite is the case with
respect to NDEs. Those who have had an NDE generally report a life change and a significant
change in their beliefs and spirituality. But the real difficulty with claiming that NDEs are
hallucinations is that hallucinations do not account for those parts of the NDE that can be
verified empirically, such as those considered in the two cases mentioned above.58 But what
about anoxia?
Anoxia is a condition that happens when the brain is starved of oxygen, a condition often
seen in fighter pilots and mountain climbers. Those who experience anoxia often experience
confusion and distortion in their mental processes. The problem with chalking NDEs up to
certain physiological explanations, such as anoxia, is that in many of the anoxia cases there is no
coherence to a person’s thoughts. But that is not what we see with respect to NDEs. Often NDE
experiences are crisp and clear, containing vivid details of all that was experienced. The British
neuropsychiatrist, Peter Fenwick, has this to say about NDEs and anoxia:
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As the brain becomes anoxic it ceases to function. It becomes disrupted and disorganized, so
that you become gradually confused, disoriented, your perception fragments and finally you
become unconscious. You do not think clearly, you don’t have insights, you don’t have
clear, coherent visions. . . . [I]f anoxia is to be the major cause of NDEs we have to postulate
a series of very unlikely events. The brain has to be able to synthesize a complex internal
world and to be able to remember it, despite a lack of oxygen which is so profound that
brain function is widely disrupted so that consciousness is lost.59
Lastly, as with hallucinations, anoxia does not account for the kind of veridical experiences
shown above.
If acceptable, then, certain phenomena such as NDEs and post-death visions provide
veridical evidence not only for the existence of something like the soul, which exists apart from
the body, but also for an afterlife. Here, we would concur with philosopher Andrew J. Dell’Olio,
when speaking of the empirical nature of near-death experiences, “naturalistic materialists, if
they are to be true to their empiricist heritage, must . . . take seriously the phenomenology of
experience and its impact on the formation and justification of belief.”60 Having examined such
empirical arguments, now we shall turn to our third and last argument for the soul—the unity-ofconsciousness argument.
Something like the unity-of-consciousness argument was first put forth by Leibniz, but a
modern defender of such an argument is William Hasker.61 Hasker’s own view on the mind/body
problem is called “emergent dualism.” Whether Hasker’s emergent dualism fails or succeeds is
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up for grabs, but the unity-of-consciousness argument is a powerful argument against the
physicalist view on consciousness.
The chief difficulty that the materialist or physicalist must face is twofold. On the one
hand, the problem lies in the complexity of the physical equipment, that is to say, the brain to
physicalism seems to be something like a machine, computer, or the sort, made up of a variety of
distinct parts. Yet, on the other hand, it is not at all clear how a unified complex conscious
experience can be distributed to any one location of the brain or to be distributed among all of
the various parts of such a complex entity. Here, Hasker argues, if we were to take an aspect of
our conscious experience, say, our visual field, the information that it yields cannot be contained
in something like one single transistor or neuron. Here, the materialist may want to suggest that
such a state is broken up into various parts of the brain. Suppose this is the case. The question
still remains: “who or what is aware of the conscious state as a whole?”62 Hasker believes that
the answer to such a question is obvious: it is the person who is aware of her “conscious state, at
any given moment, as a unitary whole.”63 But this leads to a second question for the materialist:
“When I am aware of a complex conscious state, what physical entity is it that is aware of the
state?”64 Hasker believes that the materialist cannot provide a plausible answer.
The unity-of-consciousness argument, formally stated, is as follows:
1. I am aware of my present visual field as a unity; in other words, the various components
of the field are experienced by a single subject simultaneously.
2. Only something that functions as a whole rather than a system of parts could experience a
visual field as unity.
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3. Therefore, the subject functions as a whole rather than a system of parts.
4. The brain and nervous system, and the entire body, is nothing more than a collection of
physical parts organized in a certain way. (In other words, holism is false.)
5. Therefore, the brain and nervous system cannot function as a whole; it must function as a
system of parts.
6. Therefore the subject is not the brain and nervous system (or the body, etc.).
7. If the subject is not the brain and nervous system then it is (or contains as a proper part) a
non-physical mind or ‘soul’; that is, a mind that is not ontologically reducible to the sorts
of entities studied in the physical sciences. Such a mind, even if it is extended in space,
could function as a whole rather than as a system of parts and so could be aware of my
present visual field as a unity.
8. Therefore, the subject is a soul, or contains a soul as a part of itself.65
The argument is sound, and I would agree with Hasker that if the materialist were to deny any of
the premises, setting aside the notion of the soul in 7, it would be step 4. Hasker believes that the
materialist, by denying 4, is forced to accept something like holism—but such is not without its
own difficulties.
One potential objection to the unity-of-conscious argument comes from reflection on
neurological disunity brought about by commissurotomy and multiple personality disorder.
Commissurotomy was once a procedure performed on people who suffered from severe forms of
epilepsy, whereby the thick network of connective nerve tissue between the right and left
hemispheres of the brain was severed. While such a procedure proved to help with the symptoms
of severe cases of epilepsy, it also caused the patients who had the procedure to have a
breakdown in communication between the two hemispheres of the brain. At times, it seems as
though each hemisphere of the brain was doing its own thing apart from the other, especially
when the subject was asked to do a unique or novel task. But, perhaps, more damaging to the
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notion of a single-unified consciousness are from multiple personality disorder cases. Those who
suffer from multiple personality disorder often display what seem to be two distinct conscious
personalities, with memories and beliefs of their own.66 Would such cases, then, count against
Hasker’s argument? It would seem not. Hasker’s argument is more modest in nature. All that he
is arguing for is that (1) the various parts of the brain, brain stem, etc. cannot account for the
unitary experience of consciousness; and (2) the kind of unity in question is a “modest” kind of
unity, “consisting merely in the fact that one has at a given moment a phenomenal field (visual
and/or auditory and/or tactual and/or . . .) which comprises a large amount and variety of data.”67
If the above arguments are successful, then it would seem that we have good reason to
think that there is something like the soul. If we have a soul, and having a soul is deeply
consistent with theism (which seems to be the case), then it would seem that we have good
reasons for thinking that theism succeeds in explaining consciousness. But what of our last two
categories, the metaphysics of good and evil and human responsibility?

Theism, Good, Evil, and Responsibility
How surprising is evil given theism? As the reader will recall, there are two basic kinds
of evil, moral evil and natural evil. I will consider each below, along with some attention to the
nature of gratuitous evil.
Moral evil does not at all seem surprising given theism, especially if God has brought
about human creatures who have the capacity to freely perform certain actions. As C. Stephen
Layman rightly notes, the ability to love God and neighbor freely, as opposed to some
automaton, which is programmed always to do the right thing, is a much higher good. If such
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choices were not up to the agent, then they would seem emptied of all significance. Therefore,
we would expect God, if He were a morally perfect being, to create creatures with such a
capacity to choose to love or to do otherwise. Furthermore, on theism, we would expect God to
create human creatures with certain desires and the ability to reason and the sort, much like, as
noted earlier, we see in the imago Dei. Many of the moral evils that occur in the world result
from an agent’s wrongly desiring certain things. Layman provides several examples of this.
There is nothing bad per se in a person desiring to eat food for nourishment and enjoyment;
however, the evil may come about when the person desires to hoard all of the food keeping
others from having what they need for nourishment. Again, the desire to control others is not
always a bad thing. We want leaders who are capable of leading us in the right way, and
sometimes that may require a certain amount of control, but the desire to control others when it is
not best for the common good or the individuals controlled can also happen, and too often does.68
Now a skeptic might respond by asking whether there might not be instances of
wrongdoing without any kind of suffering—such as a person hoarding all the scarce food and
God supplying more food so that those in need do not go hungry. Layman thinks that such is
logically possible, but I would agree with him that the significance of our choices is intricately
connected and organically to the consequences that ensue. On this point he argues:
If we can never benefit or harm others (or reasonably expect to do so), then we haven’t been
given a significant degree of freedom or responsibility. Furthermore, if our actions never
caused harm and suffering, we would surely fail to understand the seriousness of evil. Now,
it might be replied that my choices will be significant provided I believe I can benefit or
harm, even if the basis is false. And I will surely be apt to see the evil I do as egregious if I
believe it causes others to suffer, even if it really doesn’t cause any suffering at all.
However, if we believe we can benefit and harm others, when in fact we cannot, then we are
systematically deceived about something extremely important and fundamental to our lives,
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and such massive deception would itself be an evil; hence it is plausible to suppose that a
perfectly good God would not set up a world involving such deception.69
Deception is often thought of as a kind of moral evil in itself. If God were morally perfect and
good, then to set up a world with such mass deception would itself be a great evil. God, in turn,
would participate in evil. If God is morally perfect, as theists believe, He could not bring about
such a world.
How are theists to respond to the total amount of moral evil and wrongdoing in the
world? One way of responding is by way of skeptical theism.70 Skeptical theists argue that there
are no so-called gratuitous (unnecessary) evils in the world. Given our limited cognitive
faculties, it is impossible to know what reasons God might have for allowing certain evils in the
world. Here I would agree with a number of other theists that it would be unwise to think that
every form of evil has a corresponding greater good that is to come about as a result of God’s
allowing them.71 Again, I think Layman’s insight is correct in thinking that the moral harms and
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suffering that we humans can inflict is connected intricately to the significance of our choices.
He thinks that it is better to consider such instantiations of wickedness as “collateral effects.” He
suggests that they are “consequences of divine creative activity rather than necessary means to
divine ends.”72
One of the chief reasons that theists gravitate toward greater-good type arguments generally
has to do with a certain understanding of God’s sovereignty. They take it that if such things as
gratuitous evils exist, then God is in some sense not sovereign or in control. According to such
an understanding of sovereignty, everything that occurs must have a purpose, including evil. But
the question theists must ask centers on whether such an understanding of God’s sovereignty is
required or is the best understanding. Must God cause, or at least, allow such evils in the world
in order to bring about corresponding greater goods? I think not. The problem with such an
understanding leads to a concept of God that is consequentialist in nature when dealing with his
creatures. Bruce Little brings this point out clearly:
Does it necessarily mean that if something happens on this earth without a divine purpose,
this somehow strikes at the truth of God’s sovereignty? It seems to me that the answer is No;
to maintain otherwise leads to questionable ends. For example, say a person commits
adultery; is it gratuitous evil or is it an evil that God in His sovereignty planned? The plan
would have had to be from before creation or at the moment of creation. The end is that God
planned for a person to commit adultery, the very thing that God says is sin. God becomes
the author of sin. Furthermore, the adultery was planned to bring about a good (under the GG theodicy), so now sin brings about good and it could be argued that more sin would bring
about more good.73
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In a similar vein, Kirk MacGregor argues that theists who hold to greater-good type arguments
are faced with a dilemma. Either evil is necessary in order for God to bring about some greatergood, or it is morally unnecessary. To claim the former goes against divine omnibenevolence,
that is to say, to claim that evil is necessary in order for God to bring about greater goods is to
say that “God operates according to the principle that the ends justify the means,” which, again,
goes against a concept of God who is morally perfect and essentially good. 74 But greater-good
responses, says MacGregor, would also count against divine omnipotence. It would seem that
such an acceptance would lead to the unwanted result that if there are certain goods that can only
come about through God’s allowance of evils, then there would exist certain “logically possible
tasks that God could not perform—namely, bringing about various goods in the absence of
evils.”75 Such an argument, believes MacGregor, leads to an indirect argument for gratuitous
evils.
But there is, I take it, another reason for thinking that something like gratuitous evils exist
given significant moral freedom—that God wants for his human creatures to be morally
responsible beings. William Hasker calls this the “principle of divine moral intention,” which he
states as follows:
It is an extremely important part of God’s intention for human persons that they should place
a high priority on fulfilling moral obligations and should assume major responsibility for the
welfare of their fellow humans.76
Such a principle, argues Hasker, stands in contradistinction to the idea of God permitting certain
evils in order to bring about some greater good or to prevent some greater evil. To think that God
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is running the world in such a way as to allow certain evils in order to bring about a greater good
results in another principle he calls the “offsetting good principle.” The principle is stated as
follows:
Any harm resulting from a morally wrong action will be offset by a “greater good” that God
could not have obtained without permitting the evil in question.77
Hasker believes that if things are really like what the second principle entails, then it would have
a serious effect on our motivation to live morally good lives and to take responsibility for the
wellbeing of others. But more than moral motivation, it would seem that there is a sense in which
the two principles are contradictory. Take the following argument:
(1) If God prevents all evils that He could without thereby losing some greater good or
by bringing about some greater evil, then no gratuitous evils exist.
(2) God commands humans to thwart evil.
(3) If God commands humans to thwart evil, and if no gratuitous evils exist, then God
commands humans to thwart those evils which are necessary for bringing about some
greater good or for preventing some greater evil.
(4) If God commands humans to thwart evils that are necessary for bringing about some
greater good or stopping some greater evil, then God is requiring humans to do
something that works against the maximal good.
(5) To require humans to work against that which brings about maximal good is logically
impossible for a morally perfect being to do.
(6) Therefore, there exists gratuitous evils.78
It seems that God’s command to thwart evil runs up against His work in bringing about the
maximal good. Our actions really matter and there is a steep responsibility for humans to care for
one another. Perhaps, it would be in the theist’s interest to give up such greater-good type
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arguments and rather to recognize that such evils are a part of a world in which humans are given
significant moral responsibility and freedom.
Another possible response by the skeptic is to suggest we could still have as much
meaning and significance in the world that we do without also having certain types of evils, such
as genocide or rape. There is no doubt that there are certain evils, such as the holocaust, that the
world would have been better without (an admission that, by some definitions, again affirms
there are gratuitous evils). But the problem with such objections as this one is that if there were
no evils such as genocide or rape, then the critic might always find other evils, such as murder,
that might come under scrutiny. And when murder is in question, the critic may propose another
evil, and this could go on ad infinitum. But as Layman suggests, it may be that some people will
be perfectly satisfied with a world in which the consequences of our actions would be trivial.
Such a world, though it might have its attractions for having fewer risks, would, nevertheless,
“pale in significance to the world we find ourselves in,” says Layman.79 Nevertheless, such a
world does not seem surprising given theism, at least not on serious and sober reflection. Though
our world, as it is, contains many risks, it also contains an abundance of meaning. Our actions
really do count. Furthermore, when we demand a world other than the one that has obtained, we
are, perhaps unwittingly, wishing for a world with much less significance as our current world
now possesses.80
In addition to the amount and kinds of moral evils in the world, at least two additional
issues merit consideration: (1) what is the basis of morality; and (2) how are theists to understand
God’s commands? Let us begin with the grounding of morality. What, then, is the basis for good
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and evil according to theism? Many theists believe that God not only does that which is good and
that He always acts justly, but that God is, in God’s very nature, something akin to the Platonic
notion of “the Good.”81 God in the theistic sense, however, differs in two quite different ways.
God is, as Robert Adams suggests, “a concrete individual.”82 God is essentially a person or
essentially personal in some significant way. Second, God, as the Good, is not some abstract
object; rather, He is a “real being.”83 When theists say that God is “the Good,” they do not mean
that God, by being the Good, encompasses just anything that a person takes in common language
as “good.” Rather, as Adams emphasizes throughout Finite and Infinite Goods, he couches the
notion of good in terms of something more along the lines of excellence.84 It is God Himself as
the Good that grounds any finite goods that might exist in the world. God, then, is neither
dependent on or looks to anything other than Himself with respect to perfect moral goodness.
God Himself becomes the measure for any commands that He issues. Thus when God issues
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commands, those commands are not arbitrary, but have ramifications for flourishing and
wellbeing among His human creatures. This does not mean, however, that the commands that
God issues are always for everyone in all times and in all places. It may be that God issues
certain commands that are contextually oriented, that is to say, God issues certain commands that
are geared toward a specific group for a specific time in history, but which are, nevertheless, in
accordance with His divine purposes. These commands would not, however, be arbitrary, so as
long as they are grounded in God’s own moral goodness and are meant for the flourishing of
those with whom God gives the command.
Lastly, what about natural evil? Natural evil, I take it, provides the more difficult problem
for theists. Not only must theism answer the question of devastation caused by things such as
natural disasters or disease, but they must also answer the question of animal pain and suffering.
Before responding to the question of natural evil, it would be helpful to consider some
important distinctions. First, it is important to recognize that not everything that appears to be
natural evil can rightly be labeled as such. There are many evils that, although they do appear in
nature, are, nevertheless, at least a partial result of human doing. Flooding caused by the
breaking of dams, damage to the ozone layer and natural habitats due to pollution and human
waste, animal death through the changing or destruction of natural habitats, damage to land and
animals caused by nuclear explosions and other forms of war, famine caused by the overuse of
land, extinction or near-extinction of animals due to poaching, and acid rain due to air pollutants
are just some of the kinds of evil that appear in nature, but that, in reality, are a result of human
destructive tendencies.
Second, there are other items that must also be taken into consideration, such as human
ignorance, neglect, and the choice of risk. Often humans move into areas of the world that are
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prone to natural disasters, such as hurricanes, tornados, and the like. For many of these people,
the goods that come from living in such an area outweigh the potential for harm caused by such
natural disasters. There have also been reports of people refusing to evacuate a city even
knowing that something like a hurricane is coming. It is also understood that sometimes people
are ignorant of upcoming natural events, such as tsunamis, that cause vast amounts of
destruction. But even in such instances, there may be an element of human responsibility. In the
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that killed over 250,000 people, there was no tsunami detection
system in place, even though the technology had been around for some time. Having such a
mechanism in place could have saved thousands of lives.85 The point here is not to make light of
the tragedy that comes with such disasters, but only to point out that living in such areas that
have an elevated risk factor or refusing to evacuate despite the risk of an impending destruction
or the failure to implement strategies for protection despite the capacity to do so are all matters
that involve human choice. Our choices are significant and often carry with them certain risks.
Making this point does not entail that all evils occurring in nature are a result of human choice;
rather, the point is only that some are connected to moral action and choice.
Third, it should be noted that some diseases, which are thought to be forms of natural
evil, are either caused by humans or are perpetuated by humans. Some diseases are brought
about through neglect of taking care of one’s body. Lack of exercising or lack of control in
eating certain things can often lead to disastrous effects on the body, such as heart disease or
diabetes. Active use of certain drugs can also cause the body’s organs to shut down or to cause
certain cancers. Having multiple sexual partners may lead to certain sexually transmitted
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diseases. Sometimes hospitals, which are to be places of healing, may transmit certain diseases
through acts like blood transfusions, when the blood has not been properly screened. Pollutants
in the water or in the ground where we grow our foods may result in ill effects on the body.
Again, not to make light of these tragedies in the world, but many of these, again, show that there
is a significance to our actions and choices. Further, this is not to say that all diseases are in some
way related to human freedom; rather, it is only to point out that some are.
Having said that, it is not at all surprising on theism that God would create such a world
as ours. If God exists, then it would seem that He would have good reasons for creating, not only
human life, but also nonhuman life, such as found in the great diversity of plants and animals in
the world, reflecting His fecundity. But such a world, is the kind of world where we also find a
great amount of natural evil, particularly evils brought about through natural disasters, predation,
disease, and the like. How might the theist explain this?
First, it may be helpful to consider that many of the events that bring about great
destruction are also the same kinds of events that are necessary for the normal operations of our
world and that, often, bring about some of the greatest wonders. Take, for example, plate
tectonics crashing together. These are often the cause of such events as earthquakes, tsunamis,
and volcanoes. Yet, without plate tectonics, we would not have the beautiful mountain ranges or
tropical islands that we see. But the importance of plate tectonics goes beyond aesthetic reasons.
The earth’s climate is remarkably stable, and this is due, in part, to plate tectonics, which,
through volcanoes, cycle out CO2 into the atmosphere. The release of CO2 through volcanic
activity is important for warming the earth’s atmosphere and for the water cycle. Moreover, plate
tectonics are involved in producing the biodiversity on the earth, which allows complex life to
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flourish. Without the effects brought about through plate tectonics, while there may be life, there
could be no human life as we know it.86
Second, I am going to suggest something that goes against the intuition of many who
discuss the problem of evil—not all pain amounts to evil. It may be that certain kinds of pain are
similar to plate tectonics, in the sense that, without them, our physical bodies would not function
properly and flourish as they do. If pain is an important part of proper function, then pain itself
may be seen as a good, in the sense that it is better to have certain pains than not to have them.
As discussed in Chapter One, there are many great advantages to having pain. When we consider
those people suffering from Hansen’s disease (leprosy), many of the complications that plague
their bodies stem from an inability to feel physical pain. Without pain they do not have the same
advantage that I do of feeling certain pains. If I am out walking in the yard and contort my leg in
such a way that I sprain my ankle, my body’s response is to swell in the area and the result is that
I feel pain. Pain, in this instance, is like a warning system telling my body that something is not
quite right. The pain that I feel may be a discomfort (given that we all have different tolerances
of the pain that we feel, it may be a big discomfort), but even here the pain itself is not the
problem, as much as one of my body parts has been injured and is not functioning properly. Pain
is the consequence of the sprained ankle. Moreover, as noted in Chapter One, people will often
put themselves through great pains in order to accomplish goals. Some of the cases considered
are athletes who put themselves through great pains to become better or women who choose to
experience child birth naturally apart from any epidurals or pain medicine. Yet we do not
generally classify such pains as evils, especially when they were endured willingly. So, at least to
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me, it seems that the hedonistic principle that all pain is evil is wrong. But someone might object,
“What about mental pain?” Even with respect to mental pains, it does not seem to me that we
ought to classify all such pains as evil. Perhaps, like physical pain, mental pain, too, functions
like a warning system telling us that something is not quite right. For example, suppose I see
some heinous act carried out and my immediate response is one of anger and sorrow. At the
same time, I feel a great amount of mental pain for the person because of what I saw. If our
emotions are in any way connected to our beliefs, then perhaps the pain itself is a way of telling
me that something is not quite right. Yet again, there are many individuals who would endure a
great amount of mental pain, brought about by ridicule, mental abuse, psychological torture and
the like, in order to hold unswervingly to some conviction or to accomplish some task. Here we
might think of a P.O.W, who, despite both physical and mental torture, endures a great amount
of mental pain for the sake of defending her country. Or, again, we might think of an athlete who
willingly takes certain forms of ridicule and embarrassment from a coach or peers in order to
achieve the goal of winning or becoming the best that he can be. In each case, the person may be
in quite a bit of mental pain, but nevertheless shows resilience and fortitude. Now, to be clear,
that is not to say that there is no evil involved in what is going on in either case; rather, the point
is that mental pain, much like physical pain, may not itself be evil. The evil is in the fact that
there is something that is not quite right, which was brought about ultimately through an agent.
In the former case the agent using torture and in the latter the person bringing about the ridicule,
but the physical or mental pain itself need not be an evil.87
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Third, it seems to me that the real issue involved in the discussion of the problem from
evil is not so much pain as it is in suffering or misery brought about through certain instances of
pain. Suffering, I take it, as discussed in Chapter One, is closer to a lack of flourishing in the
person. Severe pain may be the catalyst for suffering, but it is not necessarily equivalent to
suffering. We can think of pain, whether mental or physical, as having a threshold of sorts. Much
like any physical object, when enough force or pressure is applied the pain may become so
unbearable that the object which feels the pain breaks or becomes debilitated in some way. That
is what we often see in some cases of people suffering from certain types of depression. The
person’s mental pain becomes so unbearable that she cannot function properly. Sometimes,
however, the depression is brought about through a physical deficiency, such as a lack in
neurotransmitters. In both cases, the person is suffering. In a similar fashion, people who have
cancer often times experience excruciating pain, which may result in suffering. These are all
instances of misery or suffering linked to certain forms of pain. Yet, on the flip side, we can
imagine people who have no or little experience of either mental or physical pain, but who are,
nevertheless, dying from some unknown disease. In such instances, the persons involved do not
realize it but their bodies are no longer flourishing as they should be, because they are suffering
from the disease.
Having made the above qualifications, now are we ready to answer the question of
natural evil. In order to flesh this out, I will consider an argument first presented by Ed Miller
and expanded on by Kirk MacGregor. Miller’s argument goes as follows:
It would be logically impossible to have a world without evil: Anything created by God
would have to be less than God just by virtue of being dependent on him, and this means
immediately that it must be less than perfect, and this means immediately the presence of
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various sorts of imperfections. How could God create something that was perfect and
therefore independent, and therefore uncreated? It is logically impossible.88
MacGregor expands on Miller’s argument in the following way:
In other words, it is logically impossible for God to create a world without evil; if God chose
to create anything at all, evil would necessarily come into existence, not because God
created or caused it, but because whatever God created would not be God. Notice that all
such evils are, in and of themselves, gratuitous or pointless; their only raison d’être is the
logically unavoidable privation of ontological necessity exhibited by created entities. The
only way that any created entity could display perfection is nonessentially, that is, God
supernaturally acting to overwhelm or ‘make up for’ its resident imperfections; it could not
display perfection in and of itself. Therefore, gratuitous evil is ontologically inescapable for
contingent being every bit as much as perfection is essential to Necessary Being. Such
immediately explains the existence of gratuitous natural evil; it is logically necessary to the
universe, and God simply has to put up with it if he chooses to create a universe at all.89
This argument by Miller and MacGregor includes some rather strong statements. On the one
hand, there is something right about this argument, and I think that it points the theist in the right
direction; however, it needs some qualifications. The central problem with the argument is that
we can imagine all kinds of worlds, worlds that might even be metaphysically possible, that
would not contain evil. We can imagine a world in which God creates one immutable object and
sustains that object in existence everlastingly. While this object is both contingent and less than
perfect, it does not seem to me, at least, that such a world requires evil or that evil will inevitably
take place due to the contingency and less-than-perfect nature of the thing involved. Neither
contingency nor imperfection nor finiteness requires evil in-and-of-themselves. Even if we were
to take all of these together, as in the case of the finite object, no evil is required. Now whether
God has good reasons to create such a world or not is beyond the point. It seems to me that such
a world is logically (and metaphysically) possible, and hence the Miller/MacGregor argument

88

Ed L. Miller, Questions that Matter, 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992, 356 (emphasis in original) as
quoted in MacGregor, pp. 173-174.
89

MacGregor, “The Existence and Irrelevance,” 174.

183

fails in that sense. But here is where I think their argument got it right. They grounded their
argument in the Creator/creature distinction. There are certain logical limitations to any world
that God might create due to the sheer nature of its being finite, imperfect, and contingent.
Perhaps they could have qualified their argument to say something to this effect: It would be
logically impossible for God to create a world that is dynamic with natural processes such as
ours without some ensuing evil due to its imperfect, finite, and contingent nature.
Given the above insights form the Miller/MacGregor argument, the theist might put forth
an argument for natural evil as follows:
(1) If God exists, God would have strong reasons for creating a complex, multileveled
world with a great diversity of biological creatures, including creatures that are
sentient and intelligent. Some of the highly complex intelligent creatures, namely
humans, are capable of having meaningful experiences and entering into significant
relationships with God, one another, other creatures, and their environments.
(2) Because such creatures are biological and physical in nature, the world had to be
ordered according to a set of natural laws or law-like regulating principles. Given
what we know scientifically about the universe, physical life, and especially human
life, as we know it, could not exist unless things were ‘fine-tuned’ in such a way.
(3) The universe, as it now stands, consists of a great variety of goods, both in its
physical grandeur and beauty and in the flourishing of a great diversity of biological
life that it contains. Consequently, such a world also brings with it the possibility that
sentient and intelligent life will be negatively affected by the physical processes that
govern the formation and operations of the universe, resulting in a great amount of
suffering and death.
(4) Since we have no reason for thinking that God could have brought about a world with
alternative natural laws for supporting life as we know it, and yet a world that consists
of great potential for good, or, at least, a balance of good and evil, God is morally
justified in creating such a world that contains natural evils.90
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Perhaps the skeptic might respond in a couple of ways. She might ask, “Why could God
not have changed the natural processes in order to bring about a world free of evil?” There are
several problems with this response. First, we have no guarantee that, even if God were to
change the natural processes, they, too, would not go wrong. How do we know that such
processes would not result in much greater natural evils than what we see in the world already?
Second, why should we jettison processes that work well most of the time? Take, for instance,
our genetic processes. Though genetic processes do sometimes result in mutations, this is not the
norm. The same might be said with respect to the case of natural disasters. As noted previously,
the same mechanisms that cause these great disasters are also essential for normal operations in
the earth. Most of the time these processes function extremely well.91 Third, as Bruce
Reichenbach argues, changing or altering the natural laws would affect the various constituents
that make up the world. He explains,
The introduction of different natural laws affecting human beings in order to prevent the
frequent instances of natural evil would entail the alteration of human beings themselves.
Human beings are sentient creatures of nature. As physiological beings they interact with
Nature; they cause natural events and in turn are affected by natural events. Hence, insofar
as humans are natural, sentient beings, constructed of the same substance as Nature and
interacting with it, they will be affected in any natural system by lawful natural events.
These events sometimes will be propitious and sometimes not. And insofar as man is
essentially a conscious being, he will be aware of those events which are not propitious and
which for him constitute evils. Therefore, to prevent natural evils from affecting man, man
himself would have to be significantly changed, such that he would be no longer a sentient
creature of nature.92
There is a second response the skeptic might put forward. Since God is omnipotent, as
theists believe, why could God not create a world in which He miraculously intervenes to
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prevent natural evils? There are several responses to this objection. First, could it not be that God
is already miraculously responding to certain natural evils, such that His working is keeping
more natural evils from happening than what we are aware of? Second, a world whereby God
always miraculously intervenes would result in creatures who are incapable of understanding the
significance of their actions. It is only in a world such as ours, with natural processes and one
governed by natural law-like features, that human freedom can be exercised in a meaningful
way. 93 Third, such a world would be highly unpredictable and irregular. As Reichenbach further
explains:
But without the regularity which results from the governance of natural laws, rational action
would be impossible. Without regularity of sequence, agents could not entertain rational
explanations, make predictions, estimate probabilities, or calculate prudence. They would
not be able to know what to expect about any course of action they would like to take.
Whether or not such action would be possible, what they would have to do to have God
bring it about, whether it could occur as they planned (supposing agents could plan, which is
doubtful), what the consequences would be—all this would be unknown and unknowable.
Hence, agents could not know or even suppose what course of action to take to accomplish a
certain rationally conceived goal. Thus rational agents could neither propose action nor act
themselves.94
Moreover, it is highly doubtful that humans could be fully functioning moral agents in such a
world, since being a moral agent requires not only the ability to act but also to propose some
course of action. A highly irregular world would prevent both proposing a course of action and
acting on it.95 But suppose the critic responds by suggesting that there is a middle ground, so to
speak, that is to say, a world partially ruled by natural processes and partially ruled by
miraculous intervention. Again, Reichenbach is insightful on this point:
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But what would such a world be like? Presumably, a world which was only partially
operated by miracle would be one in which God would allow events at some times to follow
a “regular pattern,” and at other times not. That is, sometimes causal conditions x and y
would result in effect z, and at other times they would be followed by an effect of a different
sort. For example, heavy snowfall in the mountains and collapse of snow walls will cause an
avalanche to proceed down the mountain slope according to the law of gravity when no
sentient creatures is in its path; but should a climber be present, either that which causes the
avalanche “regularly” will not have this effect this time, or the avalanche will still occur but
will swerve around the climber or halt at his feet. But natural laws such as the law of gravity
assert universal and necessary connections between phenomena. Then if events sometimes
followed a “regular pattern” and sometimes not, there would be no natural laws regarding
that particular event. But then the appeal to a “regular pattern” is specious, for “regular
pattern” presupposes that there are normative natural laws which describe or govern the
course of events, so that one can distinguish what is regular from what is irregular. “Regular
pattern” has meaning only within the context of natural laws. Furthermore, if this absence of
universal and necessary connections is widespread, as would seem to be required in order to
prevent all natural evils, the world would have few if any natural laws; it would, in effect, be
governed by miraculous intervention. Thus, though this so-called middle ground would
remove the contradiction with respect to the possibility of human action vis-à-vis being free,
the consequences of it still would be such as to make rational prediction and rational action
impossible, and hence to make moral action impossible.96
It would seem, then, that theists have good reasons for supposing the need for a world such as
ours.
Before moving on to a comparison between the four metaphysical systems on explaining
evil, it would be helpful to consider one last issue—the difficult problem of animal pain and
death. How might the theist respond?
Unlike its metaphysical rivals, theism provides within it the resources for thinking that
there might be some kind of compensation for animal life in the end. Many theistic traditions
hold to something like an afterlife, and all three major theistic traditions hold to the resurrection
of the dead. Christianity and Judaism both take it that there will be a future restoration of
creation. Now, there are differences of opinion on what things will be like in the end times, and
each theistic tradition will have to work this out. All that I am suggesting, here, is that there is a
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significant possibility for animal compensation and that theism, if God is omnipotent, could
bring about such a state.97
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CHAPTER 6: METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND EVIL PART 5
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Having examined each of the four metaphysical systems, I now turn to a comparative
analysis, examining how well each answers the phenomena evil based on the following criteria:
(A) Factual Adequacy
(B) Logical Consistency
(C) Explanatory Power
(D) Explanatory Scope
(E) Ad hoc-ness
(F) Plausibility
(1) How Plausible of an explanation is the theory/hypothesis in itself?
(2) How plausible of an explanation is the theory/hypothesis relative to the other
hypotheses?
(G) Livability

Factual Adequacy
Regarding factual adequacy (A), to what extent can the naturalist or pantheist make sense
of the salient facts of evil—the types and kinds of evil in the world (moral and natural), along
with the quantity and intensity of such evils? It would seem that, if one were take a position such
as Levine’s, a pantheist may have a better time of making sense of moral evil in the world than
those forms of pantheism which deny the reality of good and evil altogether, or at least see evil
as nothing more than an illusion. One would have to adopt some kind of principle which always
promotes the good. But making sense of how a principle enforces or promotes the good is
difficult and needs further explication on the part of the pantheist. Given something like the
karmic system, how can such a law or principle judge as to whether a person has done the right
or enough good, especially since laws, principles, and forces are not the kinds of things that can
judge?
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For naturalism, in order to make sense of evil, apart from adopting some ad hoc
hypothesis, such as Platonism or moral supervenience—both of which are not a given from
naturalistic assumptions—it seems that all the naturalist can do, given her system, is to say that
evil (if we can call it that) is a by-product of the way things are. Richard Dawkins has this to say
about evil, pain, and suffering in the world:
The total amount of suffering per year in the natural world is beyond all decent
contemplation. During the minute that it takes me to compose this sentence, thousands of
animals are being eaten alive, many others are running their lives, whimpering with fear;
others are slowly being devoured from within by rasping parasites; thousands of all kinds
are dying of starvation, thirst, and disease. It must be so. If there ever is a time of plenty, this
very fact will automatically lead to an increase in the population until the natural state of
starvation and misery is restored. . . . In a universe of electrons and selfish genes, blind
physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are
going to get lucky, and you won’t find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The
universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom,
no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference.1
It would seem that naturalism is, at bottom, incapable of providing a satisfactory understanding
of evil. Moreover, both pantheistic and naturalistic systems deny such a thing as natural evil in
the world. No doubt that the effects of things like hurricanes or disease are tragic, but those kinds
of things cannot be properly called evils, despite how it affects either the human or the animal
realm. Naturalism also has a difficult time explaining moral evils, since a world like “evil” where
moral evils are considered is hard to square with its determinism or near determinism.
But what of process panthentheism (PPT) and theism? Here, I take it that both Process
panentheism and theism fare better at explaining the salient facts of evil than either naturalism or
pantheism. Each system recognizes that there is such a thing as evil in the world and both have
unique ways of answering the question of evil. Moral evil, given libertarian freedom, is not at all
surprising in either system. For the defender of PPT, while it possible to explain the notions of
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good and evil in the world, there are some central difficulties. One difficulty is that the PPT view
of good and evil depends heavily on process metaphysics. While certain aspects of process
metaphysics may turn out to be true, it is difficult to understand how we can have events without
things. Moreover, the whole process metaphysic centers on creativity, but, even, here, there is
nothing that underlines or grounds the creativity necessary for the various occasions to take
place. A second difficulty is that Process thinkers must couch good and evil primarily in
aesthetic terms rather than moral ones. This goes against how good and evil are usually
understood, despite the fact that there may well be all manner of organic connections between
the good and the beautiful. But even more so, if aesthetic principles take priority, then a number
of moral principles may be violated in order to achieve the aims of those aesthetic principles.
Even more damaging, however, is the fact that it seems the sufferings and pains of creatures
become a means to an end in order for God to achieve certain aesthetic purposes.
Perhaps, the greatest difficulty for theism is explaining the existence of natural evil, and
particularly animal pain, although a world that operates according to certain stable natural laws is
better than one ruled by unpredictable miraculous intervention. Furthermore, as argued in the
previous chapter, such a world that has elements of risk, as our world does, has greater
significance than ones without such risks. Lastly, theists recognize that such a world, finite,
dynamic, and limited, inevitably leads to imperfection, especially if God has granted the creation
to have a certain amount of freedom to be and to operate as He created it to be. This
understanding demonstrates an important metaphysical principle recognized by theists that there
is a significant difference between the Creator and the creature, which theists base on the
contingency of the world (whether logically or temporally) and the necessity and eternality of
God. Regarding animal pain, while theists face difficulties, there are resources within theism that
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provide partial explanations of the facts. For example, animals, like humans, are part of a
dynamic, contingent, and limited system that, while on the whole operates and functions
properly, may nevertheless result in some destruction when animal and human life are affected
by such processes. Furthermore, as we saw, theists might rightly reject the hedonistic principle
that all pain is evil. Pain, much like tectonic plates and the like, though it may lead to suffering,
is an important part of the proper function of certain forms of biological life. In addition, pain
may even lead to certain forms of flourishing (e.g., when someone perseveres through a rigorous
physical routine in order to achieve a goal). While no doubt animal pain and predation provide
difficulties for theists, and there is much more work that needs done in this area, there is reason
to believe, however, that (1) pain in humans is quite different than pain in animals and (2) that
theism likely features resources to redeem animal suffering that exceed those of this world.

Logical Consistency
As far as logical consistency (B) is concerned, naturalism is a fairly consistent and
straightforward system; yet it stumbles in explaining moral facts. Many naturalists try to hold to
some kind of objectivist view of morality, but naturalism as a system likely does not provide its
best explanations, apart from ad-hoc explanations. Furthermore, if one finds Alvin Plantinga’s
evolutionary argument against naturalism successful, it would seem that one of the key tenets of
naturalism—belief in evolution—does not fit well within the naturalistic schema.2 Regarding evil
in the world, given how we normally classify something as evil, in order to remain consistent
with the naturalistic worldview, such classifications as moral and natural evil do not make nearly
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as good sense within the naturalistic worldview as some of the other alternatives considered. The
various kinds and variety and intensity of evil are just a part of the way things are.
Pantheism is much less straight forward a system. It is difficult to nail down just what a
pantheist means by things like the divine, all-inclusive Unity, or Absolute. Minimally, pantheists
agree that there is a Unity and this Unity is in some sense divine. But with respect to the Unity,
how much better off is the pantheist than the naturalist? How is the pantheistic Unity any
stronger of a unity than the naturalistic understanding of the four-dimensional space-time
universe? Furthermore, pantheists are not agreed over whether all reality is one substance
(monism) or if a plurality of substances (pluralism) exists (or exist) in the world. Pantheists like
Levine seek to eschew, or at least put on hold, a conclusion about the notion of substance, opting
for some minimal kind of explanation like a force or organizing principle that brings order to the
various parts of the universe. But it is hard to see how this solves the problem of ambiguity
within the pantheistic system. Epistemically, what reasons do we have for thinking something
like Levine’s notion of the organizing principle or force is the case? Perhaps the pantheist can
employ the anthropic principle and something like neo-Darwinian evolution as supporting
evidence that something is behind the events in the universe. But as shown earlier, the pantheist
will run up against the difficulties that such a system face with the notions of eternity and
necessity. With respect to the metaphysics of good and evil, it does seem that a pantheist can, at
least, provide some categories for thinking about morality and evil that are consistent within its
system. If one were to take a view such as Levine’s, then one might say good is that which
promotes the divine Unity, while evil is that which goes against it.
Process panentheism is less straight-forward than naturalism, yet it is generally
consistent. This consistency, however, depends quite a bit on Whitehead’s complex process
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metaphysics. For PPT, the “many,” the “one,” and “creativity” are central features of reality,
although, as we have suggested throughout, serious difficulties saddle Whitehead’s metaphysics,
namely, the concept of creativity. If God is not the primary organizing source, then what is?
Process thinkers believe that it is creativity, but just what is “creativity”? It is not its own entity,
nor does anything ground it; nevertheless, it is behind all the goings on in reality. This leaves us
wondering: From whence does the energy that fuels the universe come? What perpetuates this
endless supply of creativity? Many defenders of PPT bite the bullet and accept the principle of
creativity as brute fact. If one were to grant it, suggests the process theists, then all else would
follow. But this is something that theists will be unwilling to do. Furthermore, much rides on the
notion that the fundamental basic unit of reality is the actual occasion or event, instead of
substance. Here, too, as I have argued in Chapter Four, there is reason to doubt this particular
tenet of process metaphysics. Much of the PPT view on good and evil is parasitic on these two
features of process metaphysics. Despite these difficulties, taken on its own terms, PPT is
logically consistent—more so than either pantheism or naturalism.
Theism, like naturalism, is a straightforward system, though it is more complex. Despite
its complexity, theism is, nevertheless, overall consistent. Most attacks on theism come from the
phenomena of evil in the world. As I have argued, given something like human libertarian
freedom and a natural order that is governed by laws or law-like regularities, and given the finite
and dynamic nature of the world that is other than God, there is nothing logically inconsistent
about God’s existence and evil in the world. Furthermore, Alvin Plantinga, in God, Freedom,
and Evil, has shown that there is no logical inconsistency between the existence of God and the
existence of evil in the world, something to which most atheists will agree. This still leaves
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important questions to ask concerning evil, to which distinctive aspects of Christian theology, I
will argue in later chapters, are relevant.

Explanatory Power and Scope
How well do each of the metaphysical systems fare at explanatory power (C) and
explanatory scope (D)? As noted, in order to explain the concept of evil, one must explain life,
consciousness, the metaphysics of good and evil, and moral responsibility. Naturalists,
pantheists, and panentheists all have a hard time explaining the nature of the universe, which is
essential to explaining the existence of life.
Each of the three non-theistic systems runs up against the problem of infinite regress.
Naturalists often posit something like the multiverse in order to explain the anthropic principle.
But positing the multiverse only complicates the naturalistic hypothesis. Not only now do they
need to explain the anthropic principle, but an eternal universe generator of sorts. Pantheists, too,
have their own troubles. While a pantheist may hold to something like the anthropic principle
and neo-Darwinian evolution in their systems, given that the pantheistic understanding of a force
or unifying principle is at work at organizing the universe, it runs up against the problem of
necessity and the eternality of the universe. If the universe at any time began to exist, as
confirmed by standard Big Bang cosmology, then it would seem difficult to explain how the
universe is identical to God in any meaningful way. For if God transcends the universe, would
we, then, truly have a pantheistic system? But on the other hand, if all things exploded forth
through the Big Bang, this leaves the problem of where it all came from—something would have
truly come from nothing. Yet, as noted, actual infinites are impossible in the world and would
lead to all kinds of absurdities. Defenders of PPT, too, fail in adequately explaining the existence
of the universe. Like naturalists, process panentheists take it that something has always existed—
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though the universe, as we know it, has not. More so than pantheism or naturalism, PPT as a
metaphysical system provides some explanation for the anthropic principle. God is the
motivation behind the universe getting its start and direction, but how the universe has turned out
is not entirely up to God. Yet, why is there a God or nature in the first place? Here, the theist can
press the defender of PPT. While there is a sense that in the “primordial pole” God is both
“eternal” and “infinite,” we cannot, nevertheless, properly call God “necessary” or “eternal” in
the same sense that theists can. God, for defenders of PPT, is dependent on a universe for His
actualization. It does not have to be this universe; rather, all that is needed is a universe. But not
only is God’s actualization dependent on a universe, so too is God’s existence. God and the
world are co-dependent and intricately connected. If there were no world (pre-existing matter
and the like before the Big Bang), then we can presume that there would be no God, either.
Theists take it that God is both eternal and necessary. God’s eternality and necessity are
fundamental features of God’s nature, that without which God would not be God. Theists, then,
do not run up against the problem of infinite regress as naturalists, pantheists, and panentheists
do.
Regarding consciousness, physicalism cannot provide an adequate explanation.
Naturalistic and pantheistic physicalists cannot properly explain consciousness within their
systems. But as was shown, a pantheist may hold to any number of other possibilities, such as
animism, dualism, or panpsychism, which may provide grounds for consciousness.
Consciousness, then, is more likely within a pantheistic system than in naturalism. As was shown
in the discussion on PPT, however, there are some major difficulties with panexperientialism,
such as the combination problem. The combination problem not only affects panexperientialism;
it also affects pansychist theories on consciousness. How about theism and consciousness? As
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with naturalistic and pantheistic views, any attempt at adopting a physicalist form of
consciousness fails; however, most theists hold to dualism, the view whereby the mind is in
some sense distinct from the body. In Chapter Five three lines of argument were given in support
dualism. First, if God Himself is an unembodied mind, then theists have as an exemplar or
paradigm-case of what an unembodied mind is like. Second, theists have at their disposal certain
empirical evidence from NDEs and post-death visions. Third, and lastly, theists have the unityof-consciousness argument. As argued, all that one need to show is a minimalistic version of
dualism in order to have consciousness, which theists can do.
Lastly, how does each of the four metaphysical systems fare at explaining the
metaphysics of good and evil and moral responsibility? It would seem that a pantheist can better
accommodate the notions of good, evil, and morality than can a naturalist, provided that one hold
to something like Levine’s modified command theory, whereby one does what promotes the
Unity and avoids those things which defy it. The ground for the “good” is the Unity itself, which
always promotes the good and moral rightness. Evil and moral wrongness, then, is that which
goes against the Unity. But what exactly is it that promotes the Unity? How are we to make
sense of this? The pantheist will need to flesh this out more if he expects for his system to
provide greater explanatory power. The strength of the pantheistic system—that such a system
can provide some explanation for morality—is counteracted by the lack of clarity in the
metaphysics behind key parts of the system. Arguably the best that a naturalist can do for
explaining morality, without adding ad hoc hypotheses, is to offer a naturalistic explanation
grounded in neo-Darwinian evolution. But such attempts are ultimately insufficient. No matter
how deeply committed to and intent on doing the just or virtuous thing that a naturalist might be,
it is difficult to see how one can get obligation out of genetic predispositions, imperatives out of
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indicatives. Furthermore, within the naturalistic system, what we generally call evil is a
necessary feature of the cosmos. Regarding human responsibility, for pantheistic systems that are
deterministic in nature, it is hard to make sense of human responsibility. But as Levine has
argued, pantheism need not entail determinism. Some kind of libertarian freedom, I have argued,
is necessary if we are to make sense of human responsibility. If we are to understand human
freedom as libertarian, it must be seen in connection to the divine unity and in some sense found
within the basic structures of the universe. Both defenders of PPT and theism can accommodate
human freedom within their systems. For theists, humans were created with libertarian freedom,
and, hence, they generally have the capacity to do otherwise. Process panentheists, on the other
hand, recognize that freedom is a basic feature of all actual entities, and especially human
creatures, who have a greater capacity of freedom. Regarding good and evil, as I have argued
throughout, neither is surprising given theism. There is reason to expect certain forms of moral
evil given human libertarian freedom. Furthermore, based on the Creator/creature distinction, the
finite and limited nature of the world, the various processes needed to sustain biological life, and
that the world is dynamic, it is not at all surprising that certain kinds of natural evil may result.
Theists also believe that God is the good, or at least perfectly good, and the ground for all moral
action, both our source and moral telos. For theists, not only is God the ground for good, but God
has also established a moral order that humans are to abide by. Lastly, theists believe that not
only does God have the power to overcome evil, but eventually He will do so, carving out
important room for rational hope in the face of the problem of evil. For process panentheists,
good and evil can be explained; however, it is at the risk of redefining evil to fit in primarily
aesthetic categories. This is problematic, however. While doing so does not completely wipe out
evil in moral terms, the moral categories become subordinate to aesthetic ones, which, as
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discussed earlier, allows for certain moral principles to be violated, perhaps even vitiated. There
are, however, two other problems with PPT, as we saw. God, for process panentheists, is limited,
and there is no eschatological payoff. There is no guarantee that evil will ever be thwarted in the
end. The problem of evil defeats hope of ultimate resolution.

Ad Hoc-ness
To what extent do these metaphysical system provide ad hoc explanations (E)? It would
seem that both naturalistic and pantheistic systems have some elements of ad hoc-ness. For
naturalists, and pantheists like Harrison, this is mostly seen with respect to positing something
like the multiverse—whether such a thing as the multiverse is true or not—in order to explain the
anthropic principle. Yet it is also taken to be somewhat of a backdoor way of arguing for certain
metaphysical conclusions about the nature of the universe (e.g., that nature is all there is, was, or
ever will be). But as Paul Davies pointed out, this only puts the problem one step removed. The
same could be said with respect to positing something like Stephen Hawking’s space-time
curvature hypothesis. Both the multiverse and space-time curvature hypotheses come across as
ad hoc efforts to provide explanation for the apparent design of life and to show that the universe
is all that there is.
What of pantheists? Whether one takes it as ad hoc or not, it seems that for both Harrison
and Levine, with respect to their brand of pantheism, the standard method of argumentation is to
show why various other systems do not work, and then to make assertions regarding their own
systems about how things either are or could be. Assertions, however, are not arguments, nor do
they sufficiently ground metaphysical positions.
Perhaps the chief difficulty of process panentheism is its postulation of creativity as the
underlying metaphysical principle. Yet defenders of PPT have not given reason to think that such
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a principle underlies all of reality. Furthermore, they have not shown what this principle is, the
very principle on which the whole process system stands or falls.
Theists too may be charged with some ad hoc-ness in their system, especially pertaining
to the afterlife. The notion of an afterlife is an important aspect of the theistic system, without
which it would be difficult to make sense of God’s bringing the world to rights and final justice.
What reason is there for thinking that something like the afterlife is true? How might the theist
respond? There are at least two lines of argument a theist might give regarding an afterlife. First,
as discussed earlier in this chapter, there is veridical evidence for both near-death experiences
and post-death visions. Furthermore, there are modern documented cases of people returning to
life after having been prayed for.3 While the evidence does not conclusively guarantee an
afterlife, it does give theists reasons for thinking that there might be something like an afterlife.
Second, if God is omnipotent, there is reason to believe that He could do something like bring
people back from the dead, as in the notion of the resurrection. For example, Christians take it
that God raised Jesus from the dead. They base this on a variety of historical evidences.4 Now, if
the Christian theist can show that God raising Jesus from the dead makes better sense of the
historical data than do the best naturalistic theories, and if they can show that miracles are
possible in a world such as ours, then the theist is within her epistemic right to believe in
something along the lines of an afterlife. Taken together, these reasons for thinking there is such
a thing as an afterlife can do much to dispense with the charge of ad hoc-ness in theism.
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Plausibility
Regarding plausibility (F), it seems that neither the naturalistic nor the pantheistic
hypothesis, by itself, is plausible given evil, or at least given how we generally think of evil, in
the world. Perhaps the critic might think this judgment unfair, especially since pantheism
provides some reasons for thinking that something like evil exists as something that disrupts or
goes against the divine Unity. Perhaps it would increase the plausibility of pantheism if it could
explain just what it is that such a disruption consists of, or, more importantly, just what the
divine Unity is. Yet, in comparing the two hypothesis, it would seem that the notion of evil is
more plausible given pantheism than naturalism. Though naturalism as a metaphysical system is
more consistent than pantheism (provided that we grant neo-Darwinian evolution), it lacks in
both explanatory power and scope when it comes to our general understanding of the concepts of
evil. It fails to adequately explain life, consciousness, the metaphysics of good and evil, and
human responsibility. Pantheism, though it lacks overall coherence and consistency, fares much
better at explaining each of these, particularly the latter three. Yet its overall explanatory
adequacy depends on whether or not pantheism can give us good reason to think that the
universe has always existed. From the above analysis, it does not seem that it can.
PPT as a metaphysical system provides a better explanation of the salient facts of good
and evil, morality and human responsibility, the anthropic principle, and consciousness than do
either pantheism or naturalism. However, while there is an overall greater explanatory force to
PPT, it too suffers from the same major difficulty that both pantheism and naturalism face,
namely, the problem of infinite regress. There is also a yet more damaging difficulty with the
PPT view: it cannot adequately explain the nature of its fundamental metaphysical principle.
What is this creativity grounded in? What supplies it with its endless energy? Process
panentheists do not have an answer for this. Granting such a principle as creativity (which theists
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are unwilling to do) would elucidate the concepts of good and evil from the process panentheistic
perspective, though, as we have seen, it requires redefining good and evil in primarily aesthetic
terms, which is problematic, since moral principles become subordinate to aesthetic principles.
Lastly, there are two additional problems with PPT. First, the concept of a limited God
raises several difficulties. Can such a God really do anything about evil in the world? Perhaps the
process panentheist will argue that the God of panentheism can suffer along with his creatures
and provide them with the initial aims to direct them toward a more harmonious and intense
reality. As discussed, we might commend such a God for the work in thwarting evil and choose
to fight along in the good fight, but in the end, would such a God be worship worthy? It seems
not. Furthermore, it is not at all clear how the God of PPT directs the affairs of all the world in
sending the initial aims, given that the actual entities are responding to such aims immediately.
How does such a God send these aims instantaneously without the kind of omniscience ascribed
to the God of theism, particularly some kind of knowledge of the future free acts of the actual
entities? It would seem that this would be needed for the creatures to make the right decisions
necessary to follow God’s aims and purposes. Second, there does not seem to be much of an
eschatological payoff for God’s creatures if they choose to follow God. At most, all of God’s
creatures’ lives are in some sense absorbed into God’s experience, remaining a part of God’s
self-actualization. Some process thinkers are open to the idea of an afterlife, but do not press it as
a significant part of the PPT view. Thus while PPT is more plausible of a system for explaining
evil than either naturalism or panentheism, this is necessary but not sufficient to argue that it is
plausible in and of itself. It is quite an ingenious system, but quite a few unexplainable features
undermine its utlima facie plausibility.
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Lastly, we consider theism. Of the three systems, theism can genuinely explain evil based
on its major tenets. It can do so without redefining good and evil, and it can do so by
understanding such locutions how most people understand the words, that is, without equivocal
or idiosyncratic meanings. Furthermore, theism adequately answers each of the four areas: life,
consciousness, the metaphysics of good and evil, and human freedom. This does not mean that
there are no difficulties for theism. There are still many areas that theists must work out. The
areas of consciousness and the problem of animal pain are just two key areas that need further
attention. That additional work is needed does not hinder theism from providing a partial
explanation to such issues. Moreover, theists believe that God has created the world with a moral
order, and it is God Himself who is the standard for the good that we see in this order. If we take
it that God made humans to be like Him in certain respects (e.g., the Christian and Jewish
understanding of the imago dei), we have good reason for thinking that the world and its order is
knowable and understandable. It is because of the established moral order and God’s creating
humans to be like Him that people can recognize that certain things are right and wrong. They
can see the moral order of things, even if they chose not to follow it. Lastly, the God of theism
can genuinely do things about the evil in the world. While God may have general policies in
place such as libertarian freedom with respect to His human creatures and law-like regulatory
processes in nature, it does not mean that God is inactive or can do nothing about the evil in the
world. Furthermore, given the theistic understanding of afterlife, it does seem that there is
something akin to eschatological payoff for God’s creatures when it is all said and done (e.g.,
resurrection, restoration of creation, and so on). Lastly, there is the possibility of final justice for
the evils committed in this world. In all, it seems that theism not only provides a more plausible
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explanation given the other metaphysical systems when it comes to explaining evil, but theism
provides a plausible explanation in and of itself.

Livability
There is, however, one more consideration: How livable is each of the four metaphysical
systems (G)? Naturalism, at bottom, is the thinnest of the four systems. Not only does it provide
no grounding for objective morality or for human responsibility, it has a bleak outlook on life.
There is no afterlife or personal immortality. Moreover, there is no ultimate assurance that the
work we do on the earth provides any ultimate significance. Nor is there any final vindication for
the evils that we experience in the world.
Certain forms of pantheism hold to laws or principles within the Unity, such as karma or
dharma, which suggestively promote justice within the universe. But the critic will want to know
just how such laws or principles of cause and effect bring about justice? Do they function like
the laws of nature? It is hard to see how the effects of morally significant actions can be equated
with the effects brought about by the laws of physics, unless, of course, all things are determined.
After all, many theists would agree with something like natural law theories of ethics, that such
laws are in some sense “built in,” but they also recognize that the universe itself cannot explain
such theories. Furthermore, another issue is the administration of justice. How can such laws
administer justice if broken? It is not at all clear that a law or principle can. A yet further issue is
this: Are the laws themselves eternally existing, or were such laws put in place by God?
Pantheists are in basic disagreement about this. Regarding immortality, some pantheists teach
that there is such a thing as an afterlife. Some hold to the existence of individual souls living on
after death, while others hold that eventually all things will be absorbed back into Absolute or
the Unity. While there is some hope in the former, the latter leads to a bleak outlook on life.
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Defenders of PPT recognize that there is a moral order. The God of PPT sends initial
aims to its creatures in hopes that the actual entities will chose the right path which will
ultimately lead to higher levels of harmony and greater intensity. But why should any of God’s
creatures follow suit? Why should these actual entities heed God’s initial aim? But even more
damaging is that many of these actual entities are incapable of making any kind of rational
decision. Such capacities are found only in the higher forms of genuine societies. If these entities
rebel against God (if we can even call it that), there is no ultimate justice for their rebellion,
despite their response to God’s initial aims. Even more troubling is PPT’s theodicy. The process
theodicy is not strongly eschatological. I would agree with Stephen T. Davis that any theodical
solution to the problem of evil must maintain some kind of reference to the future. In response to
the theodicy put forth by Griffin, Davis asks “[D]oes God have the power, influence, or
persuasive ability to make the divine intentions succeed?”5 If the process understanding of God
is correct, then all that we can say is that God’s desires might come out in the end. There is,
however, no ultimate assurance or guarantee that they will. At best, Davis says, we might say
that God is a good being who works hard. We might even sympathize with such a God, joining
in the fight to thwart evil. But such a God would not be worthy of worship. Unless God is able to
bring about more good in the world than evil, such a God would be fully indictable.6 Davis puts
it as follows: “God will be something like a mad scientist who creates a monster he hopes will
behave but whom he cannot control; if the monster does more evil than good the scientist’s
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decision to create the monster will turn out to have been terribly wrong. The scientist will be
indictable.”7
Naturalism, pantheism, and panentheism also each face the same fate—the pending doom
of the universe. As William Lane Craig so forcefully puts it:
And the universe, too, faces a death of its own. Scientists tell us that the universe is
expanding, and the galaxies are growing farther and farther apart. As it does so, it grows
colder and colder, and its energy is used up. Eventually all the stars will burn out, and all
matter will collapse into dead stars and black holes. There will be no light at all; there will
be no heat; there will be no life; only the corpses of dead stars and galaxies, ever expanding
into the endless darkness and the cold recesses of space—a universe in ruins. This is not
science fiction. The entire universe marches irreversibly toward its grave. So not only is the
life of each individual person doomed; the entire human race is doomed. The universe is
plunging toward inevitable extinction—death is written throughout its structure. There is no
escape. There is no hope.8
For the naturalist, there is no escaping that such an outcome is the conclusion of all of our human
efforts to achieve greatness. What, in the end, have all of our scientific progress and discoveries
accomplished? For the pantheist, the same organizing force lying behind all of life, animating the
very world we live in, ultimately leads the world to its final demise. It is hard to see how a God
that is not all-powerful could turn things around for the hope of the world. In the end, would such
a God—indifferent as it may be—care? What of the God of PPT? Could such a God do any
better? Here, it would seem, the mad scientist strikes again. Just as there is no guarantee that the
world will turn out with more good than evil, so too is there no guarantee that the world will
avoid its impending doom. What, then, becomes of all of God’s work? What becomes of God?
Would God, then, begin the whole evolutionary process over again, keeping at it until all things
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finally turn out as planned? In the end, we might forecast the eschatological payoff of each
metaphysical system as follows: bleak (process panentheism); bleaker (pantheism); and bleakest
(naturalism).
Of the four systems, only theism provides a metaphysical system that is livable in the
face of evil. Theism provides within it the resources needed to not only explain why the world is
in the shape that it is, but it also provides a solution to the evil in the world. Theism recognizes
that there is something really wrong with the world. It is not how it should be. As Stephen Davis
rightly points out, “[t]he world is not worthwhile as it stands: it needs to be redeemed.”9 Only a
God who is powerful enough to act in the world and who is religiously available to His creatures
can bring about the kind of changes needed to thwart evil. Moreover, theists believe that the
world will eventually be put to right. There will be final vindication for all wrongs committed,
and many of God’s creatures will share in a blissful afterlife. Lastly, if God created all things,
including the entire four-dimensional space-time universe, as theists believe, then there is no
reason to think that God could not stop the impending doom that lies in store for the universe.
Only a God who is infinite in power can keep the universe from reaching its ultimate doom and
restore it to its original intended goodness.

Concluding Thoughts
In Chapters Two through Five, I have sought to compare four metaphysical systems.
Throughout, I have argued that of the four metaphysical systems considered, theism best
explains the phenomena of evil in the world. I have not argued that theism explains all things
well or that it explains every instance of evil. That was not my goal; rather, I have only sought to
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argue that theism explains evil as well as or better than its metaphysical rivals. In the previous
chapter I argued that theism adequately explains life, consciousness, the metaphysics of good
and evil, and human responsibility, and does so better than its rivals. Moreover, I argued that
theism is livable in the face of evil and provides an overall thicker worldview response.
Before moving on to the next chapter, there is one final challenge the theist must face. To
see this challenge, it will be helpful to consider a quote from H. P. Owen summarizing Charles
Hartshorne’s critique of Classical theism:
In particular, Hartshorne maintains that the self-sufficient, changeless God of classical
theism cannot possess the property of love that Christian theists attribute to him. If God is
love he must be a ‘social’ being. He (like any member of human society) must be affected
by the objects of his love; he must be pained by their sufferings and enriched by their
achievements. If he did not need his human creatures for the completion of his being he
would not have any reason for creating them. ‘A being which contains, in sheer
independence of others, all possible perfection and value must surely know better than to
clutter up existence with beings which can add nothing to the value that would exist without
them’ (50).10
There is much going on, here, and I cannot feasibly consider the entirety of this objection in
these concluding remarks. Much of this objection I will consider in the final chapters. For now, I
would like to focus on Hartshorne’s point that if God is love, then it necessitates that God be a
social being. If Hartshorne is correct, then it raises a fundamental problem for the theist. Either
God needs the world to demonstrate His love or God does not have love as an essential attribute.
Many if not most theists recognize that love is an essential attribute of God. Moreover, if God
were not loving, as the preponderance of theists believe, then could theists provide an adequate
answer to the problem from evil? But in order for God to feature love as an essential property,
there must be something for God to love. Theists will want to avoid saying that God must create
in order to love something other than Himself, since such an admission suggests that God is not
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complete in-and-of-Himself, deficient in aseity. God would then need something other than
God’s self for His completion, which results in a form of panentheism.
A way out for the theists is available, however. We can make a distinction here between
“Unitarian” theism and “Trinitarian” theism. Unitarian theists believe that God consists of only
one person. Trinitarian theists, on the other hand, recognize that God is more than one person
(presumably three). By this, they do not mean that there is more than one God; rather, they mean
that within this one God there exists more than one person (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). If one
were to accept a Trinitarian understanding of God over a Unitarian view, one can avoid either
horn of the Hartshornean dilemma. This is the move that I will pursue and argue for in the pages
that follow. We shall we now turn to the Christian worldview.
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CHAPTER 7: THE TRINITY AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD

As discussed in the previous chapter, Christian theists have a different perspective on the
concept of God from other theists. Central to the Christian claim is a concept of God that is tripersonal in nature. It is precisely this concept of a Trinitarian God that enables a theist to resist
slipping into panentheism, whereby God is in some sense dependent on creation for His
actualization—something from which most all theists will want to steer away. If God depends on
creation, then God would not be the greatest conceivable being, since such a view would call into
question God’s perfection and necessary existence. In what follows I will outline a sketch of the
mere Christian concept of God and worldview proposed in Chapter One. I do not claim that all
Christians will accept my conclusions, but this will be, rather, a sketch of what I take most
Christians to believe. As noted in the introduction, it may be that some denominations or
traditions will want to tweak what I say below. That is fine. My intention is to put forth a basic
overview of what I take to be the Christian worldview, centered on the perichoretic relationship
of the Triune God. I want to show how the perichoretic relationship of the persons of the
Godhead may shed light on various other core doctrines of the Christian faith.
I begin by showing that there is a clear connection between God’s nature and morality. I
then argue that the perichoretic relationship between the persons of the Trinity provide the
paradigm for thinking about God’s intentions for creation and that it gives us a clue for the telos
of creation, that is to say, from the beginning of creation, God has had intentions of bringing
about, what I will call, the perichoretic kingdom.
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Light, Love, and Fellowship
The brief New Testament letter of 1 John makes two striking claims about God—“God is
light” and “God is love.” These claims provide for the Elder a theological framework and ethical
vision for the small community of believers.1
Throughout Scripture, ‘light’ is often used as a metaphor to reflect certain characteristics
of God, His revelation, or salvation.2 Discernable from the context of 1 John, the Elder uses
‘light’ as a metaphor to reflect God’s flawless perfection, truthfulness, impeccability, and moral
goodness. Immediately following the words “God is light,” the author of 1 John clarifies what he
means by reminding his readers that in God “there is no darkness at all” (1 John 1:5). The Elder
is setting up for his readers a strong contrast between God, who is light, and darkness. As noted
by I. Howard Marshall, “The contrast between God and darkness is expressed as strongly as
possible. The point is not so much that God did not create darkness but rather that living in
darkness is incompatible with fellowship with God. This makes it clear that the writer is thinking
of light and darkness predominately in ethical terms.”3
I agree with the Marshall’s basic thrust, but I think there is some need to clarify his point.
First, he is right in asserting that the words ‘light’ and ‘dark’ are used “predominately in ethical

1

Yarbrough provides four reasons for thinking this is the case. First, it has the ring of a summary
statement. It is the message that the elder heard “from him” and declares to his readers. Second, the verse comes
after four introductory statements, which would seem to indicate, based on positioning, its overall importance.
Third, when the elder speaks of the Son, he ipso facto speaks of the Father, since it is the Son who came from the
Father and reveals Him to us (a major theme in the Johannine writings Jn 1:1-2, 18; 14:8-11; 1 Jn 1:2-3). Fourth and,
perhaps, most critically, the language is deeply rooted in OT theology. Robert W. Yarbrough. 1-3 John. Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008. 46-47. Similarly, Kruse argues “God is light” “defines the content of his [the
elder’s] message . . . which provides basis for the ethical implications the author makes” in the rest of the passage
that follows (John 1:6:2:2). Colin G. Kruse, The Letters of John (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2000),
60-1.
2

I. Howard Marshall The Epistles of John (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1978), 109.

3

Ibid.

211

terms.” This becomes clear given certain statements by the Elder which speak of the believer’s
having or not having fellowship with God and others. Hating one’s brother results in walking “in
the darkness” (1 John 2:9); loving one’s brother results in walking “in the light” (1 John 1:7).
Those who walk in the light have fellowship with God and with other believers (1 John 1:7). The
confusion may occur in how “light” and “dark” are used with respect to God. The Elder is not
saying that God walks in the light, which would have to do with ethics, but that “God is light.”
This leads to my second point. When the Elder says that “God is light,” he is making an
important ontological claim with respect to God’s nature. Ontologically speaking, “God is light”
is reference to God’s perfect moral goodness.4 The negative that follows, that “there is no
darkness at all,” serves to intensify the previous point. In other words, the Elder is saying that
God is morally perfect.5
There is another important aspect with respect to the proposition “God is light” that needs
to be addressed, namely, that ‘light’ also has to do with, in the words of Millard Erickson, God’s
“integrity” or “truthfulness.”6 With respect to truthfulness, Erickson lists three dimensions: “(1)
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genuineness—being true; (2) veracity—telling the truth; and (3) faithfulness—proving true.”7
That God always tells the truth (veracity)8 and that God never breaks His promise (faithfulness)9
are grounded in God’s genuineness.10
Here we may conclude that the Elder’s reference to God as light contains within it a close
connection between God’s perfect moral goodness and his genuineness or integrity, which would
also indicate for humans that there is a close connection between moral goodness and
truthfulness in character and living. As Yarbrough reminds us, the theme of the epistle, then, “is
not dominated first of all by his [the Elder’s] teaching, his commands, or his encouragement to
love, or even the occasions that call all these forth”; rather, “It is dominated . . . by his vision of
God—God’s light, his moral excellence and efficacious purity.”11 A proper “vision of God”
provides for us a proper framework for ethical thinking and living.
The second claim that “God is love” also weighs significantly in the thought of the Elder.
As noted with “God is light,” “God is love” is an ontological claim about the very nature of
God.12 On the one hand, we must be careful not to mistake function with ontology. The Elder is
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not saying, here, in 1 John 4:8, that God loves; rather, God is love. 13 Yet, on the other hand, it is
equally important not to think that love is, in some sense, an abstraction. In Hebraic and
Christian thought, God is personal. Love, then, is an essential quality of the nature of the (tri-)
personal God. Moreover, “God is love” (as with “God is light”) provides further theological
grounding and additional framework for ethical living (1 John 4:7-12).
The reason that the Elder’s readers should love one another is because love “comes from
God,” who “is love” in His very essence. Those who love God “know God” and have “been born
of God.” Those who do not love do not know God.14 But what does the Elder mean by “love”?
He gives his readers a clue earlier in the epistle when he says, “This is how we know what love
is: Jesus Christ laid down his life for us” (1 John 3:15, NIV). Jesus, who is God incarnate,
exemplifies love in the giving of Himself for others. For this reason, believers are to lay down
their lives for one another; loving not merely in word, but by action “in truth” (1 John 3:17-18).
God, too, shows His love toward us in that He sent His Son. God sent His Son, not because we
loved God, but because of His love for us. “God’s love is,” as Millard Erickson points out, “an
unselfish interest in us for our sake.”15 Similarly, C. S. Lewis speaks of God’s love in the
following way: “He can give good, but cannot need or get it. In that sense all His love is, as it

I want to be clear that in other passages the Elder does speak of God’s love toward others (1 Jn 3:1; 4:9).
My only point is that we cannot conflate “God is love” with “God’s love toward His creatures.” If God is love, His
loving actions are a natural result, so this should not be suprising.
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were, bottomlessly selfless by very definition; it has everything to give and nothing to receive.”16
Thus the Elder’s understanding of God as love suggests that in God’s very essence is a sense of
selflessness or giving up of one’s self toward the “other.”17
“God is love” and “God is light” are two sides of the same proverbial coin. It would
seem that the Elder is painting a vision of God which informs how we humans ought to be—a
life lived in truth, in harmony with God, and with the other’s best interest in mind. Yet the
Elder’s reasoning for our living this way is grounded in the very nature of God. As light, God
cannot do anything that is morally evil. As love, God seeks out the best for the “other.” It is
God’s moral character that grounds His love, and it is His love that seeks out what is best and
good and holy for the “other.” Hence God’s loving actions toward His creatures are always for
their best; He cannot do otherwise. His desire is for His creatures to be in fellowship with Him,
because He is the source of all that is good, true, and holy.
Since God is light, what God desires for His children is for them to “walk in that light”
and to be in fellowship with Him (1 John 1:7). What does walking in light and fellowship with
God consist of? First, the Elder reminds us that walking in the light means that we are to be
truthful with ourselves. To deny that we have sin in our lives or to claim that we have fellowship
with God when we are walking in the darkness causes us to be liars and the truth not in us. When
we acknowledge sin in our lives before God, God forgives and purifies us through the blood of
Jesus (1 John 1:6-10). Second, one must have true beliefs about God and His Son (1 John 2:2223; 3:23; 4:2-3; 5:1-5). At face value, this may seem a bit odd. Why must one have true beliefs
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discussion below.
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about God and His Son? A significant aspect of being in the light and having harmony with God
is living in truth. To deny truth about the Son results in having a false belief about God. Jerry L.
Walls presents a similar argument when speaking of belief in Jesus as necessary for one’s
salvation. According to Walls, salvation is “about a perfect relationship with God.”18 He goes on
to argue:
If God is a Trinity and Jesus is God the Son incarnate, as Christians teach, then a perfect
relationship with God entails knowing Jesus is God the Son. Not to believe Jesus is God the
Son would involve a fundamentally mistaken understanding of God, which would be
incompatible with a perfected relationship.19
God has given humans revelation about Himself, which is clear about Jesus’ identity as the Son
of God. Furthermore, “revelation is sufficiently clear,” says Walls, “that those who have access
to it are responsible to believe.”20 Further, when rejecting Jesus, one is not only rejecting the
source of truth (Colossians 2:3; John 14:6), but also the source of all life. Both the Gospel of
John and 1 John provide pictures of Jesus as being the source of truth and of life.21
Since God is love, believers are to love one another, as noted earlier, with self-giving
love. This kind of love looks out for the benefit of the other. Love that is selfless is the same kind
of love that God has. The Elder points out that those who fail to love their brothers remain in
death (1 John 3:14). Death, here, does not refer to physical death, but it points to a lack of life
and of fellowship with God and with others (1 John 2:9; 3:15). Moreover, one cannot claim to
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love God and not love one’s brother. In doing so, that person becomes a liar. Love for God and
love for one’s brother are closely connected. Those who love God must also love one’s brother.
Yet, the Elder makes it clear that the reason that brothers can love one another is because God
first loved us (1 John 1:19-21). It was out of our need that God responded to us. It is not that we
initiated it, but only that we responded to it. Receiving God’s love is transformational, for in it,
God demonstrates to us what love truly is (1 John 3:16; 4:9). Lastly, believers are to love God
above all, doing His will, not loving their own worldly desires, which, as part of the world, pass
away (1 John 2:15-17).
Before moving on, it would be helpful to consider what Christians mean by loving one’s
neighbor, since the command is potentially ambiguous and often misunderstood. In modern
Western culture, love is often associated with an emotion or affection. C. S. Lewis found such an
understanding of love inadequate. “Charity means ‘love, in the Christian sense’,” says Lewis,
“But love, in the Christian sense, does not mean an emotion. It is a state not of the feelings but of
the will; that state of the will which we have naturally about ourselves, and must learn to have
about other people.”22 It seems that Lewis is on to something important here. Love cannot be
equated merely with an emotion. Based on our study of 1 John, having pity on a brother or sister
in need requires also loving through actions “in truth” (1 John 3:17-18). However, one must
proceed with caution not to chalk loving one’s neighbor up solely to a matter of the will or to
some sort of loving behavior. In 1 Corinthians 13:3, Paul tells us that “If I give all I possess to
the poor and surrender my body to the flames, but have not love, I gain nothing.” Given Paul’s
words, love cannot be equated merely with acting in such a manner. One’s inner state is at least
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as important as one’s actions.23 Francis Howard-Snyder believes that loving one’s neighbor
requires, at minimum, some amount of benevolence; however, it cannot be limited to that. She
writes,
The second great commandment is like the first. It is fair to assume that the love we owe our
neighbor is of the same kind as the love we owe God. Our love for God ought to include an
appreciation of him and a desire for union with him, in addition to a desire that his will be
done. If our love for our neighbor is to be like the love we owe God, this suggests that the
love we have for our neighbors should involve the same elements. Indeed, it makes sense
that our love for other people should not be simply benevolence or sheer concern for their
well-being, but should also involve desires to be related to them, and an appreciation of what
is valuable in them, and enjoyment of them. For if one’s attitude toward others was solely
that of benevolence, it would seem that one wouldn’t want anything they have to offer.
Sheer benevolence looks like a kind of arrogance, an attitude of independence and inequality
vis-á-vis our neighbors.24
Similarly, Alexander R. Pruss suggests that biblical concept of love includes three
“intertwined aspects.”25 Not only must one show benevolence, but also an appreciation for and
“a striving for union” with the other.26 Pruss argues that benevolence without appreciation turns
toward “a proud and superior philanthropic attitude.”27 The reason that we pursue union with the
other is because of the value that we see in the other. In seeking union with the other, the
benefactor becomes not merely the giver of good things, but places herself “on a more equal
plane with the beloved, and is vulnerable to being rejected by the beloved.”28 Yet, the recipient
of the goods cannot take the actions of the benefactor for granted. If the benefactor seeks union
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with the other, it breaks down the barrier of the recipient’s feeling shame for being helped.29
Pruss continues by arguing that appreciation is not enough. Appreciation without union is
bankrupt, since a failure to “possess” or to be “joined with the beloved” results in an inability of
fully appreciating the other. Lastly, pursuing union and appreciating the other is not enough. One
must also seek the other’s good. Failure to do so results in “a self-defeating selfishness.”30 Pruss
continues,
For genuine union with the other involves pursuit of the other’s goals, and an appreciation of
goods is incomplete when it does not motivate us to further those goods. And it is only if,
with a mixture of humility and surprised joy, we see our being united with the other as good
for the other that we can hope that the other will fully (and not merely by being deceived,
say) be joined to us.31
Lastly, the expression “love your neighbor as yourself” in Jesus’ command implies an
element of self-love. This does not demand, however, that one fall into vanity or nihilism. As C.
S. Lewis aptly puts it, love for ourselves “means that we wish our own good.”32 Further, selflove, suggests Howard-Snyder, should serve for us as a blueprint for how we ought to respond to
others. While we often find ourselves having greater love for those we find attractive or find
deserving of our love, self-love, on the other hand, is generally not as temperamental. While the
object of our focus in self-love may change, say from being upset with some performance or
being glad when we do well at some goal, our overall concern, whether being upset or glad, is
for our well-being. Sadness and gladness point to that same desire.33 Further, union with the
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‘other’ is not merely what’s best for her, but it is also what’s best for the self. Lastly, it is not
selfish or wrong to appreciate one’s self. The self’s identity is found in relationship to others.
Appreciation for the self, then, is formed through one’s relatedness with others within the
community. The self is an important part of the community, which without the community would
not be what it is.
The New Testament concept of love, then, is unconditional in nature. Jesus’ parable of
the Good Samaritan exemplifies unconditional love.34 Unconditional love is an overall attitude
and movement toward the other, looking out for the best interest of the other, while also seeking
union. It is directed toward all, whether or not the other responds back in the same manner, or
even if the other retaliates in hostility or in hurt.35

Trinity, Human Freedom, and Sin
Not only do Christians affirm with the Elder that God is “light” and “love,” they also
hold to the central claim of the Christian faith that God is triune. But why think God triune?
What advantage does a triune God have over Unitarian view of God? In response to these
questions, J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig put forth the following argument:
(1) God is by definition the greatest conceivable being
(2) As the greatest conceivable being, God must be perfect
(3) A perfect being must be a loving being
(5) If God is perfectly loving by his very nature, he must be giving himself in love to
another
(6) The other cannot be a created person
Therefore
(7) The other to whom God’s love is necessarily directed must be internal to God
himself36
34
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They conclude,
God is not a single, isolated person, as unitarian forms of theism like Islam hold; rather, God
is a plurality of persons, as the Christian doctrine of the Trinity affirms. On the unitarian
view God is a person who does not give himself away essentially in love for another; he is
focused essentially on himself. Hence, he cannot be the most perfect being. But on the
Christian view, God is a triad of persons in eternal, self-giving love relationships. Thus,
since God is essentially loving, the doctrine of the Trinity is more plausible than any
unitarian doctrine of God.37
Perhaps the weakest premise of Moreland and Craig’s argument is (6). Most theists would not
doubt that God is the greatest conceivable being, nor would they doubt that God is love and that
love belongs to divine perfection. But why think that the object of God’s love cannot be (merely)
directed toward something outside of God Himself, say, His creatures? Craig and Moreland
respond with the following thought experiment. Creation is a free act of God. God was neither
compelled nor caused to create. But we can think of a possible world in which God exists
without having created. If love is essential to God’s nature, then God must be perfectly loving.
Yet, in such a world, no humans, angels, or other agents exist. Thus created agents cannot
sufficiently explain God’s love.
If God is, as Craig and Moreland argue, “a triad of persons in eternal, self-giving love,”
then within the triune God is the deepest relationship in all of reality. This relationship—the
perichoretic relationship between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—forms the heart of Christian
theism. But how are we to understand the doctrine of perichoresis?

basis of these considerations, it is clearly impossible that any one person in the divinity could lack the fellowship of
association. If he were to have only one partner, he would not be without anyone with whom he could share the
riches of his greatness. However, he would not have anyone with whom he could share the delights of love. There is
nothing which gives more pleasure or which delights the soul more than the sweetness of loving. Only someone who
has a partner and a loved one in that love that has been shown to him possesses the sweetness of such delights.” See
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John of Damascus employed the word ‘perichoresis’ in order to describe “the mutual
indwelling” or “mutual interpenetration” between the Father, Son, and Spirit.38 He borrowed the
word from Gregory of Nazianus, who used the concept largely in connection to Christology. 39
For John and other Eastern fathers, perichoresis was an important theological concept, which
expressed, in the words of Verna Harrison, “the conjunction of unity and distinction, stability
and dynamism, symmetry and asymmetry.”40 They noted that perichoresis gave insight into three
key areas: the Trinity, the incarnation, and life in the Kingdom.41
In recent years, theologians have rediscovered the importance of perichoresis. Karl Barth
describes perichoresis in the following way:
The triunity of God obviously implies, then, the unity of Father, Son and Spirit among
themselves. God’s essence is indeed one, and even the different relations of origin do not
entail separations. They rather imply—for where there is difference there is also
fellowship—a definite participation of each mode of being in the other modes of being, and
indeed, since the modes of being are in fact identical with the relations of origin, a complete
participation of each mode of being in the other modes of being.42
Barth did not like the modern understanding of “person,” that is, an autonomous and isolated
individual. As a corrective measure, he preferred the term “mode.” 43 But what is significant
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about Barth’s notion of perichoresis within the triune God is his emphasis on “fellowship” and
“complete participation” among each of the “modes,” or, in the terms of classical Christianity,
“persons.”
But how might we understand this complete participation? Here I would like to suggest
that at the deepest level of the perichoretic relation is the notion of interpenetrating love between
each of the persons of the Trinity. Not only is God one in essence, but God is also one through
love toward the other. This is the deepest love possible. It is a love that is active and self-giving;
whereby, the Father eternally gives of Himself toward the Son, and the Son eternally gives of
Himself toward the Father, and the Spirit eternally gives of Himself toward the Father and the
Son.44
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Given the doctrine of perichoresis, we can now see how the Elder could proclaim such a
statement about God’s nature. God is love is not merely a statement about God’s character, nor is
it a statement primarily about how God acts towards His creatures; rather, it is an ontological
claim about the very nature of the inner life of the triune God. The very nature of God is such
that the three persons of the Trinity exist in eternal self-giving love toward the ‘other’. There is
complete indwelling and mutual interpenetration between the persons of the Trinity. As
philosopher Stephen T. Davis suggests with respect to perichoresis, “the core of God’s inner
being is the highest degree of self-giving love. The Persons are fully open to each other, their
actions ad extra are actions in common, they ‘see with each other’s eyes’, the boundaries
between them are transparent to each other, and each ontologically embraces the other.”45 At the
core of all of existence is a dynamic “loving relationship among persons.”46
In creating humans, it may be suggested that, what God wanted to do was to bring about
in his creatures what we see in the perichoretic relationship of the divine persons. God wanted to
create individuals who could, in a very real sense, be like God, in that they share in the same
kind of or similar capacity for, what I shall call, deep love, as exemplified within the
interpenetrating life of the persons within the tri-unity of God. This deep love is God’s own love.
At its heart, deep love is active movement toward the other. It is not the kind of love that is “selfseeking” or “boastful” (1 Cor 13:4-7), nor is it passive sympathetic response; rather, it is selfgiving in nature, seeking out union with and what’s best for the other. Human persons, as
creatures, then, were created with the ability to relate with and love other persons on the deepest
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levels possible. It is this capacity for deep love and relationality that separates humans from all
other created beings.
From a Trinitarian grounding, then, this means that humans not only have certain
qualities (structure) like God, and that they are capable of performing certain tasks (function)
like Him, but that they are also created to be relational like God. The very notion of relationality
like God’s own—relationality that can demonstrate itself in deep love for another—can only be
so if the human person is freely capable of being relational, that is, if the person is capable of
freely reciprocating or not reciprocating love. Humans, then, who were created in God’s image
and likeness, were not only capable of receiving love from God, but also capable of reciprocating
such love. As Marilyn Adams suggests, “God made human beings to enter into nonmanipulative
relationships of self-surrendering love with himself and relationships of self-giving love with
others.”47
If humans have the capacity for loving God, then it would also imply that the opposite is
true. From the biblical narrative we see that is what happened with humans. Rather than
choosing to love God, humans sinned and rebelled against Him. Christians typically define sin as
disobedience to or rebellion against God’s law or commands. Sin is surely that, but this
definition does not go far enough. It does not capture the nature or essence of just what sin is. At
its core, sin is violence and opposed to love. It is violence because, rather than looking out for
what’s best for the other, it exalts the self at the expense of the other. All sin, whether intentional
or unintentional, brings division, separation, and alienation. It is violent in that it breaks harmony
between humans and God, humans and humans, and humans and nature. Thus such a rift finds its
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way throughout all sociological, cultural, and ecological structures. But God does not leave it at
that. As Steven Davis suggests:
Cosmically, the relationship between God and human beings was severed by the entrance of
sin into the world. Personally, it is broken whenever we separate ourselves from God by sin.
All of God’s actions in history are expressions of the personal relationship that is at the
center of reality. God is attempting redemptively to restore human beings to the splendor of
that relationship. Christians affirm that the relationship is fully restored through the action of
God in the world and preeminently through God’s action in Jesus Christ. Its essence is
summed up sublimely by the prophet Jeremiah: “I will be your God, and you shall be my
people” (Jer 7:23). At the center of the universe is a personal relationship and a God who
acts on its behalf.48
According to Christian theism, God’s desire is for humans to have abundant life. The very
essence of such life is in knowing God49 and living in accordance to His own being. Yet, because
of sin, this life can only come about through the death and resurrection of Jesus, and through the
power and work of the Holy Spirit in the life of those who believe. Because of God’s own work
in human history, and by means of His own love toward us, humans can be set free from the
power, corruption, and effects of sin—such freedom overturns sin that brings about alienation
from God, other people, and creation. It is to this Christian hope that we now turn.

The Kingdom, Creation, Gospel, and Church
Perhaps there was no other doctrine that Jesus taught on more often than that of the
kingdom of God. After John the Baptist’s imprisonment, Jesus began to “proclaim” the “good
news of God” (Mk 1:14, NIV). He proclaimed that the “kingdom of God is near” and called for
the people to “repent and believe the good news” (Mk 1:15, NIV). Here we see an intricate
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connection between the gospel, “good news” and the nearness of the kingdom of God. But how
shall we understand the kingdom of God?
Robert Saucy defines the kingdom of God in the following way: “The Kingdom of God
in Scripture is the all-embracing program of God’s divine salvation history. All ages, peoples,
and saving activities are in some way related to it.”50 Yet, for Saucy, the concept of the kingdom
is much broader. He explains it as follows:
Involved in the term kingdom (basileia) are both the sovereignty or royal dignity of a king,
and the realm or territory in which the kingship is exercised. The kingdom of God thus
refers to the sovereign rule of God over His creation. Although there is, in the ultimate
sense, one kingdom of God, the Scripture uses this term for two distinct aspects of this
kingdom. On the one hand, it signifies God’s universal, eternal rule over all creation. . . . On
the other hand it refers to the eschatological Messianic kingdom which is to be established in
history, which Christ announced as at hand, and for which He taught His disciples to pray.
While the first kingdom is ruled directly by God, the second aspect is founded upon the
covenant promises and ruled through the God-Man, Jesus Christ, the Seed of David.51
Given Saucy’s understanding of the kingdom, God’s rule is, on the one hand, over all of creation.
Consider the Lord’s Prayer. In this prayer that Jesus gave to the disciples, he instructed them to
pray, “Your kingdom come, your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven” (Mt 6:10, ESV). It is
possible to understand the “your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven” clause as subordinate
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to the “Your kingdom come” clause.52 If that is the case, then Jesus is making a direct link
between God’s will and the kingdom of God, that is to say, the coming of the kingdom on earth
as in heaven is an expression of the will of God. The implication of this interpretation of
Matthew 6:10 is that God’s kingdom rule extends and includes both heaven and earth. There are,
in addition, various other depictions within Scripture which would lead one to conclude that the
kingdom is broader in scope than to humans and the created space-time universe. For example,
in 1 Chronicles 29:11, we are told that God’s dominion extends both to heaven and earth:
“Yours, O LORD, is the greatness and the power and the glory and the victory and the majesty,
indeed everything that is in the heavens and the earth; Yours is the dominion, O LORD, and You
exalt Yourself as head over all” (NASB). Psalm 145: 13 informs us of the everlasting nature of
God’s kingdom and dominion. God’s dominion, says the psalmist, “endures throughout all
generations.” Thus God’s rule is not limited merely to future generations, but throughout the
entire creation history.
For theologian Stanley Grenz, one cannot properly understand the concept of kingdom
apart from the concept of community:
From the narratives of the primordial garden which open the curtain on the biblical story to
the vision of white-robed multitudes inhabiting the new earth with which it concludes, the
drama of the Scriptures speaks of community. Taken as a whole the Bible asserts that God’s
program is directed to the bringing into being of community in the highest sense—a
reconciled people, living within a renewed creation, and enjoying the presence of their
Redeemer . . . The concept of community fills the idea of the kingdom of God with its
proper content. When God’s rule is present—when God’s will is done—community
emerges. Or viewed from the opposite direction, in the emergence of community, God’s rule
is present and God’s will is accomplished.53
N. T. Wright, “The Lord’s Prayer as a Paradigm of Christian Prayer,” originally published in Into God’s
Presence: Prayer in the New Testament, ed. R. L. Longenecker, 132-54 (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2001), accessed
December 9, 2011, www.ntwrightpage.com/Wright_Christian_Prayer.htm.
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Grenz defines the kingdom, quite simply, as the “divine reign.”54 But what does such a
reign look like? Having surveyed the biblical material and current debate on the various issues
revolving around the biblical understanding of kingdom, Grenz makes a helpful distinction
between de jure (in principle) and de facto (in fact) rulership. Out of principle God is the ruler of
all things. This right is His because He is the creator of all things. “Consequently,” says Grenz,
“the entire universe is the kingdom of God or the realm of God’s dominion de jure.”55 Yet, as
one considers the biblical data, “what is true de jure is not yet fully true de facto.”56 The reason
for this stems from the God-given human capacity to respond to God’s rule. Thus because of our
sin and rejection of the Creator king, “we have erected an enclave of rebellion in which another –
Satan – appears to reign. As a creature, this de facto ruler is a usurper, for he does not possess the
right to rule that is God’s alone.”57
On the one hand, the kingdom is already here, but only in part. “The divine reign,”
explains Grenz, “is related to Christ’s first advent.” Furthermore,
It is a reality that people can enter (Mark 9:47; Matt. 21:31-32), for it is the kingly power of
God. Hence, the kingdom is a “sphere of existence” in which people are called to live. It is
incorporation into God’s powerful invasion of our world. As such it consists in doing the
will of God (Matt. 6:10; 7:21-23), and it demands a radical decision (13:44-46).58
There remains a future eschatological aspect to the kingdom connected to Christ’s Second
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divine intent.”59 It is only then that the earth will be in conformity to God’s will as it is in
heaven.
Grenz’s analysis of the kingdom is helpful for several reasons. First, much like Saucy’s
definition, it encompasses the whole of creation (heaven and earth). By defining God’s kingdom
as the “divine reign,” Grenz properly gives consideration both to the cosmic reign of God and the
future aspect of His reign that occurs at the second coming of Christ.60 But he also recognizes
God’s reign exists apart from salvation history (e.g., God’s reign over heaven), without
neglecting the important role that redemption has in both the present and future aspects of the
eschatological aspect of the kingdom. Second, Grenz’s emphasis on community is helpful. As
Grenz rightly notes, stress on community helps to divert radical individualism. Moreover, as will
be expressed below, the inclusion of community into the kingdom motif fits with a proper
reflection on creation (and re-creation).
In the creation account we find that God created the entire space-time universe (Gen 1:1;
cf. Jn 1:1-3; 1 Cor 8:6; Col 1:16-17; Heb 1:2-3), and that on the sixth day He created humans in
his “image” according to His “likeness” (v.26-27). In this passage we see clearly that God gave
to humans the task of taking care of and ruling over his good creation. Humans were God’s viceregents, ruling over the creation under God’s authority. On the one hand, as God’s vice-regents,
they were to serve the creation, to take care of it, and to watch and care for it (Gen 2:15, 19-20;
Ps 8:6). Yet, on the other hand, the creation is something that was (and is) to be enjoyed (Gen
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2:9; cf. Jer 2:7; 31:5; 1 Tim 6:17; Eccl 9:9). As God’s image bearers, humans were to be “like”
God, as His representatives to the creation.
The first humans were one aspect of God’s overall reign and universal kingdom. They
were to participate in God’s universal kingdom, which includes, not only His divine authority
ruling over all of creation, but also, such a rule which included, at its core, all that is good, pure,
and beautiful. The creation itself is a product of God’s own love and grace, by which he allows
something other than Himself to exist and to have life. In creating, God shares life with
something other than Himself. As the giver of life, the kingdom of God is a kingdom of life, by
which God shares that which is central to his own life, that is, all that is good, pure, and
beautiful, apart from any corruption. Within the intra-trinitarian relationship we find a dynamic
relationship between each of the persons of the Tri-une God, and that God, in making a world
like ours, decided to share His own life with His creatures.
Because of sin humans are estranged from God, one another, and the creation. They are
in need of redemption, that is to say, they need to be brought back into right relationship with
God, one another, and creation. This is the great message of the gospel. Not only does God offer
forgiveness of sin, but he also offers new life through the finished work of Jesus and through the
empowering by the Holy Spirit. But how are we to understand the nature of the gospel,
especially in relation to the kingdom of God?
Christians often have a limited view of the gospel. As Darrell Bock rightly points out, too
often Christians see the gospel as being a “transaction” of sorts and miss the full meaning and
ramifications of all that the gospel entails.61 Central to the gospel is the cross of Christ (1
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Corinthians 1:23; 15:3-5). It is the core of the good news; however, that is not the full message of
the gospel. As Bock relays,
When Paul refers to the cross in this early part of 1 Corinthians, the term cross functions as
the hub and a synecdoche for all that Jesus’ work brings. A synecdoche is a part that
represents the whole. I mention one central thing to picture all of it. For example, if I speak
of the Law and the Prophets, I am speaking of the whole Old Testament. If I speak of fifty
head of cattle, I’m talking about fifty whole cows—heads, hooves, bodies, and tails—not
just fifty heads. Likewise, when Paul speaks of the cross here [in 1 Corinthians 1:23], he is
using the word as a synecdoche for the whole of the gospel.62
Bock further notes that the gospel began with a promise of new life, and this new life is brought
about through the giving of the promised Holy Spirit. In Genesis 12:1-3 God made a promise to
Abraham that He would make him a great nation and that all the peoples of the earth will be
blessed through Him. God’s faithfulness to His creation begins with the Abrahamic covenant and
continues through the Davidic and New Covenants.63
There are several central themes that come out in each of these covenants. As noted, in
the Abrahamic covenant, God promised Abraham that all the peoples of the earth would be
blessed through him. In the Davidic covenant, God promised David an ancestor and a throne that
would last forever. In the New Covenant God promised that He would bring about renewal to
His people (Jer 31:31-34). Similarly, in the book of Ezekiel, God promises to “cleanse” His
people from all their “filthiness,” to give them a “new heart and put a new spirit” within them,
and to remove their “heart of stone,” giving them “a heart of flesh.” He will then put His “Spirit”
within them and “cause” them “to walk” according to God’s “statutes” (Ezek 36:25-28, NASB).
We see from these two passages an emphasis on God’s renewal in two ways, first through
cleansing and making His people clean, removing their hearts of stone, and, second, through
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writing His law upon their hearts, giving them a heart of flesh, and putting His Spirit within
them.
The promise of the forgiveness of sins and the coming of the Holy Spirit is what we see
fulfilled through the finished work of Jesus in the Gospels and Acts, and thus mirrors the two
works of Christ, His death on the cross for forgiveness of sins and His resurrection, which is a
foreshadowing of our own resurrection. In Luke 3:16, John the Baptist proclaims that “One is
coming who is mightier than I, and I am not fit to untie the thong of His sandals; He will baptize
you with the Holy Spirit and fire” (NASB). Furthermore, in Luke 24:49, Jesus tells his disciples
that the Scriptures predicted “that the Christ would suffer and rise again from the dead on the
third day,” and that “repentance for forgiveness of sins would be proclaimed in His name to all
the nations, beginning from Jerusalem” (NASB). In the book of Acts, the giving of the
forgiveness of sins and the promised Holy Spirit is a continual theme throughout the various
proclamations. In Acts 1:8, Jesus tells his disciples that they are to wait in Jerusalem until they
receive the Holy Spirit; when they do they will “receive power.” On the day of Pentecost, the
disciples were given the Holy Spirit (Acts 2:1-13). This fulfilled the prophecy in Joel 2:28-32
that God would “pour forth” His “Spirit on all mankind” (NASB), the same Spirit give to the
Gentiles, as shown later throughout Acts (Acts 10:47; 15:7-8). As Bock points out, the first
gospel message presented in Acts, not only included mention of the forgiveness of sins, but also
the promise of “the reception of the Spirit of God, the reception of a promise God had made to
enable His people.”64
The effects of the gospel are not limited, however, to human redemption, but also entails
God’s saving work throughout all of creation, which is mirrored in Christ’s resurrection. God’s
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plan includes reconciling creation to Himself, as noted in Colossians 1:20, “and through him to
reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his
cross” (ESV). Similarly, in the book of Romans, Paul connects directly the redemption of the
creation with human redemption. The creation itself “waits in eager longing” and “has been
groaning together in the pains of childbirth” (Rom 8:19, 22, ESV). Yet, as Paul notes, we have
been given the “first fruits of the Spirit” (Rom 8:23, ESV). It is unclear exactly what Paul means
by this. Within the context, Paul contrasts the life lived in the flesh with the life lived in the
Spirit. Believers are “in the Spirit” and the Spirit indwells them (Rom 8:9, 11). Those living
according to the Spirit, and not the flesh, “set their minds on the things of the Spirit” (Rom 8:5),
which results in “life and peace” (Rom 8:6, ESV). Furthermore, it is the Spirit who raised Christ
and who gives those who are in Christ life (Rom 8:11). Given the context, it would seem that
Paul is indicating that creation, too, will one day receive the effects of the Spirit’s work just as
those who are in Christ are now experiencing His work and are indwelt by Him. Interestingly
enough, the book of Revelation gives a glimpse of the renewed creation, which includes
language which speaks of God dwelling among His people:
2

Then I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, made
ready as a bride adorned for her husband. 3 And I heard a loud voice from the throne, saying,
“Behold the tabernacle of God is among men, and He will dwell among them, and they shall
be His people, and God Himself will be among them, 4 and He will wipe away every tear
from their eyes; and there will no longer be any mourning, or crying, or pain; the first things
have passed away.”5 And He who sits on the throne said, “Behold, I am making all things
new.” (Rev 21:2-5, NASB)
Note that God Himself will “tabernacle,” “dwell,” and “be among them.” Interestingly enough,
this language is strikingly similar to the language found in the Gospel of John, when the Gospel
writer speaks of Jesus’ incarnation, “And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we
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saw His glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father” (Jn 1:14, NASB). Millard Erickson
captures well the essence of the incarnational language:
The most amazing assertion is that “the Word became flesh” (1:14). The reference is not to
some timeless occurrence, but to a specific event at a definite point in history. Note that
John does not say that the Word “appeared as” or “showed himself in” flesh, but that he
actually “became” flesh. That this was not only a definite historical occurrence but a
continuing fact is seen in the phrase “and dwelt among us” (v.14). The term is a strong one,
which literally means “tabernacled among us” or “pitched his tent among us.” It conveys the
idea of a lengthy period of residence rather than a temporary visit.65
While there is some parallel between Revelation 21:2-5 and John 1:14, it must be made clear,
however, that there is one central difference. In the incarnation the Son of God became flesh.
Scripture is not speaking of God adding creation to Himself, as the Son of God added a human
nature in the incarnation. Nevertheless, what we do see taking place in the eschaton is something
radical—God himself will dwell among His people. It is unclear how exactly this will take place.
Several places in Scripture speak of the impossibility of humans seeing God. In John 1:18 the
text says that no one has “seen God at any time” except for the Son who was at the Father’s side.
In a similar vein, Paul tells his readers that God alone “possesses immortality and dwells in
unapproachable light, whom no man has seen or can see” (1 Tim 6:16, NASB). If my assessment
of Romans 8:23 is correct, perhaps, then, it is the Spirit, the same divine person of the Trinity
working in and indwelling us, who will be the one who indwells creation. At the very least, it is
the Spirt, who is the agent of re-creation, who will be involved in not only our own redemption
and renewal, but the renewal of all creation.66
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Lastly, we find similar language regarding God’s cosmic plan for redemption employed
in the book of Ephesians. Yet the language is intricately connected to the mission of church.
Howard A. Snyder defines the church as, “The community of God’s people—a people called to
serve God and called to live together in true Christian community as a witness to the character
and virtues of God’s reign.” 67 As Snyder further reminds us (and as we saw in the previous
section), God is about saving souls; however, such a definition of the gospel is much too narrow.
The church’s mission is much broader than that.68
According to Snyder, the mission of the church “is nothing other than bringing all things
and, supremely, all people on earth under the dominion and headship of Jesus Christ.”69 As
Snyder reminds us, in the book of Ephesians we catch a glimpse of the church’s role in God’s
cosmic plan. In Ephesians 1:7-10 Paul expresses that,
in him we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, in accordance with
the riches of God’s grace that he lavished on us with all wisdom and understanding. And he
made known to us the mystery of his will according to his good pleasure, which he purposed
in Christ, to be put into effect when the times will have reached their fulfillment—to bring
all things in heaven and earth together under one head, even Christ. (NIV)
God’s plan is, in the words of Snyder, “that God may glorify himself by uniting all things in
Christ.”70 The biblical vision is that of the whole creation as coming together to worship God,
and hence, the key concept is that of reconciliation. As expressed by Snyder, “God’s plan is for
the restoration of his creation, for overcoming, in judgment and glorious fulfillment, the damage
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done to persons and nature through the Fall.”71 This plan took place before “the foundation of the
world” (Eph 1:4, NASB). God is reconciling all things to Himself, not just humans, but all of
creation (Eph 1:10; Col 1:20; Rom 8:18-23; Rev 21:1-5). It is the restoration of all things to his
original intentions that will finally be brought about through the eschatological coming of the
King of Kings and Lord of Lords. The church’s role, then, is to be a part of God’s plan for
reconciliation. As Paul expresses in his second letter to the Corinthians, “God was in Christ
reconciling the world to Himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and He has given to
us the word of reconciliation” (2 Cor 5:19, NASB). Therefore, those who belong to the church
are to be “ambassadors for Christ” (2 Cor 5:20, NASB), and thus, ministers of reconciliation.
Before moving on, it should be noted that there is another relation between the kingdom
of God and the church, namely, the church is a glimpse of what is to come. Those who have been
reconciled to Christ have been given the “first fruits of the Spirit” (Rom 8:23, NASB). They are
“in Christ” through the indwelling Holy Spirit. It is the indwelling of the Holy Spirit that brings
new life, and it is only through the empowering of the Holy Spirit that the church can fulfill its
mission of reconciliation. Jürgen Moltmann captures this rather clearly, in his seminal work, The
Church in the Power of the Spirit:
The church as the community of justified sinners, the fellowship of those liberated by Christ,
who experience salvation and live in thanksgiving, is on the way to fulfilling the meaning of
the history of Christ. With its eyes fixed on Christ, it lives in the Holy Spirit and thus is itself
the beginning and earnest of the future of the new creation. It proclaims Christ alone, but the
fact that it proclaims him is already the advent of the future of God in the word. It believes
Christ alone; but the fact that it believes is already the sign of hope. In its liberation it
follows Christ alone; but this is already the bodily anticipation of the redemption of the
body. In the Lord’s supper it remembers and makes present the death of Christ, which leads
to life; but the fact that this happens is a foretaste of the peace to come. It only confesses
Jesus, the crucified, as Lord; but the kingdom of God is anticipated in this confession. This
relationship between what happens and the fact that it happens can only be understood
pneumatologically. The community and fellowship of Christ which is the church comes
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about ‘in the Holy Spirit’. The Spirit is this fellowship. Faith perceives God in Christ and
this perception itself the power of the Spirit.72
In this passage, Moltmann captures the already/not yet aspect of the kingdom. It is the church
“in” God’s kingdom that stands in tension and hope between the current indwelling and
empowering of the Spirit, the abundant life that only God can provide, and the final
eschatological promise of reconciling all things to God and making all things new in heaven and
on earth.

Theosis and the Kingdom of God
Having given consideration to the relationship between the kingdom of God, creation, the
gospel, and the church, I now turn to the Eastern Orthodox teaching of theosis. What relation
does this ancient doctrine bear to God’s original intentions for His creation and the kingdom, and
what are the implications for the church today, if any at all? I begin by sketching a brief
theological and biblical view of the doctrine, stressing the work of Irenaeus and Athanasius,
followed by an examination of the doctrine of theosis as connected to God’s work in the
reconciliation of “all things.”
In its basic understanding, theosis means “deification” or “becoming God.”73 The first
historical Christian expression of the doctrine is found in Irenaeus’s Against Heresies. Here
Irenaeus expresses that no one else could obtain the throne of David other than Jesus Christ. He
was the one whom God “promised by the law and the prophets that He would make His salvation
visible to all flesh; so that He would become the Son of man for this purpose, that man also
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might become the son of God.”74 The reason for the incarnation was for the redemption of our
human nature. The Word became flesh so that “He might win back to God that human nature
(hominem) which had departed from God.”75 Similarly, humanity could not have learned the
ways of God apart from the Word becoming man.76 The incarnation ultimately brought about our
union with God:
Since the Lord thus has redeemed us through His own blood, giving His soul for our souls,
and His flesh for our flesh, and has also poured out the Spirit of the Father for the union and
communion of God and man, imparting indeed God to men by means of the Spirit, and, on
the other hand, attaching man to God by His own incarnation, and bestowing upon us at His
coming immortality durably and truly, by means of communion with God.77
It was through incarnation that Christ took upon our human nature, giving up both soul and body
for our behalf. It is by the blood of the Lord that humans are redeemed. In so becoming incarnate
we receive “immortality.” We should note, too, the significant connection between Christ’s work
and the work of the Spirit. As noted, in giving us the Holy Spirit humans receive God, and, thus
share in “union and communion” with God.
We also see the doctrine of theosis expressed in the thought of Athanasius. Central to
Athanasius’s doctrine of theosis is his anthropology. Like many of the Greek Fathers, he made a
clear distinction made between the Creator and the creature, but such a distinction did not result
in a disjunctive dualism. The Creator alone is immortal, eternal, and incorruptible. All that exists
was created out of nothing, unlike the Platonic doctrine that saw the artificer as forming the
universe out of some kind of pre-existing and uncreated matter.78 In the same way, humanity was
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created out of “non-existence.” God is the giver of life, and humans were created in a state of
innocence, that is, a state of “incorruption.” Athanasius saw evil as “non-being, the negation and
antithesis of good,” and thus, turning away from God, humanity became corrupted and, as a
result, they were “in process of becoming corrupted entirely.”79 It was the Word who “had called
them into being,” but through rebellion they “lost the knowledge of God,” and “they lost
existence with it.” The reason for sending the Word, says Athanasius, “was for our sorry case.”80
The beauty of the incarnation is that the very God who brought all things into existence, and who
fashioned the very body in the virgin that he would take on, died on our behalf through His great
love for us:
Thus taking a body like our own, because all our bodies were liable to the corruption of
death, He surrendered His body to death instead of all, and offered it to the Father. This He
did out of sheer love for us, so that in His death all might die, and the law of death thereby
be abolished because, having fulfilled in His body that for which it was appointed, it was
thereafter voided of its power for men. This He did that He might turn again to incorruption
men who had turned back to corruption, and make them alive through death by the
appropriation of His body and by the grace of His resurrection. Thus He would make death
disappear from them as utterly as straw from fire.81
Toward the end of his work on the incarnation of the Word of God, Athanasius says something
surprising and startling: that the Word “assumed humanity that we might become God.”82 This
may sound strange to our modern ears, but it was a common thought among the Greeks of
Athanasius’s time. His readers would have understood the implications. According to
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Athanasius, the Son took on our human nature that we might “perceive the Mind of the unseen
Father” and that He “endured shame from men that we might inherit immortality.” 83 In so doing,
He did not cease being who He was, that is, He remained “impassible and incorruptible” in His
divine nature; nevertheless, it was through His impassibility “He kept and healed the suffering
men on whose account He thus endured.”84
We see the thread of theosis throughout other Fathers, particularly in the works of
Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, and
Maximus the Confessor.85 The Fathers never understood theosis to mean that humans become
God in some ontological sense. Only the Triune God is a se, eternal, and without generation. In
becoming deified, humans never cease being what they are; rather, they are transformed and are,
thus, fulfilled in their humanity. While they were created “sinless,” there was always the
possibility of corruption. In the eschaton, humans will be transformed and brought into a state of
“maturity and perfection through the regenerative grace of God and become not only sinless but
also incapable anymore of falling into sin.”86
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According to Eastern Orthodox thinkers, there are key Scriptures which point to the
doctrine of theosis (2 Pet 1:4; Ps 82:6; and John 10:34-35; 17:21-23).87 Perhaps the strongest
passage is 2 Peter 1:4, which informs us that believers, through God’s promise, “may become
partakers of the divine nature, having escaped the corruption that is in the world by lust”
(NASB). Because of their becoming “partakers of the divine nature” and because they have
“escaped corruption,” believers are to apply diligence “in” their “faith,” adding spiritual
qualities, which include, “moral excellence,” “knowledge,” “self-control,” “perseverance,”
“godliness,” “brotherly kindness,” and “love” (2 Pet 1:5-7, NASB). These qualities should
belong in the life of believers and they should be “increasing” (2 Pet 1:8, NASB). When a
believer lacks such qualities, he is “blind” and has “forgotten his purification from his former
sins” (2 Peter 1:9, NASB). Note the comparison between “having escaped the corruption that is
in the world by lust” and having received “purification.” Thus believers have been purified and
are to practice such qualities, that is, such qualities that are consistent with becoming “partakers
of the divine nature.” Believers are capable of such qualities because God’s “divine power has
granted to us everything pertaining to life and goodness” (2 Peter 1:3, NASB). And, in so doing,
believers are being like God, “who called us by His own glory and excellence” (2 Pet 1:3,
NASB).
Another significant passage is John 17, where Jesus prays that all those whom He has
been given by the Father “may all be one; even as You, Father, are in Me and I in You, that they
also may be in Us, so that the world may believe that You sent Me. . . . I in them and You in Me,
that they may be perfected in unity, so that the world may know that You sent Me, and loved

For a dissenting view that Ps 82:6 and Jn 10:34-35 refer to theosis, see Michael S. Heiser, “Monotheism,
Polytheism, Monolatry, or Henotheism: Toward an Assessment of Divine Plurality in the Hebrew Bible,” in Bulletin
for Biblical Research 18, no. 1 (2008): 2-4.
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them, even as you have loved Me” (Jn 17:21, 23, NASB). This unity that Jesus prays for is a
unity that He and the Father share, and, yet, it seems that in some way believers will also be “in”
both the Father and Son. This instance in John 17 is not, however, an anomalous thought in the
New Testament. Similarly, throughout the Pauline epistles Christians are said to be “in Christ” or
that Christ is “in” believers. 2 Corinthians 5:15-21, which I touched on earlier, states that the
reason Christ died was “so that they who live might no longer live for themselves, but for Him
who died and rose again on their behalf” (2 Cor 5:15, NASB). In verses 16-17, Paul goes on to
reiterate that we do not know anyone according to the flesh, but rather, “if anyone is in Christ, he
is a new creature; the old things passed away; behold, new things have come” (2 Cor 5:17,
NASB). Those who are in Christ have been changed, they are a new creature, and are thus to be
ministers of reconciliation (2 Cor 15:18-20). In verse 21, Paul tells the Corinthians that God
“made Him who knew no sin to be sin on our behalf, so that we might become the righteousness
of God in Him.” Thus we are given reconciliation to God so that we may be like God, that is, to
“become the righteousness of God.” This takes place “in” Christ. This “in” language occurs in
other places throughout the Pauline corpus (Eph 1:3-4, 26; 2:10; 4:12-16; 5:23-32; Col 1:27; Gal
2:20).88 Furthermore Christ is the true “image” of the Father (Col 1:15-18), and Christians are to
be renewed in the image of God (Eph 3:16-19; 4:13-15).89
What, then, is the connection between theosis, the church, and the kingdom of God? As
noted, there is a distinction between the church and the kingdom of God. Moreover, the church’s
mission is to share in the ministry of reconciliation, taking the “good news” of Christ to the
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world, and being a part of what God is doing to reconcile all things to Himself. Central to the
gospel message is Jesus’ death and resurrection. It was Jesus’ death that secured for us our
salvation, and it was his resurrection which points to our future renewal, yet there is a sense in
which we experience our future reality now, especially when Paul iterates to us that we are the
“first fruits of the Spirit” (Rom 8:23, NASB). We enter into this salvation by grace through faith
because of the finished work of Christ (Eph 2:8-9). Believers are said to be justified (Rom 4:3,
16; 5:1); adopted as sons and daughters (Rom 5:15, 23; 9:4; Gal 4:5; Eph 1:5); sanctified (1 Cor
1:2); washed, regenerated, and renewed by the Holy Spirit (Tit 3:5); and given the Holy Spirit
(Titus 3:6) as a deposit and guarantee of our future redemption (2 Cor 1:22; Eph 1:13-14; 4:30).
It is the Holy Spirit who brings life and works in us (sanctification) to bring about people who
are transformed, and who are to be workers for the kingdom. Paul tells the church in the letter to
the Ephesians that believers have working in them God’s “incomparably great power . . . like the
working of his mighty strength, which he exerted in Christ when he raised him from the dead and
seated him at his right hand in the heavenly realms” (Eph 1:19-20, NIV).
Further, in the initial creation we find God’s good intentions for his creatures, that is, that
they were to share in life, which reflects his own beauty and goodness. Yet, because of sin, our
human ancestors brought about disunity between them and God, one another, and the creation.
God is working to bring about harmony and reconciliation—the effects of the gospel in its wider
context. The doctrine of theosis, when understood properly, refers to the entire context of human
salvation and reconciliation, not merely of our justification, but also in regards to our
sanctification—the part of our salvation where believers are called to “work out,” through the
gift and empowerment of the Holy Spirit, and through God who works in them (Phil 2:12-13,
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NIV). Further, theosis refers to the believer’s glorification, where she is finally and completely
made new, free from sin, and brought into full union with God and creation.
Emphasis on theosis does not entail either pantheism or panentheism. There is no
ontological union with God where a blending between natures takes place. God remains who He
is and humans remain what they are. Perhaps we may understand theosis, like Myk Habets
suggests, as “the re-creation of our lost humanity in the dynamic, atoning interaction between the
divine and human natures within the one person of Jesus Christ, through whom we enter into the
triune communion of God’s intra-trinitarian life.”90 It is through Jesus Christ and Holy Spirit that
humans participate in God. As Habets clarifies, this union is a “thoroughly personal and
relational experiencing of the triune relations.”91 Ultimately, theosis is the bringing about of
God’s original intentions for humans from the beginning, the capacity to share in the life of God,
but not only that, to obtain ultimate human fulfillment. It points to our future hope and to the new
creation, where humans will fully receive their final redemption, and ultimately obtain human
fulfillment. Yet, this is not something that believers wait for in the eschaton. It begins now
through the empowering work of the Holy Spirit, who works in us to bring us into a right
relationship with God, and who also gives believers the energy and ability to live out Christian
lives. Furthermore, the doctrine of theosis helps to redirect the proclamation of the Christian
gospel. There is no doubt that Scripture expresses God’s wrath against sin and the sinner.
Nevertheless, there is much more to the proclamation of God’s love, the gospel, and salvation
than this. Again, in the words of Habets, “The ultimate goal of salvation is no longer to appease
the wrath of an angry God but to attain to participation in the divine life through the Son by the
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Holy Spirit. This still necessitates judgment on sin and justification of the sinner, but it does not
end there.”92 The church can begin to preach a gospel which reflects “good news,” that is, a
gospel grounded in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, which brings hope of new life to a
lost and dying world.

Concluding Thoughts
I began this chapter by giving consideration to how the doctrine of the Trinity,
particularly the perichoretic interpenetrating relationship among the divine persons, impacts a
variety of other Christian doctrines. Not only is the doctrine of the Trinity essential to Christian
theology, but, as I will show in the next chapter, it is central in mounting a theodicy.
Finally, when we reflect on each of the above themes—the kingdom, creation, gospel,
and theosis—we see that God is doing something radical in the world. According to Christian
theology, He is bringing about a world in which His everlasting kingdom will reign supreme.
This kingdom resembles the perichoretic relationship within the Trinity. There is a sense in
which God’s human creatures are taken into the divine relationship through divine activity,
though we must be careful here and recognize that there is some mystery to it. God and His
creatures become one in union, though this union is not ontological. Furthermore, it is not that
God’s creatures penetrate God, as we see in the interpenetration of the divine persons of the
Trinity. Rather, the penetration seems one way. God, through God’s dynamic working and
movement, and through God’s indwelling Spirit, will bring about a world by which His presence
will penetrate all of creation in such a way that His divine beauty, goodness, and radiance will
fill all of creation. This, we may call, the perichoretic kingdom.
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CHAPTER 8: TOWARD A FULLER THEODICY

In this chapter, I will attempt to bring together all that I have argued thus far by means of
a theodicy. I begin by sketching out three theodicies that have been suggested by Christians. I
will attempt to show the limitations of such theodicies, while recognizing that some, more so
than others, have their own merit and should be worked into an overall theodicy. I will then
move on to formulate a proposed theodicy grounded in the perichoretic relationship of the divine
Trinity, which I have dubbed the “Trinitarian Perichoretic Theodicy” (TPT). But one further
point must be considered, which I will tackle in the conclusion of this chapter.
Any adequate theodicy must not only answer why God allows for the amount, types, and
kinds of evil that He does, but it must also answer the existential question of evil. While no doubt
the problem of evil has its share of philosophical and theological difficulties, I believe at the
heart of the issue of evil is the question: If God exists, what is He doing about all of the evil in
the world? This is an existential or religious question as much as it is a theological and
philosophical one. This question has been the motivation and drive behind this present work.
When people ask questions such as Why does God allow X?, they often do not see God at work.
After all, if God were working, then X would not have occurred. Providing justifying reasons for
why God allows evil in the world is only part of the equation. They also want to see that God has
not abandoned us and that He is really doing something to stop evil in this world. It is to these
two questions—the “why” and the “what”—that I now turn. It is my contention that TPT
provides not only an adequate justifying reason for why God allows evil in the world and redeem
those sufferings already experienced, but also gives a parameter and framework for thinking
about an adequate response to the religious or existential problem from evil.
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Theodical Suggestions
In what follows I work through three theodicies often proposed by Christians to justify
God’s reasoning for allowing evil in the world. While each has its own merits, there are certain
limitations of each theodicy. Despite such limitations, we should not jettison them entirely.
Rather, each provides important angles for thinking through an adequate response to why God
allows evil in the world.

Freewill Theodicy
I begin by discussing, perhaps, the most popular response to why God allows evil in the
world—the Freewill theodicy.1 Before moving on to the main line of argument, it would be
helpful to consider what it means to say that a creature is free.
A creature is significantly free if, say, given a choice between two morally significant
actions x and y, it has the capacity to make such a choice, without thereby being determined or
forced into performing one action over the other,2 or as Plantinga puts it, “no antecedent
conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will perform the action, or that he won’t.”3 If a
creature is significantly free, not even God can bring it about that the agent chooses one action

1

The Freewill theodicy was first proposed by Augustine, but has been adapted over the years by various
theologians and philosophers. Perhaps the clearest expression is put forward by Alvin Plantinga. It should be noted,
however, that Plantinga’s own version is not a theodicy; rather, it is a defense. A theodicy, according to Plantinga,
seeks to show God’s reason for allowing certain evils. A defense, on the other hand, is much more modest in what it
claims. It does not attempt to show why God allows evil; rather, it only attempts to show that there is no
inconsistency between God’s existence and evil in the world. While I recognize the difference between a defense
and a theodicy, I am concerned more with understanding it as a theodicy for the purposes of this chapter, since I do
recognize in formulating a fuller theodicy that the notion of libertarian freedom is a central feature of God’s reason
for allowing certain kinds of evil in the world. For a fuller discussion of the difference between a theodicy and
defense, see Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1977),
28-29.
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over the other.4 Now that an understanding of what I mean by “freewill” has been given, an
exposition of the Freewill theodicy will follow.
According to the Freewill theodicy, among those possible worlds that God could have
created, a world in which significantly free creatures exist would be more valuable than a world
without such creatures. But if God creates a world in which creatures have the capacity for moral
good, then it must also be the case that such creatures have the capacity for moral evil. Given
such a capacity to perform morally significant actions, some of those creatures rebelled against
God. As many theists will argue, creaturely free agency is the cause of moral evil in the world.5
Some atheologians, however, find such a theistic response deficient on several fronts. I
shall consider three. First, the atheologian may argue that the Freewill theodicy, while it answers
the problem of moral evil, says nothing about natural evil. This objection, however, may be a bit
premature. Some have argued that even so-called natural evils are, in actuality, the result of the
moral choices of God’s free creatures, specifically powerful beings that rebelled against God and
that seek to wreak havoc on God’s good creation. So, in the end, all evils that occur are
ultimately moral.6 Not everyone, however, is keen on holding fallen angels responsible for
natural evil. For instance, Richard Swinburne and Peter Harrison find the suggestion that angelic
beings are behind natural evils ad hoc, and caution against such a view.7 While I can sympathize

4

Van Inwagen, “The Argument from Evil,” 64.

5

Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 30.

6

See Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 59-64 ; Gregory Boyd has constructed a defense of what he
calls the “Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy.” In this theodicy, natural evils in large part fall on the actions of free
agents, particularly demonic agents-chiefly Satan—who have power to destroy, manipulate creation, and cause
much harm. But Boyd would argue that Satan is not sufficient to explain natural evil. Gregory Boyd, Satan and the
Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 1718, 29-49.
Richard. Swinburne, “Natural Evil.” American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 4 (October 1978): 296;
Peter Harrison, “Theodicy and Animal Pain.” Philosophy 64, no. 247 (January 1989): 80. Just to be clear,
7

249

with Swinburne and Harrison’s fear, it is not at all implausible, given that an omnipotent being
exists, and when taken into connection with the data that we view from our own world, such as
the great variety and complexity of creatures that we observe. Could God not have created beings
that are equally or more powerful than we are, yet creatures that are very much like the kind we
find in the Bible, who seek to ruin God’s good creation? Perhaps if such creatures are as
powerful as described in the Bible, they could be behind much of the goings on of evil in nature.
So, at least these powerful beings could stand behind some of the natural evils in the world. So,
one cannot fully rule out the Freewill theodicy as a partial response to natural evils. But like
Swinburne and Harrison, the atheologian may not be satisfied. So, in this sense, the Freewill
theodicy is limited.8
The second objection centers on whether God could have made free creatures in such a
way that they would always freely perform morally good actions. Or at least, could not God have
brought about the world in such a way in which creatures would always choose what is right? H.
J. McCloskey makes the following argument:
might not God have very easily so have arranged the world and biased man to virtue that
men always freely choose what is right? Clearly theists cannot consistently argue that free
will and necessitation to virtue are incompatible, for they represent God himself as
possessing a free will and as being incapable of acting immorally.9
There are two problems with this sort of objection. First, if God “biased” his free creatures, then
could one really say that such creatures have free will? There is no doubt that it is logically

Plantinga’s argument was a defense and not a theodicy. His appeal to the free agency of demonic creatures was
intended to show that it was logically possible for God to allow such natural evils in order to meet the requirements
for his defense.
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possible for God to have created a world in which creatures always do his bidding. Let us
suppose that God, in some way, built into a creature’s psychological make-up a strong desire to
always do His bidding. For example, suppose He installed some complex, say, something similar
to a phobia, that, when faced with a choice between x and y, the creature would always act upon
its desire to please God. But let us suppose further that this same complex would keep the person
from performing the wrong action out of a fear of displeasing God.10 Now such a view is
plausible; however, it is not libertarian freewill. If a creature is free, according to the libertarian
understanding, then it is not up to God or anyone else what action some creature might choose.
If, however, God has “built” into the creature such a mechanism so as to always desire what is
right, then, the choice is based on that desire, which was “fixed” by God, and not a response
from the agent’s willing. But, as Plantinga has forcefully shown, the heart of the freewill
argument is to suggest that it may have been metaphysically impossible for God to actualize such
a world.11 Plantinga gives an example of a politician named Curly, who accepts a bribe of
$35,000. But Smedes, the one who bought Curly with the bribe, wonders if he could have gotten
Curly for less, say $20,000. Given this scenario, it seems that one of two outcomes is possible: 1)
If Curly had been offered $20,000, he would have taken it; and 2) If Curly had been offered
$20,000, he would not have taken it. Either choice is logically possible; however, if Curly is
significantly free, then whichever of the two actions he chooses, whether Curly accepts the bribe
or whether he rejects it, it means that the other is a state of affairs (possible world) such that God
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could not have actualized it. So the moral of the story is that, if Plantinga’s argument is
successful, there are some worlds that God could not have weakly actualized.12
Concerning the second part of McCloskey’s objection, it seems that he is mixing
proverbial apples with oranges. There is a difference between a necessary being, who has as His
essential nature the quality of being good, and that of a finite, contingent being, who does not
have “goodness” as an essential part of its nature. Moreover, there is a significant difference
between being good and the capacity to do good.
William Rowe provides a third objection to the Freewill theodicy. In Response to
William Alston, Rowe makes the following claim:
But, of course, it is sometimes right to curtail a particular exercise of free will when one foresees or
predicts that its exercise is evil and/or will result in considerable suffering. Since curtailing a
particular exercise of free will does not significantly diminish a person’s overall degree of freedom,
the question at hand is whether it is rational to believe that an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good
being would have prevented the particular exercise of free will (if that is what it was) Sue’s attacker
engaged in when he brutally beat, raped, and strangled the five-year-old child.13

Here, it may be true that by “curtailing” some exercise of free will that it would not take away or
diminish a person’s overall freedom. But there are several items to consider. First, while God’s
curtailing one act of freewill may not, necessarily, diminish that person’s overall degree of
freedom, we must discern how that one act of freedom interconnects with a variety of other acts
of freedom. Would God, by removing some exercise of free will, eliminate several other interconnected acts of freewill? Second, how would one draw the line in the curtailing of such
freedoms? Just because it may appear to us, in this one particular instance, that it would have
been better for God to curtail a certain exercise of freedom, we cannot see the ripple effects or
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repercussions that such might cause. Without drawing the line in a way that inevitably may seem
to those afflicted with cognitive limitations such as ours, God’s interventions would almost
certainly prove to become ubiquitous.

Soul-Making Theodicy
The Soul-making theodicy has been proposed by such theological figures as the Church
Father, Irenaeus, and the Protestant liberal theologian, Frederic Schleiermacher.14 But, perhaps, it
was John Hick who most famously advanced this argument in his work Evil and the God of
Love. Hick, working from the theological anthropology of Irenaeus, suggests that God created
human beings in two stages. The first stage was to create human beings with personal life, who
were rational and capable of having a relationship with God. This, says Hick, was easy
(anthropomorphically speaking) for God to do. The second stage, however, was not something
that God could bring about by “divine fiat.”15 Concerning this second stage, Hick says “personal
life is essentially free and self-directing. It cannot be perfected by divine fiat, but only through
the uncompelled responses and willing co-operation of human individuals in their actions and
reactions in the world in which God has placed them.”16 What is it, then, that God wanted to
bring about in His creatures? Hick believes that God, in wanting to “bring many sons to glory,”17
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put human beings into the kind of world that would produce certain characteristics within them.
Through the world that God created He wanted to build souls.18
Hick believes that Irenaeus provides an “outline” to approaching the problem from evil in
his theology that stands in contrast to the Augustinian model of the tragic Fall of humanity.19 He
goes on to explain:
Instead of the doctrine that man was created finitely perfect and then incomprehensibly
destroyed his own perfection and plunged into sin and misery, Irenaeus suggests that man
was created as an imperfect, immature creature who was to undergo moral development and
growth and finally be brought to the perfection intended for him by his Maker. Instead of the
fall of Adam being presented, as in the Augustinian tradition, as an utterly malignant and
catastrophic event, completely disrupting God’s plan, Irenaeus pictures it as something that
occurred in the childhood of the race, an understandable lapse due to weakness and
immaturity rather than an adult crime full of malice and pregnant with perpetual guilt. And
instead of the Augustinian view of life’s trials as a divine punishment for Adam’s sin,
Irenaeus sees our world of mingled good and evil as a divinely appointed environment for
man’s development towards the perfection that represents the fulfillment of God’s good
purpose for him.20
For Hick, humans were created with an epistemic distance from God. He thinks the Christian
creation “myth” provides a basic portrait of human freedom. Humans were not created in a high
and lofty state, where they were in “a continuous awareness of God’s environing presence”;
rather, what we see is a portrait of “a frail, uncertain creature living in his own world, to which
God is but an occasional visitor.”21 Hick continues, “when God summoned man out of the dust
of the evolutionary process He did not place him in the immediate consciousness of His own
presence but in a situation from which man could, if he would, freely enter into the divine
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Kingdom and presence.”22 For Hick, however, the epistemic distance that humans now face was
not a result of the Fall; rather, it is the situation of our human experience as being a creature of
God who has not yet fully arrived to his destination. God’s human creatures, left in such an
environment, would lead, inevitably, to turning away from God.23
For Hick evil is a necessary feature of our world without which certain goods could not be
had. He posits two worlds, one a “hedonistic paradise” and the other the world in which we live
that has a great amount of evils in it. The atheistic antagonist, says Hick, expects the world to be
like the former. Since the world is not like that, “it proves to them that God is either not loving
enough or not powerful enough to create such a world.”24 But what was God’s ultimate purpose?
Was it to make a world that is convenient and comfortable, or does God aim to create a world
with an environment that builds “moral beings . . . through their own free insights and
responses”?25 On this point, Hick continues by providing an analogy between a parent and his
children, which he believes clarifies God’s purposes in creating this world:
I think it is clear that a parent who loves his children, and wants them to become the best
human beings that they are capable of becoming, does not treat pleasure as the sole and
supreme value. Certainly we seek pleasure for our children, and take great delight in
obtaining it for them; but we do not desire for them unalloyed pleasure at the expense of
their growth in such even greater values as moral integrity, unselfishness, compassion,
courage, humour, reverence for the truth, and perhaps above all the capacity for love. . . .
And to most parents it seems more important to try to foster quality and strength of character
in their children than to fill their lives at all times with the utmost possible degree of
pleasure. If, then, there is any true analogy between God’s purpose for his human creatures,
and the purpose of loving and wise parents for their children, we have to recognize that the
presence of pleasure and the absence of pain cannot be the supreme and overriding end for
which the world exists. Rather, this world must be a place of soul-building.26
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Thus God’s ultimate intention in creating was to produce a world in which His creatures could
grow and obtain a certain character. In order to build souls, God would have to create a world
that contains evil.
There is much that can be gleaned from Hick’s soul-making response to evil. The
Christian theist will no doubt agree that God created the world in such a way that it was meant to
produce a certain quality of life for His human creatures, not just bios (biological) but zoe
(qualitative).27 In creating a world such as ours, God did not seek to create a “hedonistic
paradise,” but as Hick rightly points out, God sought to create a world whereby His human
creatures exhibit a character that is full of “moral integrity, unselfishness, compassion, courage,
humour, reverence for the truth, and perhaps above all the capacity for love.”28
Furthermore, there is a sense in which God created his human creatures with some
epistemic distance.29 Upon a careful reading of Genesis narrative, Scripture seems to indicate

27

Ibid., 257.

28

Ibid., 259.

Hick has this to say regarding epistemic distance: “In creating finite persons to love and be loved by Him
God must endow them with a certain relative autonomy over against Himself. But how can a finite creature,
dependent upon the infinite Creator for its very existence and for every power and quality of its being, possess any
significant autonomy in relation to the Creator? The only way we can conceive is that suggested by our actual
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epistemic distance. In other words, the reality and presence of God must not be borne in upon men in the coercive
way in which their natural environment forces itself upon their attention. The world must be to man, to some extent
at least, etsi deus non daretur, ‘as if there were no God.’ God must be a hidden deity, veiled by His creation. He
must be knowable, but only by a mode of knowledge that involves a free personal response on man’s part, this
response consisting in an uncompelled interpretive activity whereby we experience the world as mediating the
divine presence. Such a need for a human faith-response will secure for man the only kind of freedom that is
possible for him in relation to God, namely cognitive freedom, carrying with it the momentous possibility of being
either aware or unaware of his Maker” (Ibid., 281). While I agree with Hick that some amount of epistemic distance,
perhaps a partial epistemic distance, is needed, I find his argument that such a distance “as if there were no God” a
non-sequitur, since we do see in the Genesis narrative that God makes Himself known to His creatures and seems to
do so on a regular basis.
29
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that while God’s human creatures were aware of His presence, there is a sense, nevertheless, that
His presence was not an immediate and overtly pervasive presence (Gen 3:8). The garden,
according to the Genesis narrative, was something like a sacred space.30 It was a place where our
original parents met with God. Kenneth Matthews describes this meeting as follows, along with
the impending effects of broken fellowship sin brought about:
The anthropomorphic description of God “walking” (mithallēk) in the garden suggests the
enjoyment of fellowship between him and our first parents. . . . “Walked with God” is a
favorite expression in Genesis, depicting the righteous conduct of Israel’s heroes, including
Enoch, Noah, and Abraham.191 Yet now the man and the woman are hiding from God in
fear. God’s presence is also noted by his “walking” in the camp and sanctuary of Israel.
Later Israel recognized that God demanded holiness and obedience if he were to continue to
“walk” among his people. It was part of the sad deception that the man and woman who
wanted so much to be “like God,” rather than obtaining the stature of deity, are afraid even
to commune with him. The language of the verse, “the man and his wife,” imitates the
description of the couple when in their innocence they had lived without shame (2:25). Now
they have lost their innocence, their childlike trust in the goodness of God. “Among [i.e., in
the midst of] the trees of the garden” echoes v. 3, which describes the forbidden tree “in the
midst of the garden.” Their disobedience at the “tree” of knowledge leads to this hiding
among the “trees.” They are pictured in the narrative like children hiding in fearful shame
from their father.31
Before the Fall, our original parents had fellowship with God and maintained a status of
something like an “unconfirmed creature holiness.”32 So the Christian theist will want to nuance
Hick’s perspective on epistemic distance a bit to suggest that it was only a partial distance, that is
to say, such a distance did not necessitate moral evil and that there was only enough of an
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epistemic gap in their awareness of God that would allow them to respond in a significant
manner. Such a distance, then, does not require evil.
Lastly, to support the notion of soul-making, there are numerous instances within
Scripture that would suggest our experiences—some of which are full of pain and suffering—
build our characters (Jas 1:2-4; 1 Pet 1:6-7; Rom 5:3-4; 8:17-18; Phil 3:10-11), and that these
painful experiences often bring about great goods.
Hick’s soul-making theodicy, however, is not without its difficulties. The first difficulty
is Hick’s insistence that evil is a necessary feature of this world in order to produce certain
virtues, such as courage, patience, and compassion.33 I do not disagree with Hick, here, that in
creating His human creatures, God wanted them to have certain virtues. But I am not convinced
that evil, and particularly moral evil, was necessary for God to do this. All that is required is a
world, such as ours, with some amount of risk. If, as argued in the previous section, that God
created humans to “subdue” the earth, then there is quite a challenge in that—a challenge that
comes with significant risk attached to it. In order to subdue the creation, to populate the earth,
and the like, it would mean that Adam and his descendants were to travel outside of the
boundaries of the safety of the garden paradise. Leaving safety to go out to an untamed world
would be quite risky. Moreover, a virtue like courage does not require evil, but it does require
risk. We can think of various kinds of projects that humans might take on, but that, nevertheless,
may result in failure. The failure may lead to disappointment, but it does not seem to me, at least,
that disappoint is an evil (especially if we take it that not all pain or displeasure is an evil, as I
have argued). The disappointment of failure may lead us to step out to fulfill our goal with
greater determination. Part of the problem that humans face is that we do not know what it is like
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to experience such things as failure and disappointment apart from our fallen nature. We are
epistemically challenged by such a limitation.
A second difficulty is that Hick denies the Fall. While there are questions regarding the
extent and ramifications of the Fall, it is, nevertheless, an important feature of Christian theology
and should not be done away with. Further, like the Freewill Defense, the Fall provides some
valuable insights for a genuine Christian theodicy.
The third and last difficulty is the divine determination of evil in the world so that good
may result. In his book, God, Why This Evil?, Bruce Little takes it that any position that requires
evil as necessary in order to bring about a greater good is problematic.
If the good is necessary, then so is the particular evil, for if the good could be accomplished
with a lesser evil, then the all-good God would use the lesser evil. The end is, that the
particular evil is necessary, for the good could not obtain without the evil and the good must
obtain because it is necessary. If the good is necessary, and it is dependent on the evil, then
the evil must also be necessary. If the evil is necessary, I see little hope of escaping the
conclusion that God must have determined the evil. Otherwise, there could be no assurance
that there would be the good. 34
By affirming such a view, says Little, it “makes God directly responsible for the evil—not in a
contingent way, but in a necessary way.”35
Not everyone, however, finds Little’s dilemma problematic for the theist. For example, in
a recent article, Christian philosopher James Spiegel defends a version of the soul-making
theodicy. While he recognizes that the soul-making theodicist is forced to embrace the first horn
of Little’s proposed dilemma, he does not find it to present a difficulty for the theist, especially
when we consider the difference between moral evil and natural evil. By natural evil, Spiegel
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means any evil that refers to pain and suffering, and by moral evil he means those evils that are a
result of immoral choices. Regarding natural evil, he says:
Is it problematic, from a Christian perspective, to suggest that God ordains pain and
suffering? I don’t see why it would be, given that Scripture contains many assertions of
God’s doing just this, such as when he punishes people for their sin (e.g., Sodom and
Gomorrah, the Canaanites, Ananias and Sapphira) or when he tests or disciplines the
righteous (e.g., Abraham, Job, Jesus).36
I find Spiegel’s response problematic for three reasons. First, unless we hold to the hedonistic
principle that all pain is evil, then we must be careful in nuancing our discussion of “pain” as
being an evil. We cannot lump all forms of pain together into one category. Moreover, as argued
in chapter four, it does not seem that pain is the real culprit; rather, it is the effect that severe pain
has brought on us or it is the condition that brought on the pain itself in the first place that is the
real issue. Second, it seems that Spiegel is confusing God’s permission to allow certain instances
of evil with God’s determining certain instances of evil. If God has ordered creation in such a
way that it allows for libertarian freedom, on the one hand, and natural processes to be as they
were designed to be or to operate as they do (e.g., plate tectonics, quarks, atoms, biological
processes, and so on), on the other, then there is a fair amount that God has not determined, but
allows. Third, we must be careful not to confuse God’s bringing about judgment or discipline on
individuals, which results in pain and suffering for the individual, with God’s determining all
pains and suffering that take place.
But what about moral evil? Spiegel finds this much more problematic (as he should), but
points to Genesis 50:20 and Acts 2:23 as possible examples. We will consider each passage in
order.
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Regarding the first passage, Joseph, after having been sold into slavery by his brothers
and eventually restored to them, proclaims, “As for you, you meant evil against me, but God
meant it for good, to bring it about that many people should be kept alive, as they are today”
(ESV). No doubt we see from this passage God’s sovereignty at work; however, the passage
does not require determinism. We see determinism in this passage only if we assume
determinism at the start.
Consider the following analogy. Suppose that my son is about to do something to his
sister, whereby it might cause some pain or suffering, such as pushing her down or the like.
Now, I could either choose to stop him or I can choose to let him go through with it. Whichever
choice I make, in either case I did not determine nor did I ordain either my son’s intentions or his
actions, even if I have good reasons for allowing him to go through with it. Rather, what I have
done is to permit my son to follow through with his intentions. Yet, despite my son’s actions, I
may choose to bring some good out of it. Suppose that I send my son to time out and, in order to
cheer up my daughter, allow her to eat ice cream while watching her favorite T. V. show.
Through this experience my daughter might rightly say, “he meant it for evil, but you, Dad,
meant it for good.” In the same way, why could we not understand the story of Joseph in a
similar way? Rather than God determining the events of Joseph’s life, He brought good out of
the free choices of His human creatures.
Acts 2:23 is a bit more challenging than Genesis 50:20. In his sermon at Pentecost, Peter
proclaims to the Jews listening, “this Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and
foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men” (ESV). No doubt
that such a passage as Acts 2:23 demonstrates God’s sovereignty over all that takes place, but
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does it require that God determined certain evils? Much of the answer to that question depends
on the relationship between boulē (plan) and prognōsei (foreknowledge).
Given the nature of the construction of the text, there is more than one possibility: (1) the
concepts are distinct; (2) one of the concepts is subsumed under the other; (3) the concepts are in
some sense overlapping; or (4) the terms are identical.37 Of these options, that the two are
identical is least likely, as Daniel Wallace explains:
If “foreknowledge” defines “predetermination,” this opens the door that (according to one
definition of πρόγνωσις) God’s decree is dependent on his omniscience. But if the terms are
distinguishable, the relationship may be reversed, viz., omniscience is dependent on the
eternal decree. Without attempting to resolve this theological issues entirely, it can
nevertheless be argued that the “identical” view is unlikely: the least attested meaning of
impersonal constructions is referential identity. The relationship between the two terms here
may be one of distinctness or the subsumption of one under the other.38
In this case, then, the debate cannot be solved by the construction alone. In his own view,
Wallace takes the side of God’s prognōsei (foreknowledge) as grounded in God’s hōrismenē
boulē (definite plan). He bases this on what he considers to be a key foci of the chapter, namely,
“the divine plan in relation to the Messiah’s death and resurrection.”39 Whether one agrees with
Wallace’s reasoning for grounding prognōsei in the hōrismenē boulē of God or not (I am not
convinced that his reasoning requires it to be taken that way), the key is that the construction
itself does not demand one way or another. Other factors must be considered, particularly the
context, and, perhaps, other theological reasons, too.
Historically, there was not just one position on predestination and free will in the GrecoRoman world, nor was there only one view in Palestine during the time of Jesus and Paul. While
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God’s sovereignty over history was a central belief of most Jews, it by no means excluded
human free choice.40 But what if Wallace is right that prognōsei is subsumed by hōrismenē?
Does it require determinism? Here, I think not. Suppose we translate horizō as the NIV14 has:
“deliberate.”41 This is somewhat of a weaker word than “determined” or “predetermined,” but,
nevertheless, seems to be a genuine possibility. When we think of “deliberate,” we have
something in mind like “conscious” or “intentional.” Now, let us consider an analogy to flesh
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this out. Suppose that a CEO has a plan of letting the company go. Before taking action, he turns
to his consultants for advice (interestingly enough, boulē could also mean counsel). Now, while
it is the CEO’s plan, it is a deliberate (or well thought out) plan, since he sought counsel from his
advisors. Perhaps, here, we can think of the relation between God’s plan and foreknowledge in
the same manner. God’s plan is not grounded in His foreknowledge; rather, God’s
foreknowledge, much like the consultants, informs His plan.
There is also a theological reason for thinking that God did not determine the evil that
Christ experienced. In John 10:17-18 we read:
17 For

this reason the Father loves me, because I lay down my life that I may take it up
again. 18 No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord. I have authority to lay
it down, and I have authority to take it up again. This charge I have received from my
Father” (ESV).
In this passage we see that Jesus suffered, because Jesus gave himself freely. Jesus freely giving
of Himself is in compliance with God’s plan (perhaps, worked out in the divine counsel of the
persons of the Trinity?), but not determined. So, it would not seem, then, that Acts 2:23 require
that God determine evil, even if God had a “determined plan.”
Lastly, to say that omniscience (if one interprets prognōsei that way, as Wallace seems to
be doing) is a subset or subsumed under God’s plan seems philosophically, theologically, and
logically untenable. In order to plan something, one must know quite a bit. Take, for example,
the simple act of making scrambled eggs. In order to make scrambled eggs, one must know that
there are such things as eggs, that eggs are good and edible, and how to crack said eggs in order
to put it into the skillet. But even more, one must know that a stove exists, that the stove must be
turned on to cook, and so on. There is much knowledge and thought that goes into the task of
making something as simple as scrambled eggs. Now, when we consider the complexity of the
universe alone, human history, God work in restoring humanity, and so on, obviously much more
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knowledge is needed. So, in this sense, knowledge must be logically prior to any plan.
Furthermore, Christians rightly acknowledge that God might not have created. If God exists a se,
then creation was not necessary. Suppose that God had not created. We would, then, not have
had need of a plan; however, God would have still been omniscient. Things like plans are
contingent features of any state of affairs; whereas omniscience, on the other hand, is not. It is an
essential feature of God’s nature, that without which, God would not be God, and it is something
that God must have in all possible worlds.
Despite its limitations, the soul-making theodicy does provide some valuable features that
can be part of an overarching theodicy, which I will consider below. Before concluding this
section, it would be helpful to consider one additional theodicy—Alvin Plantinga’s ‘O Felix
Culpa’ theodicy.

‘O Felix Culpa’ Theodicy
In his ‘O Felix Culpa’ theodicy,42 Alvin Plantinga begins by considering what sort of
world God could have created. Rejecting the Leibnizian view that God must have created the
best of all possible worlds, Plantinga argues that God only needs to weakly actualize “an
extremely good feasible world.”43 But considering those possible worlds with “good-making
qualities,” what makes one possible world more valuable than any other? Plantinga suggests that
out of all the possible worlds that God could have created, those worlds in which God exists are
extremely more valuable than any world in which He does not. But given that God is a necessary
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being, any world that He so chooses is a world in which He exists.44 This, in and of itself, is a
great good, for, as Plantinga asserts, “God is unlimited in goodness and holiness, as well as in
power and knowledge; these properties, furthermore, are essential to Him.”45 Thus any world in
which God exists is enormously valuable. And if one were to take a world in which God does not
exist, but in which all of the creatures always acted in the rightly, and compared that with a
world in which God exists, the goodness of the world in which God exists is incommensurable to
the (impossible) world with merely creaturely goods.46 Taking this further, Plantinga suggests,
given Christian theism, out of all the possible worlds that God could have created, those worlds
which have divine-incarnation and atonement tower above all of the rest.47 But such worlds also
include evil and suffering. So, given Plantinga’s view, how might he respond to the question:
“Why is there evil in the world?” Evil exists in the world, says Plantinga, because “God wanted
to create a highly eligible world, wanted to actualize one of the best of all the possible worlds; all
those worlds contain atonement, hence they all contain sin and evil.”48 Therefore, in the debate
between infralapsarianism and supralaspsarianism, the Supra’s got it right!49
While there are many difficulties with this view, which I will get to below, I do believe
that Plantinga has provided us with a framework for thinking about theodicy. Surely, as
Plantinga suggests, there are certain worlds that are better than others that God could create. I
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would also agree with Plantinga that there may not be a best of all possible worlds (perhaps there
is a tie, for all we know). So, out of all the possible worlds that God could weakly actualize, such
a world must be “an extremely good feasible world.”50
So far so good, but what makes one world better than other worlds? For Plantinga, it is
those worlds with incarnation and atonement. Why, then, is there sin and evil in the world? On
Plantinga’s theodicy, William Hasker puts it as follows:
The reason there is sin and evil in the world is not, as the free-will defense would have it,
that they are the byproducts, which God cannot prevent, of a world containing free will. The
reason, rather, is that they are among the necessary conditions of a world containing
incarnation and atonement. God doesn’t just put up with sin and suffering in his world; he
positively seeks them out by selecting a world to actualize that contains plenty of both. The
free-will defense is not, perhaps, invalidated by this; it may still perform its function of
showing that God and evil are logically compatible with each other. But the “real reason”
for sin and evil (and Plantinga does seem to think he has found the real reason; that is, he
thinks his theodicy is true) is something else entirely.51
In such a theodicy, then, while the free-will defense maintains some force in answering the
logical problem of evil, it becomes deficient in answering both the evidential, and I believe, the
existential problems, especially if sin and evil become a necessary feature of the world in order
to arrive at a divine end. In such a theodicy, God is, as Hasker suggests, “using his creatures,
treating them as a means and not as ends in themselves, placing them in great peril in order to get
the glory of saving them.”52
Plantinga recognizes the above objection and likens it to a father throwing his son into
the river only to heroically rescue him. He seeks to stifle this objection by providing cases in
which it is perfectly legitimate to treat someone as a means and not an end. Take, for example,
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when someone hires a person to perform a task. In both cases, it may be that the person is using
the other as a means. The employer is using the employee as a means to accomplish a job;
whereas the employee is using the employer as a means to earn money. The problem, however,
is that the employee was offered the job. She could have easily refused it. Plantinga suggests that
with God it is different:
He doesn’t ask our permission before creating us, before actualizing this world in which we
are called upon to suffer. We don’t accept the suffering voluntarily; we don’t get a choice;
God doesn’t consult us before actualizing this world, this world that requires our suffering.
Obviously he couldn’t have consulted us about whether we wish to be created in a world
such as this, but still he doesn’t; and isn’t that somehow unfair? So with respect to this
strand of the objection, the charge is twofold: (a) God requires his creatures to suffer, not for
their own good, but in order to advance some aims or ends of his own; and (b) God does this
without asking their permission.53
Plantinga seeks to solve this conundrum by making several distinctions. Surely there would be
no such issue if a person were to freely consent to suffering so that God might bring about a
greater good for another or for the world as a whole. But what if the person does not consent?
For those who are incapable to consent (e.g., a person in a coma), there are times that it is
acceptable for another person to make the choice for them. Suppose further, however, that the
person freely chooses not to consent, but God recognizes that she does so out of ignorance. If she
only knew the real reasoning and great benefits the suffering will bring, she would gladly accept
it. Lastly, consider that the reason she freely rejects such suffering in her life is because she has
disordered affections. God knows that if her affections were ordered rightly, then she would
freely accept the suffering. In each of these cases, Plantinga believes that God’s being perfectly
loving would not preclude the individual from suffering.54
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How might we respond to Plantinga? To begin with, I take it as problematic that sin is
necessary for God to bring about His purposes. There is no doubt that Christ’s incarnation and
atonement are immensely important to Christian theology and are very great gifts as a result of
humanity’s sin. But regarding incarnation, Plantinga is assuming that God might not have had
any other reasons for becoming incarnate. In fact, some Orthodox traditions believe that it is
perfectly conceivable to think of Christ becoming incarnate, even if Adam had not sinned. Such
an act would be a result of His divine love and grace. I suspect that much of what is driving
Plantinga’s theodicy stems from his Reformed tradition, namely Reformed soteriology. Involved
in our salvation is both redemption and glorification; however, the assumption, I believe, is that
one is logically connected to the other. Given the Fall, I would agree. But, perhaps there is a
sense in which humans were not complete before the Fall and were still in need of divine help to
obtain God’s goal for humanity (e.g., glorification). Perhaps, as the doctrine of theosis suggests,
the goal of creating humans was so that they might grow in greater and greater love and unity
with their Creator, with one another, and with creation. To achieve this, perhaps all that is
required is for the world to be such that it allows for significant choices, difficult tasks, and
assistance from the incarnate Son. Or, as Hasker suggests, “If suffering is as good as Plantinga
thinks it is (which is certainly open to doubt), then those sin-free worlds might contain extremely
difficult tasks, set both for the incarnate Son and for his followers (i.e., in such worlds, for
everyone)—tasks that would involve serious suffering, though not of course separation from God
and his love.”55 In such a case we might have had suffering without sin.
Regarding Plantinga’s conundrum and the distinctions he makes, I find them wanting.
Biblically speaking, Paul was adamant that we should not do evil so good may come about (Rom
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3:8). In the same sense, I find it difficult to believe, based on what we know of God’s goodness,
God would bring about evil (sin) so that good may obtain.
As noted, I do think Plantinga has clued us in on an important requirement for theodicy,
namely, that God had specific intentions of bringing about a world—an extremely good and
feasible world. But rather than thinking that God’s intention in creating was to save (redeem) a
people for His own, which requires both sin and the Fall, as is often emphasized in Reformed
theology, it would be better to think that all along God had intended on bringing about something
else, namely, a kingdom that is filled with a great diversity of creatures, some of which have the
capacity to freely choose to serve and love their Creator. Bringing about such a kingdom does
not require evil, but only a world with great freedom, significance, and challenges, such as are
found in our world.

Concluding Thoughts
Upon examining each of the three theodicies, it is clear that no single one provides a full
explanation for why God allows evil in the world. It seems that for any theodicy to be successful,
it must be multi-dimensional and cumulative in nature. As I will show below, when we put
together the strengths of the above three theodicies, along with some of the conclusions reached
from previous chapters, a fuller theodical response begins to emerge.

Trinitarian Perichoretic Theodicy
Having worked through certain conclusions above and in Chapters Five through Seven,
shall we now bring it all together? I will do so by means of a story.
There is one, eternal, all-mighty, all-knowing, and all-good God, who is the Creator of
all things. Central to the very nature of this God are two positive ontological affirmations:
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God is light and God is love. These two affirmations provide a theological vision for
Christian ethical living. As light, God cannot do anything that is morally evil. As love, God
seeks out the best for the ‘other.’ It is God’s moral character and essential goodness that
grounds His love, and it is His love that seeks out what is best and good and holy for the
“other.” Hence God’s loving actions toward His creatures are always for their best. His
desire is for His creatures to be in fellowship with Him, because He is the source of life and
of all that is good, true, and holy.
Yet, not only is God light and love, but God is also a tri-unity of persons. Within God’s
triune nature is the deepest love relationship in all of reality. The kind of love found in the
interpenetrating, perichoretic relationship of the Trinity is such that it is self-giving and
eternally moving toward the other. Such love is not a passive sympathetic response, nor is it
inert; rather, it is active, by which each person is opened up to and gives fully toward the
other.
In creating the world, God sought to bring about an extremely good feasible world. The
world was not made out of necessity, but out of the abundant overflow of the
interpenetrating love relationship of the divine persons. Creation, then, is a gift of divine
grace and love. Furthermore, in seeking to create the world, God sought to bring about a
kingdom—a kingdom filled with a variety of complex creatures with whom He could share
life. The kingdom that God sought to build was one full of goodness, peace, and great care.
Some of the creatures that make up this kingdom are biologically complex, including
creatures with sentience and intelligence. Some of the highly complex intelligent creatures,
namely God’s human creatures, are capable of having meaningful experiences and entering
into significant relationships with God, one another, other creatures, and their
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environments. Because such creatures are biological and physical in nature, the world had
to be ordered according to a set of natural laws or law-like regulating principles. Therefore,
God brought it about so that the world was ‘fine-tuned’ to support such life. The universe,
as it now stands, consists of a great variety of goods, both in its physical grandeur and
beauty and in the flourishing of a great diversity of biological life that it contains.
Consequently, such a world also brings with it the potential that sentient and intelligent life
will be negatively affected by the physical processes that govern the formation and
operations of the universe. Therefore, any world with great significance, such as the one
God created, that is both finite in nature and dynamic, brings with it great risks.
In creating humans, God bestowed great worth upon each of them equally and
unqualified. Moreover, God wanted to bring about creatures who could exhibit the same
kind of deep love found within the interpenetrating relationship of the Godhead, making
them in His image and likeness. God wanted to create individuals who could care deeply for
the other; creatures who could love on the deepest levels possible—to love one another in
the same way that He Himself loves them—and to care for God’s good creation. However,
deep love can only occur from creatures with the capacity of freely giving themselves to
others. Because of this, creaturely freedom must resemble, in the closest way possible, the
same kind of freedom that God Himself has, that is, a freedom that is non-coerced or
determined. Yet, in giving them such freedom, these creatures also had within them the
capacity to rebel against their Creator.
Yet, in creating a world with free creatures (angelic and human), God knew that some of
them would rebel against Him, rejecting His goodness toward them, and rejecting one
another. He also knew that they would bring about great pain and suffering on one another.
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This is exactly what took place. God’s creatures sinned against Him, bringing violence to
the creation order. Rather than completing their task of subduing and taking care of the
earth, God’s human creatures sought their own agendas and brought the creation under
great distress. Rebelling against God is a rejection of life and goodness, which, ultimately,
brings death—both spiritually and physically. Some of God’s angelic creatures, too, have
brought about great destruction both in the natural world and in the lives of God’s human
creatures.
God did not leave it at that. Out of His great love, God provided a means for His human
creatures to enter back into a relationship with Himself, and to live in such a way that they
could, once again, love one another deeply. God’s intentions for His creatures from the
beginning was for them to have and share in His own life—life that is abundant. This life,
however, can only come through intimate personal relationship and knowledge of the Triune
God, and the radical moral transformation that this knowledge makes possible.
In order to solve this problem of separation and to restore His human creatures and the
creation order, God has been working in and through human history. God the Son took on a
human nature in order to defeat death and to conquer all that opposes His kingdom. In the
person of Jesus of Nazareth, the Son of God died on a cross and was raised back to life by
the power of the Spirit. With the death and resurrection of God’s Son, God inaugurated
something new in the creation order—the end of death and destruction and the beginning of
new life—life that begins now for all who believe and trust Him. Through the death and
resurrection of His Son, and through the power of the Holy Spirit, God’s human creatures
can now experience abundant life—life that is God’s own life, found only in relationship to
Him—and demonstrate deep love toward others. They have also been given the power to
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overcome sin and violence and oppression in their lives. Salvation is not merely about what
takes place in the eschaton, but it is for healing to take place in the here and now. God
offers this new life to all his human creatures who will embrace His goodness through the
work of His Son on the cross and through His resurrection from the dead.
God the Spirit, too, has been moving throughout the world, bringing about new life. It is
through God’s Spirit that God has made Himself known to the world through the Bible and
the creation. God’s Spirit has also been at work enlightening people to the truth of God’s
work in restoring fallen humanity, convicting the world of sin, changing the hearts of
people, and actively indwelling and moving through the people of God—the church.
The role of the church, then, through the power of the Spirit, is to be an ambassador of
God’s deep love to the world. God has called the church to be involved in overthrowing sin
and violence among the oppressed, seeking out the good for the other, being bearers of
peace, helping the widow and orphans in their time of need, blessing those who persecute it,
feeding its enemies, defending the weak and victimized, taking care of God’s good creation,
and sharing the good news of God’s work in restoring all things. When the church
participates in deep love, the kingdom of God breaks through to the here and the now. We
catch a glimpse of God’s ultimate triumph, when the world will be rid of sin, oppression,
and death. Christian ethics, which is ultimately grounded in the paradigm of God’s
interpenetrating love, gives the church the resources to bring about real difference now, but
will ultimately escalate when the Son of God brings about His Kingdom, renewing all
things. But moreover, God has called his people to recognize that the present suffering they
are now going through leads to a maturity in character and will ultimately advance God’s
kingdom as they are faithful to His goal. Furthermore, what they are presently going
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through pales in comparison to what awaits them when God makes all things new—a newly
resurrected body in the eternal kingdom of God of the restored creation. In this restored
creation we find heaven and earth coming together under the reign and rule of our Great
God.
One day God will bring it about that all sin, death, and evil will be overcome. Just as
God has redeemed His human creatures, reconciling them to Himself, He will also restore
all of creation. In reconciling all things to Himself, God will bring about His kingdom—the
perichoretic kingdom—which was His intentions from the beginning. It will be a kingdom of
peace and shalom, whereby, there will be no more pain, suffering, violence, or hurt. God’s
human creatures will demonstrate God’s own love, reciprocating it not only to God, but to
one another and to creation. This kingdom will be a kingdom of flourishing and life,
whereby God’s creatures will live to their fullest. In this kingdom, God’s righteousness,
holiness, and love will reign supreme. Through the indwelling Spirit, God’s people will be
united to Christ and to the Father, and all of creation, full of God’s presence, will rejoice in
the greatness of God for its redemption. It is in this way that God will be All and in all.
Because God is that which nothing greater can be conceived, God is the ultimate Good—
a good incommensurate to all of the created goods and temporal evils found in this world.56
In contrast to other worldviews, which the joys we experience are destined for extinction,
the incommensurate good relation of the Triune God of Christian theism defeats any of the
sufferings that may be endured in this life, including those horrific evils that rob us of any
meaning, turning our deepest tragedies into victories and our greatest sorrows into joys.
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TPT and The Existential Problem
Having proposed TPT, we now turn to the Existential Problem from Evil (EPE). As
suggested earlier, an adequate theodicy not only answers why God allows evil, but it must also
give us reasons for thinking about what God is doing about all of the evil in the world. God may
be justified in allowing evil; but is He doing anything to stop it? I believe that TPT satisfies both
conditions. In what follows, I want to flesh out how the proposed theodicy gives us a framework
for thinking about the existential and pastoral question of suffering.

Evil and Divine Suffering
One’s theology, which is intricately connected to one’s theodicy, shapes not only how
one responds to the problem of evil, but also how one responds to those who are suffering great
evil. I will return to this below, but for now, it is important to see God’s own response to evil in
the world.
At the center of TPT is, as I have argued, the notion of deep interpenetrating love. Love is
at the center of who God is. This love is not a passive kind of love; rather it is an active love that
is selfless and seeks out the good for the other. This love is grounded in God’s goodness; yet, this
love also directs God’s goodness. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter Five, the God of Christian
theism is a God who can act in the world to stop evil, in contrast to the pantheistic and process
panentheisitc conceptions of God.
Some Christian theists have argued, not only can God act in the world, but that God also
suffers along with His creatures. Take, for example, the view of Alvin Plantinga:
God’s capacity for suffering, I believe, is proportional to his greatness; it exceeds our
capacity for suffering in the same measure as his capacity for knowledge exceeds ours.
Christ was prepared to endure the agonies of hell itself; and God, the Lord of the universe,
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was prepared to endure the suffering in order to overcome sin, and death, and the evils that
afflict our world, and to confer on us a life more glorious than we can imagine.57
A variety of theologians, too, take it that God is passible. Regarding God’s suffering, Clark
Pinnock believes that God’s “suffering or pathos . . . is a strong biblical theme.”58 The German
theologian, Jürgen Moltmann, takes the suffering of God to be central to any theodicy. “If God
were incapable of suffering in every respect, then he would also be incapable of love,” says
Moltmann.59 He continues,
He would at most be capable of loving himself, but not of loving another as himself, as
Aristotle puts it. But if he is capable of loving something else, then he lays himself open to
the suffering which love for another brings him; and yet, by virtue of his love, he remains
master of the pain that love causes him to suffer. God does not suffer out of deficiency of
being, like created beings. To this extent he is ‘apethetic’. But he suffers from the love
which is the superabundance and overflowing of his being. In so far he is ‘pathethic’.60
Baptist theologian, Millard Erickson, too, thinks that God suffers. Time and again, says
Erickson, we see in the Old Testament that God is abandoned by His people, Israel. Furthermore,
in passages such as Genesis 6:6 and Psalm 103:13, we are told that God “grieves” over human
sin and “pities His children.” There is no doubt some anthropomorphism going on in such
passages, but we must not dismiss such images as having no import with respect to God’s nature.
But most importantly for Erickson is the incarnation. It is in the incarnation of the Son of God
where we see, most clearly, God’s experience of evil. Jesus weeps over the death of his friend,
Lazarus (John 11:35). Through this he experienced sorrow. Moreover, Jesus experienced
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abandonment, suffering, ridicule, physical abuse—and, ultimately, death on the cross.61 When
we consider the incarnation, says Erickson, it is difficult to escape the conclusion of divine
suffering.
Some theologians have sought to avoid this conclusion and to preserve the impassibility of
God by maintaining that Jesus’ suffering was a function only of his human nature. Gregory
of Nyssa, for example, held that as God, the Son is impassible. Augustine maintained that
“passion,” suggesting disturbance and changeableness, is incompatible with the divine
nature. This, however, seems not only to impose upon Jesus a set of conceptions not based
upon clear biblical witness, but to divide the unity of the two natures in the one person. It
may in effect be a variety of incipient Nestorianism.62
Erickson cautions that any suffering that God partakes in, however, is endured voluntarily. God,
says Erickson, has chosen at several points certain imposed self-limitations (e.g., creation,
making covenants with His people, incarnation). None of these self-limitations, however, leads
to any kind of deficiency in the divine nature.63 God’s suffering is never more clearly seen than
in the Son’s death upon the cross, the ultimate outworking of His love toward us. Moreover, it is
through the suffering on the cross that God makes possible for His free creatures to be reconciled
to Him. Reconciliation does not come without great cost. As Erickson further explains:
Reconciliation, the restoration of relationships that have been broken, always requires some
cost, some pain. In quarrels there is an exchange of harsh statements. Each is followed by a
similar or perhaps more bitter response. If the quarrel is to cease, someone must decline to
respond or retaliate. This means forgoing the satisfaction of returning the pain to the other:
And this decision means absorbing the pain into oneself.64
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Erickson suggests this is what God, through Christ, has done on our behalf. He has absorbed the
pain and suffering brought about by human sin.65
Unlike these theologians and philosopher, however, I am hesitant to say that God suffers,
especially if we understand suffering to mean that God in some sense would not flourish.66 How
could the giver of all life not flourish? Such an understanding of God would imply that there was
a deficiency in the divine nature. Yet, we must deal with the biblical evidence? Are such
passages merely anthropomorphic? How might we resolve this?
On the one hand, there is some bite to the above arguments. There is a real sense in which
God experiences the full effects of evil, particularly through the incarnation. Yet, on the other
hand, we may not call the experience of these effects of evil suffering. I believe it is precisely
because of God’s impassibility—the inability to suffer—in His essential nature that God can
withstand the evils in the world. When the Fathers spoke of impassibility, they primarily meant
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that God is in no way “debilitated” or “crippled” by passions, as humans are, or as one might see
among the gods of the Greek and Roman pantheon.67 In other words, God is not fickle in His
response to His creatures. It is the doctrines of impassibility and immutability that ensure that
God remains steadfast in His nature, character, and responses to His creatures. Furthermore,
impassibility does not mean that God is unresponsive. He is not apathetic as the Stoics believed.
God is really related. There is genuine love, long-suffering, compassion, and so forth. The
doctrine of impassability, then, in the words of Thomas McCall, “safeguards and protects the
fact that holy love is the essence of the triune God.”68 He continues, “Rather than a denial of the
love of God, it resoundingly affirms that holy love.”69 Perhaps a better word to use when
speaking of divine immutability and impassibility is Karl Barth’s emphasis on “constancy.” God
is constant in His nature, character, and responses to His creatures.70
But how, then, does God experience the full effects of evil? Pace McCall there is a sense
in which God experienced evil through the incarnation. Following Aquinas and others, McCall
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believes that one must maintain a clear “distinction between the humanity and the divinity of
Christ.”71 Failure to do so, says McCall, may lead to Docetism. But I would agree with Erickson
that to deny that God was somehow affected by the evil that Christ experienced may just as
easily lead to some form of Nestorianism. Perhaps the solution is in holding to something like
Thomas Morris’s two-minds view of Christ. According to Morris there are two distinct centers of
consciousness—the divine mind and the human mind. The eternal divine mind of the Son
“encompasses the full scope of omniscience.”72 The human mind, however, came into existence
a finite time in the past. “The earthly range of consciousness, and self-consciousness,” says
Morris, “was thoroughly human, Jewish, and first-century Palestinian in nature.”73 It would be
impossible for the earthly mind to contain the divine mind; rather, what we see is that the divine
mind contained the earthly mind. There was an “asymmetric accessing relation between the two
minds.”74 Morris goes on to explain:
The divine mind had full and direct access to the earthly, human experience resulting from
the Incarnation, but the earthly consciousness did not have such full and direct access to the
content of the overarching omniscience proper to the Logos, but only such access, on
occasion, as the divine mind allowed it to have. There thus was a metaphysical and personal
depth to the man Jesus lacking in the case of every individual who is merely human.75
Morris believes that this solution allows for, on the one hand, the human growth and
development of Jesus, and, yet, on the other, his cry of dereliction.76 If Morris is correct, and
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something like the two-minds view of Christ is correct, it would mean that the divine mind of the
Son had full access to all of the emotions, experiences, pains, and horrors felt by the human
nature of Christ. It would go to stand that, though there is a distinction within the persons of the
Trinity, and though it was Christ alone who suffered on the cross (on pain of the heresy of
patripassianism), nevertheless, given that the Father, Son, and Spirit share divine omniscience, it
would seem that each of the divine persons of the Trinity have access to the horrors that Christ
suffered and faced through His work and His death in the human nature. In this sense, via divine
omniscience, the divine Trinity can relate to the various horrors that people in the world face
because of the tragedies that Christ went through on the cross.
Yet, there is another way to think of the divine experience of evil. Having an experience
of evil against you is not the same thing as experiencing suffering from the evil. We can make
such a distinction in our everyday human experiences. We can imagine cases where a person
hurls insults at another, but the person receiving the insults is in no way fazed by the insults,
perhaps, because this person has a strong and immovable character when it comes to such things
as being insulted. Nevertheless, though not fazed by the insults, the person may take the right
steps to reconcile with the one doing the insulting. In this case, the person receiving the insults
could retaliate, but, instead, absorbs any effects of evil against her, and then seeks to reconcile
with the other. But let us suppose further that some pain is involved. The person receiving the
insults feels pain, perhaps even deep pain, from the insults, but nevertheless remains steadfast in
character and immovable in resolve. Here, again, the person absorbs the effects of evil—pain in
this instance—and, yet, does the good despite the evil. In the same way, God can experience the
effects of evil, even if the deliverance of such evils causes deep pain, and He can respond to
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them, yet He can do so without being affected by the evil so as to debilitate Him or to change His
metaphysical stature in anyway.

Evil and Divine Action
As noted from the above discussion, there is a sense, particularly through the incarnation,
that God knows what it means to suffer and to experience the tremendous horrors of the world.
Not only does God know these things, there is a real sense in which God is active in defeating
evil. In order to see this more clearly, it would be helpful to consider a passage from the book of
Job.
In chapter 41 of Job, we see God answering Job out of the windstorm. Job has asked for
his day in court with God, and he gets his wish. Rather than Job questioning God, however, it is
the Lord who questions Job. The standard reading of this passage takes it that God reminds Job
who is in charge and that Job has no right to question Him on these matters. In the end, Job is
silenced and realizes his folly. But there is much more to the passage than this. Often, readers fail
to recognize the use of Job’s allusions to the ancient Near-eastern mythic tradition throughout in
his complaints. As John R. Schneider explains:
In his very first oration, Job uses the mythic tradition to curse the night he was conceived.
The anti-cosmic symbolism is powerful: “let those curse it who curse the day, who are
skilled to rouse up Leviathan, let the stars of its dawn be dark” (Job 3:8-9). In his second
oration he ironically equates himself with chaos.” Am I the sea, or a sea monster, that
though hast set guard over me?” (Job 7:12). His personal complaint is expanding swiftly to
become global—better no world at all than one in which chaos lives. His distress over the
injustice of history reaches its peak when Job considers God’s power over chaos. “By his
power he stilled the sea, by his understanding he smote Rahab, by his wind the heavens were
made fair, his hand pierced the fleeing serpent” (Job 27:12-13, [his italics]. But this of
course is no more the triumphant declaration of praise, as it functions in the tradition. In
view of what has happened, and in light of what Job now realizes about the world, it has
become an ironic lament, the confession of a bitter, broken and thoroughly bewildered
man.77
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In the ancient Near-east, the sea is often understood as chaos. It is the unknown and often
symbolizes evil. It is also the place where Leviathan—the chaos monster—dwells. Psalms 74
and 83, along with Isaiah 51, provide images of God’s defeat over the various manifestations of
chaos. Job’s complaint was that the chaos had not died, but was still very much a part of the
world.78 It is no wonder that in chapter 41 God begins His divine speech with the Leviathan. God
asks Job, “Can you draw out Leviathan with a fishhook or press down his tong with a cord?”
(Job 41:1, ESV) Then in vv. 10-11 we read, “No one is so fierce that he dares to stir him up.
Who then is he who can stand before me? Who has first given to me, that I should repay him?
Whatever is under the whole heaven is mine” (ESV). In other words, God is affirming to Job that
the chaos monster is still very much a part of this world. No human can think of stopping or
resisting him. But, despite this, God is very much in the midst of the chaos. Rather than the chaos
monster being in control, it is God who can lead the chaos monster around, as imaged, by a hook.
On this point, Schneider provides helpful insight: “God acknowledges the reality of the chaos,
but he now reveals, and Job now sees, that he is in complete control of events. The relationship
between God and Leviathan is not friendly, but rather one of grudging domestication.”79
From this reading of Job, we see that God is in the midst of the evil that is taking place in
the world, and He is doing something about it. In dealing with evil, it takes, in the words of N. T.
Wright, God getting his “boots muddy” and “his hands bloody” in order “to put the world back
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to rights.”80 This is most clearly seen in the life and person of Jesus of Nazareth. As Wright
explains,
Jesus on the cross towers over the whole scene as Israel in person, as YHWH in person, as
the point where the evil of the world does all that it can and where the Creator of the world
does all that he can. Jesus suffers the full consequences of evil: evil from the political,
social, cultural, personal, moral, religious and spiritual angles all rolled into one; evil in the
downward spiral hurtling toward the pit of destruction and despair. And he does so precisely
as the act of redemption, of taking that downward fall and exhausting it, so that there may be
new creation, new covenant, forgiveness, freedom and hope.81

He continues: “What the Gospels offer is not a philosophical explanation of evil, what it is or
why it’s there, nor a set of suggestions for how we might adjust our lifestyles so that evil will
mysteriously disappear from the world, but the story of an event in which the living God deals
with it.”82
This work of God is connected with our future hope. As Paul tells us in 1 Corinthians
15:54, because of Christ’s work on the cross, “Death has been swallowed up in victory.” God has
defeated death and this will ultimately come to fruition. The vision that Revelation 21 paints for
us is an image where God will bring about a new heavens and a new earth (v. 2). In this passage
we see that there will be “no more death or mourning or crying or pain” (v. 4), but we also see
that there will be no more sea (v. 1). The old order, with its chaos, death, and destruction will be
done away with (v. 4). God’s presence will be fully felt throughout all of the created order (v.3).
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Evil and the Church
Having seen God’s work in defeating evil through Christ, there is one final area to
consider. God has called the church to action in defeating evil in the world. As we begin to think
about the church’s response to the existential problem from evil (EPE), there are several
important things that we must keep in mind. To begin with, in answering EPE, it is precisely at
this point that our theology comes together with praxis. How we respond to EPE is ultimately
grounded in what we believe, particularly about God, people, sin, salvation, hope, and so on. In
other words, our theology should ground our response to the problem of existential suffering.
In Chapter Seven I gave significant consideration to the doctrine of the Trinity,
particularly the doctrine of perichoresis. Furthermore, I discussed how this doctrine informs our
thinking about how we should respond to others. If at the center of all reality is this
interpenetrating, dynamic, and self-giving love relationship between the persons of the Trinity,
then this should inform us about how we are to interact with creation, and particularly human
beings. Humans were created in the image and likeness of God. Part of what it means to be
created in this image and likeness is to be in relation to one another. Yet, our relationships, as I
have argued, should be ones that represent deep love—the same kind of deep love that we see
within the perichoretic relationships among the persons of the divine Trinity. When thinking
about our response to EPE, the center of our response should be one of self-giving deep love. In
other words, our response should be that of care. This response is not merely sympathy toward
the other; rather, a deep care that is ultimately self-giving and other-centered.
Reflecting on the doctrines of sin, gospel, and church, too, as we considered in Chapter
Seven, should inspire thought about how we should respond to those who are suffering
existentially. Sin has caused deep rifts within our relationships—rifts that affect our relationship
with God, one another, and with the creation itself. Sin, at its very core, is oppressive and self286

centered. Often, many of the existential sufferings that we see taking place in the world are a
direct result of sin. Yet, through the good news of the gospel, we see God’s response to evil and
sin in the world. It was through Christ’s broken body and resurrection that God defeated death.
Nevertheless, we live in an already/not yet realization of the defeat of evil. As noted above,
Christians have hope that because of Christ’s work in the world a day will come when there will
be no more suffering, pain, and sorrow. Death will be no more (Rev 21:4). Yet, we still live in a
world where pain, death, and suffering are very much reality. But the gospel does not stop with
the reality that death has been defeated through Christ; sin, too, along with its effects, has been
defeated. God, through the gospel, offers new life—eternal life. This life is not something that
begins in the future; rather, it begins now. It was through Christ that God defeated death and sin,
but it is through the Spirit that God brings new life to the world. As the redeemed community of
Christ, then, it is the Spirit who is the agent of change, and it is He who provides the church with
the power to make a difference and to confront the evil in the world. Through the Spirit, God has
supplied all of the power and energy needed to truly be agents and ambassadors of reconciliation.
The church never replaces His work; rather, it is the church in-and-through the power of the
Holy Spirit that God has chosen to confront evils in the world. Therefore the church should be on
the front lines confronting sin, particularly the many social injustices that we see taking place in
the world today, as well as bridging the gap of broken relationships through the preaching and
proclamation of the gospel. Social justice and the gospel are not opposed to one another. Rather,
both have at their center the care and concern for the other.
God has called the church to love its neighbors (Mk 12:31); to help widows and orphans
in their distress (Js 1:27); to love enemies and to make peace so much as it is within its power
(Mt 5:44; Rom 12:14, 16, 18); to forgive unconditionally and to reconcile with those who sin

287

against it (Mt 5:44; 18:15, 21-22); to turn the other cheek (Mt 5:39) and not seek revenge (Rm
12:19); to give of its material possessions to those in need (Ps 82; Mk 12:31; Lk 10:25-37; Rom
1:13, 20; Js 1:27; 2:14-17; 1 Jn 3:16-18). The church has been called to a life of self-giving
love—a love that does not retaliate when wronged or seek revenge. The kind of life that the
church has been called to is a kingdom life. Such a life represents God’s intentions all along in
creating. This is the very life that we see in the interpenetrating relationship of the divine persons
of Trinity and demonstrated in God’s selfless actions toward His creation. Lastly, the church has
been called to be a part of God’s work in building His kingdom. When the church accepts its
call, it becomes a part of what God is doing (and has been doing throughout the entirety of
human history) to confront the evils and horrors in the world.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUDING MATTERS

This project sought to show that no worldview is exempt from answering the problem
from evil. Each worldview must account for the amount, types, and kinds of evil in the world. Of
the four worldviews considered, only theism provides a robust and adequate response to the
philosophical and theological difficulties raised by evil in the world.
But I have also argued that theism in-and-of-itself is not enough. A specific form of
theism is needed—a form of theism that is grounded in the perichoretic relationship of the divine
Trinity. Chapter Seven argued that our understanding of the Trinity, particularly the perichoretic
relationship of the divine persons, informs our understanding of the world, and particularly
human nature. The Trinity is at the center of not only our theology as Christians, but the intraTrinitarian love relationship between the persons of the Father, Son, and Spirit is at the center of
all reality. Reality is deeply and essentially relational. This interpenetrating relationship between
the persons of the Triune God is dynamic and one that is moving toward and opening up to the
“Other.” The Father gives of Himself fully to the Son and the Son gives of Himself fully to the
Father and the Spirit gives of Himself fully to the Father and the Son. What we see in the
dynamic love relationship between the persons of the Trinity is the deepest love possible. As
argued, this deep love that we see within the dynamic relationship of the persons of the Trinity is
the same love that, on the one hand, created something “other” (creation) than God out of sheer
selfless giving of divine love and grace, and, yet, on the other hand, the kind of love that God
lavished upon His human creatures in making them in His image and likeness. It is this same
kind of deep love that God expects for his human creatures to have in their relationships with one
another and with creation.
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Because a deep rift separates humans from God, one another, and creation, God’s human
creatures suffer from a multiplicity of evils: war, disease, famine and starvation, chronic pain,
depression, anxiety, rape, homicide, genocide, the loss of loved ones, and death. Creation itself is
groaning and is in need of liberation. We must not be concerned merely with the question of why
evil exists and why God allows it; we must also be concerned for the sufferer. Any theodicy,
then, which seeks to answer the theological and philosophical problems brought on by evil in the
world, must also address the existential problem of suffering.
As I have argued, it is precisely a theodicy grounded in the interpenetrating love
relationship of the Triune God—a theodicy I have dubbed the “Trinitarian Perichoretic
Theodicy” (TPT)—that provides not only a robust response to the philosophical and theological
challenge of evil, but also a way forward in answering the existential problem from evil. As
argued in Chapter Eight, what God sought to bring about was a dynamic and loving kingdom
that was full of life, harmony, and peace and that was essentially relational. Such a kingdom does
not require evil, nor does it require sin; but it does require a certain kind of freedom—freedom
that resembles God’s own freedom. Though sin and moral evil is a product of the human abuse
of freedom and rebellion, God does not leave it at that. God has responded to the evil in the
world through the agency of His Son and through the agency of His Spirit. Through the death
and resurrection of His Son, God conquered death; through the work and empowerment of the
Holy Spirit, God has given His human creatures new life and power to overcome evil in the
world. The church, empowered by the indwelling Spirit, is God’s instrument for bringing about
change in the world in the here and now. God has called the church to a life of self-giving love—
a love that reflects the very dynamic love relationship we see among the Persons of the Trinity. It
is this kind of love that transforms a world that is full of evil, since such a love is at bottom
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selfless, dynamic, and active, seeking out the best and good for the other. God’s work in the
world will escalate until He fully brings about His kingdom—a kingdom where heaven and earth
unite and God’s presence penetrates all of the created order. In this kingdom evil will be
defeated. There will be no more sorrow, pain, or death. All wrongs will be righted and justice
will prevail.

Objections Considered
Along with any new proposal, there will be some resistance, doubts, and loose ends that
must be considered. In what follows I consider two potential objections to my proposal, though
more could be considered. Given that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is a central teaching of
Christian theism, and since it is a central feature of this work, it is important that it can hold up to
scrutiny with respect to its coherence.
There is more than one charge of incoherence that could be brought up against the
Christian doctrine of the Trinity. In what follows I consider two issues related to its coherence.
First, I consider the problem of monotheism. How is it that a Christian can claim, on the one
hand, that God is one, and yet, on the other, proclaim that He is three? Would not such an
understanding preclude, mark a departure from, monotheism? Second, I consider a fuller charge
of incoherence surrounding the problem of identity. How is it that the each of the divine Persons
can be said to be God, and yet, each of the persons is not also identical to the others?

The Problem of Monotheism
First, an objector might claim that the doctrine of the Trinity contradicts the very concept
of monotheism. Take, for example, this Christian claim: The Father is God, the Son is God, and
the Holy Spirit is God. Would not such a claim lead to something like tri-theism—the view that
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three divine beings exist—instead of monotheism? Would not the acceptance of more than one
divine person contradict the Jewish understanding of monotheism? How might the Christian
theist respond?1
To begin with, it may be helpful to consider just what it is that one means by
“monotheism.” Traditionally philosophers of religion have understood monotheism to mean
something like: there is only one God who exists and that this God alone is ultimate.2 Yet, if not
careful, certain other expectations might be read into this understanding of God, such as any
being who is considered to be God must have a certain property X. In the case of Christian
theism, critics often assume that for some being to be classified as God, such a being must have
the characteristic or property of being only one person. Therefore, trying to understand Jesus and
the Holy Spirit as God would be a violation of basic monotheism, and especially Jewish
monotheism. But as recent investigations into early Judaism, particularly Second Temple
Judaism, have shown, we must be careful not to impose categories upon a Jewish understanding
of monotheism that were not necessarily a part of it, while at the same time we must allow that
some development has taken place in Jewish thinking as it pertains to monotheism. There has
been much in recent discussion on just what Jewish monotheism entails.3 Just what is it that sets
the God of Judaism apart from other deities?

1
In this first part I will consider the question of monotheism. In the next section, I will focus more on the
question of unity between the divine Persons.
2

For a discussion on various kinds of monotheistic views, see Keith Yandell, Philosophy of Religion: A
Contemporary Introduction (New York: Routledge, 1999), 86-97.
3

See especially Richard Bauckham, God Crucified: Monotheism and Christology in the New Testament
(Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998; idem, “Monotheism, and Christology in the Gospel of
John,” in Contours of Christology in the New Testament, ed. Richard N. Longenecker (Grand Rapids, MI: William
B. Eerdmans, 2005 (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005), 148-166; idem, Jesus and the God
of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies on the New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Grand Rapids,
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2008); Larry W. Hurtado, One Lord, One God: Early Christian Devotion
and Ancient Jewish Monotheism (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1988); idem, “First-Century Jewish
Monotheism,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 71 (1998): 3-26; idem, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to
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In his work on monotheism during the Second Temple period, Larry Hurtado has argued
that what set the God of Christians and Jews apart from other conceptions of deity in the ancient
world was a radical devotion to and exclusive worship of this one God. Early Christians and
Jews during this period held to a diversity of heavenly beings, “whom they regarded very
positively, typically as part of the entourage of the one God (e.g., angels).”4 But these beings
were not the recipients of worship. Hurtado contends that such devotion “means that the ‘God’ of
the NT is posited, not as one among others, or as one member of a divine genus, but as sui
generis, unique and solely worthy of worship.”5 Interestingly enough, within the New Testament
documents, Jesus, claims Hurtado, received the same devotion that was reserved for God alone.
Early on there was a binitarian shape to worship among Christians, which began after Jesus’
death and resurrection. Some of the earliest Christological materials in the New Testament are
hymns and confessions embedded within the New Testament documents, giving primacy and
devotion to Jesus (John 1:1-18; Rom 1:3-4; 3:24-26; 1 Cor 15:3-5; Gal 3:26-28; Eph. 5:14; Phil
2:6-11; Col. 1:15-20; 1 Tim 3:15; Heb 1:3;).6

Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2003); idem, How on Earth
Did Jesus Become God? Historical Questions about Earliest Christian Devotion (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005); idem, God in New Testament Theology (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2010);
James D. G. Dunn, Did the Early Christians Worship Jesus?: The New Testament Evidence (Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2010); Peter Hayman, “Monotheism—A Misused Word in Jewish Studies?” Journal
of Jewish Studies 42, no. 1 (Spring 1991), 1-15; Paul A. Rainbow, “Jewish Monotheism as the Matrix for New
Testament Christology: A Review Article,” Novum Testamentum 33, 1 (Jan 1991), 17-91; Michael S. Heiser,
“Monotheism, Polytheism, Monolatry, or Henotheism: Toward an Assessment of Divine Plurality in the Hebrew
Bible,” in Bulletin for Biblical Research 18, no. 1 (2008), 2-4.
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5

Ibid., 29.

6

Within the body of the New Testament, there are numerous creedal, hymnic, and confessional materials.
These statements are often short, pithy statements; however, there are some longer statements, as well. In addition,
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Richard Bauckham, too, has done significant work in the area of Second Temple
monotheism. Rather than focusing on either a “functional” or “ontic” Christology, as many
biblical critics and theologians are often prone to do,7 Bauckham begins his investigation by
working from within the category of, what he calls, “Christology of divine identity.”8 A
Christology of divine identity, which was the Christology of the earliest Christian communities,
“was already the highest Christology.”9 Making such distinctions as “ontic” and “functional,”
Bauckham thinks, distorts our understanding of how the earliest Christians understood God and
how they did their Christology. On this point, Bauckham asserts:
When we think in terms of divine identity, rather than divine essence or nature, which are
not the primary categories for Jewish theology, we can see that the so-called divine
functions which Jesus exercises are intrinsic to who God is. This Christology of divine
identity is not a mere stage on the way to the patristic development of ontological
Christology in the context of a Trinitarian theology. It is already a fully divine Christology,
maintaining that Jesus Christ is intrinsic to the unique and eternal identity of God. The
Fathers did not develop it so much as transpose it into a conceptual framework more
concerned with the Greek philosophical categories of essence and nature.10
There are two basic ways that one can approach monotheism during the Second Temple
period. The first is to argue that the monotheism of the postexilic period was “strict” in such a
way that it would have been “impossible to attribute real divinity to any figure other than the one

Longman Group Ltd., 1972), 13-29; Vernon H. Neufeld, The Earliest Christian Confessions (Grand Rapids, MI:
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Communities,” in Contours of Christology in the New Testament, edited by Richard Longenecker (Grand Rapids,
MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005), 68-74; Ralph P. Martin, Worship in the Early Church (Grand Rapids,
MI: Wm B. Eerdmans, 1974), 39-65; Gary R. Habermas, The Historical Jesus: Ancient Evidence for the Life of
Christ (Joplin, MS: College Press Publishing Co., 1996), 143-170.
7

For a detailed discussion of Functional Christology, see Millard J. Erickson, The Word Became Flesh
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God.”11 Within the context of Jewish monotheism, there is no way that Jesus could have ever
been considered divine. The second is a “revisionist” approach to understanding Jewish
monotheism during the Second Temple period. According to Bauckham, this second approach,
which places focus on intermediary figures, such as principal angels, exalted patriarchs, and
personification of divine attributes, tends toward blurring the distinction between the one true
God and “all other reality.”12 Bauckham recognizes that both approaches are somewhat
misguided. With the first view, Bauckham believes that Jewish monotheism is indeed strict. The
Jews during the Second Temple period were self-consciously aware of their monotheistic beliefs,
and, for them, there was a clear distinction between the one true God of Israel and all other
reality. Despite an abundance of intermediary figures within the literature of postexilic Israel,
and the fact that such figures had some relevance within the matrix of the Israelite worldview, it
is a major point of contention as to whether such figures provide any key insight into the study of
Christian origins. A high Christology developed within such a context not because the Jews
applied to Jesus a “semi-divine intermediary status”13 but because they identified “Jesus directly
with the one God of Israel.”14
According to Bauckham, what has been lacking in the whole discussion is a proper
understanding of how the Jews during the Second Temple period understood the uniqueness of
the true God of Israel. When a proper understanding of what made the God of Jewish
monotheism unique is rightly considered, then can one appropriately assess and understand just
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exactly what the early Christians were doing with Jesus when they included Him into the unique
identity of the one true God of Israel. How, then, are we to understand “divine identity”? 15
“Identity” is a term that Bauckham coined to describe his findings in the literature of the
Second Temple period.16 For Jews during the Second Temple period, their entire worldview
revolved around a certain pattern of “cultic worship,” which was “formed by exclusive
allegiance to the one God”.17 Yet, this presupposes that God was in some way “identifiable,” that
is, this God had a unique identity. “Since the biblical God has a name and a character, since this
God acts, speaks, relates, can be addressed and, in some sense, known, the analogy of human
personal identity suggests itself as the category with which to synthesize the biblical and Jewish
understanding of God,” 18 says Bauckham. This is not to say, however, that Jews were
unconcerned with metaphysical statements about God. It is clear from some of the literature of
the Second Temple period that certain writers, for example Josephus and Philo, adopted Greek
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metaphysical language and applied it to God. Moreover, one of those aspects which distinguish
the true God from all other reality is the belief that He is eternal, which is a metaphysical
statement about God. But this was not the predominant conceptual framework from which Jews
during this time period worked out their understanding of God. They were not so much
concerned with “what” deity is, but rather with “who” the one true God is. But what are those
characteristics that distinguish the one true God from all other reality, including the gods of the
nations?
Bauckham recognizes two sets of “identifying features” that distinguishes the God of
Jewish monotheism. First, there are features which speak to God’s relationship to His people
Israel. It was to Israel that God revealed His divine name, Yahweh. Moreover, it was Yahweh,
the God of Israel, Who made a covenant with His people, Who delivered His people out of the
hands of Egypt, and Who gave them a Law. The second set of identifying features—the set that
Bauckham is most concerned about for his argument—focuses on how Israel’s God relates to the
rest of creation. Concerning this second category, there are two underlying themes that are seen
throughout the literature—that God is creator of and sovereign ruler over all things. It is these
two distinguishing factors (being creator and sovereign) that set apart the God of Israel from all
other reality, including the gods of the nations. As the sole creator and ruler over all of reality,
God employs a variety of servants to do His bidding. He is envisioned in the Second Temple
literature as the great and supreme emperor ruling over all of reality.19
There is a third aspect that one must take into account in connection with God as creator
and sovereign ruler—monolarity, the view that God alone should be worshipped. Unlike the

Ibid., 7-10; Richard Bauckham, “The Worship of Jesus in Philippians 2:9-11,” in Where Christology
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Press, 1998), 129.
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gentiles, who thought that one could worship a high god, and, yet, at the same time worship
lesser deities, the Jews during the Second Temple period reserved worship for the one true God
alone.20
When one takes these three aspects of Second Temple Judaism together, one can further
differentiate between three main categories of Jewish monotheism: creational, eschatological,
and cultic monotheism. God alone is the sole creator of all reality. He accomplished this without
help or advice from any other. Yet, stemming from this first category of creational monotheism,
comes the second, eschatological monotheism, by which God, as the sole ruler over all creation
will ultimately fulfill His promises, establish His eschatological kingdom, and make His
Lordship known to the nations. Only the sole ruler and Lord over all things should be
worshipped—this is the notion of cultic monotheism.21 What Bauckham finds striking is that the
earliest Christians applied these same categories to Christ, making up, what he calls,
Christological Monotheism. Perhaps the strongest evidence of this is the widely used expression
found in Psalm 110:1, in which Christ is seated on God’s cosmic throne (Phil 2:9-11; cf. Isa
45:22-23). Within the earliest Christian literature, Jesus is depicted as “the one who will achieve
the eschatological lordship of God and in whom the unique sovereignty of the one God will be
acknowledged by all,” and, moreover, he is “included in the unique rule of God over all things,
and is thus placed unambiguously on the divine side of the absolute distinction that separates the
only Sovereign One from all creation.”22 God does not share His throne with any other. Yet, by
taking a place on the cosmic throne of God, by participating in the sovereign rule and Lordship
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of God, and by receiving worship due to God alone, Christ was depicted in the earliest Christian
literature as sharing in the unique identity of the one true God, and thus was given the highest
status that could have possibly been given (Phil 2:6-11). The earliest Christians attributed to
Jesus the highest Christology possible within the Jewish monotheistic context. Moreover, in the
earliest Christian formulations, Jesus is seen, not only as sovereign ruler, but He is also depicted
as Creator of all things (John 1:1-3; 1 Cor 8:6; Col 1:15-17; Heb 1:2-3), which implies His preexistence (Phil 2:6-8). Lastly, we see within the literature that Jesus is given the divine name
(Phil 2:9).23
Given studies like Hurtado’s and Bauckham’s, it would seem that Jewish monotheism
can accommodate for more than one person within its overarching schema, especially given
Bauckham’s notion of “identity.” Holding to a concept of a tri-personal God in no way
contradicts the concept of Jewish monotheism, unless, of course, one loads upfront what
monotheism means and insists on saying more than what those during Second Temple Judaism
would say. The early church, then, found themselves with the task off translating ideas and
concepts from one way of thinking to another. It is precisely because of what they found within
the pages of the Scriptures that the early Fathers of the church wrestled through working out a
formula that faithfully expressed their findings, yet doing so in such a way that that expressed the
language and concepts found within the matrix of their own religious and cultural contexts.

The Problem of Identity
Suppose there is room within Jewish monotheism for something like more than one
person belonging to the unique identity of the one true God, there is still yet another problem that
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critics raise—the problem of identity.24 How is it that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are
understood by Christians to be identical? After all, The Father is God, The Son is God, and The
Holy Spirit is God. Would not this imply that the Father is identical to the Son and to the Spirit,
which is an apparent contradiction?
In order to answer this it will be helpful to consider the aforementioned distinction
between the “is” of identity and the “is” of predication. When speaking of the “is” of identity,
one aims at asserting that some object or person can be understood in at least two ways. For
example, Ronnie Campbell is the father of Abby, Caedmon, and Caleb or Superman is Clark
Kent. In each case, one could insert the words “the same thing as” or the “same person as.” The
“is” of predication, on the other hand, is used to express that whatever is located on the left side
of the equation has the property of that which appears on the right. “Superman is superhuman,”
“Jack is furry,” and “Caspian is feline” are all examples of the “is” of predication.25
With respect to God, then, what is it that Christians are claiming? If by “is God” the
Christian had something like the “is” of identity in mind, then she would be caught in a
contradiction, since it would follow that the Father is identical with the Son and with the Spirit;
however, if she takes “is God” to mean something like the “is” of predication, then she is saying
something more along the lines of person P “is divine,” which would be much less thorny of an
issue when it comes identity. But the Christian is not yet clear. It seems that for Christians to
predicate of each of the persons “divinity” would render them susceptible to the charge of tritheism, the heretical view that three gods exist. Moreover, such a view would clearly contradict

24
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the Christian adherence to monotheism (that only one God exists). Prima facie Christians are
stuck with the following juxtaposition: God is one and God is three. But the critic will point out
that nothing can be both exactly one thing and three things without holding to a view that is
logically incoherent. The doctrine of the Trinity, then, is logically incoherent.26 But as Thomas
Senor as rightly suggested: “When the creeds say that God is three and yet one, they should not
be understood as asserting that God is three and one of the same thing. That would be
contradictory and obviously so. Rather, what is being claimed is that there is an important unity
in the godhead as well as plurality.”27
Christians have long recognized the tension between the three-ness and the one-ness of
the Trinity. Steering too much toward the three-ness leads to tri-theism; steering too much
toward the one-ness leads to modalism—the view that God manifests Himself in different modes
of existence (at one time the Father and at another the Son or the Spirit). Both views were
rejected by the early church as being heretical. So, how might the Christian make sense of the
unity and plurality within the Trinity?
Traditionally Christians have put it this way: God as being three individuals (hypostases)
or persons (personae) in one substance (homoousios).28 Thomas Torrance expresses the classical
Christian understanding of the Trinity in the following way:
In our understanding of the New Testament witness to God’s revelation of himself, ‘the
Father’, ‘the Son’, and ‘the Holy Spirit’ are unique and proper names denoting three distinct
Persons or real Hypostases who are neither exchangeable nor interchangeable while
nevertheless of one and the same divine Being. There is one Person of the Father who is
always the Father, distinct from the Son and the Spirit; and there is another Person of the
Son who is always the Son, distinct from the Father and the Spirit; and another Person of the
26
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Holy Spirit who is always the Holy Spirit, distinct from the Father and the Son. In this threefold tri-personal self-revelation of God one Person is not more or less God, for all three
Persons are coeternal and coequal. They are all perfectly one in the identity of their Nature
and perfectly homoousial or consubstantial in their Being. Each of the three Persons is
himself Lord and God, and there is only one and the same eternal Being of the Father, the
Son and the Holy Spirit. The Holy Trinity of three divine Persons is thus perfectly
homogeneous and unitary, both in the threeness and oneness of God’s personal activity, and
in the threeness and oneness of his eternal unchangeable personal Being. Three Persons, one
Being.29
Though Christians speak of the three persons as distinct, that must not be confused with
separateness. As Torrance further explains, “No divine Person is who he is without essential
relation to the other two, and yet each divine Person is other than and distinct from the other
two.”30 In this sense, then, it is this relatedness of each divine Person to the other divine Persons
that constitutes what and who They are. The Father cannot be the Father apart from His relation
to the Son and the Spirit, and the Son cannot be the Son apart from His relation to the Father and
the Spirit, and the Spirit cannot be the Spirit apart from His relation to the Father and the Son.
“The relations between the divine Persons are not just modes of existence,” explains Torrance,
“but hypostatic interrelations which belong intrinsically to what Father, Son and Holy Spirit are
coinherently in themselves and in their mutual objective relations with and for one another.”31
Thus when thinking of the doctrine of the Trinity, Christians cannot think of God apart from the
interrelatedness of the three Persons. If one of the persons were absent, then we would not have
the Christian God but something like ditheism.

29
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What is it, then, that constitutes the unity between the divine Persons? Here, something
like the doctrine of perichoresis might provide a way forward. Before considering perichoresis as
it relates to my proposal, it may first be helpful to consider Social Trinitarianism.
There are two main views on the doctrine of the Trinity—the so-called Latin view (LT)
and the so-called Social Trinitarian view (ST). I will not here defend either view, since this is an
“in-house” debate.32 For now I will assume something like the ST view is true in order to defend
against the charge of incoherence.
ST begins with the three-ness of God instead of God’s oneness. Most versions of ST hold
to each of the three Persons as existing as a society or community (perhaps a better
understanding is that God is community-like) and each having something like a generic divine
nature. The notion of Person for defenders of ST carries the idea of having a distinct mind and
will or distinct center of consciousness. The word “God” then carries the notion of “the
Godhead.”33
In order to explain their version of ST, William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland use the
example of the Greco-Roman mythological creature, Cerberus. Cerberus is a dog-like creature
who has three heads. Given that Cerberus has three heads, we may assume that it has three brains
with three distinct centers of consciousness. Yet because of its biology we might also assume
that there is no one center of consciousness, which would indicate that in order for Cerberus to
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function properly it would require a significant amount of cooperation between each of the
minds. Despite there being three distinct heads with three centers of consciousness, given that it
is a single biological entity we would still think that there is only one dog-creature, so say the
authors. To flesh this out a bit more, the authors assign to each of the heads the following names:
Bowser, Rover, and Spike. They then give the example of Hercules attempting to enter Hades
and one of the heads, Spike, snarled at him in the act. In such a case, they explain, Hercules
could accurately report that Cerberus snarled at him. They then ask their readers to suppose
further that Cerberus is not merely canine, but has minds much like our own, endowed with
rationality and self-consciousness, and each of the heads has personal agency. Would we not,
then, have something like a tri-personal being? If Cerberus were to die in battle and its soul were
to persist in the afterlife, might not we have something like what is pictured in the Trinity prior
to the incarnation—three unembodied distinct centers of consciousness united as one being? The
authors take it that God is a soul or is soul-like. Here we would have not one person; rather, we
would have one being (a soul) with three distinct centers of consciousness.34 Does this model of
ST work?
I find Craig and Moreland’s proposed analogy appealing, allowing for the “three-in-one”
model that ST Trinitarians hold; however, I would like to bolster their view with some reflection
on the doctrine of perichoresis.
In working through his own model of the Trinity, which he calls “perichoretic
monotheism,” Stephen Davis suggests the following are needed to show the Trinity to be a single
individual (unity):
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(1) Each of the Persons equally possesses the divine essence in its totality. (2) The three
necessarily share a marvelous unity of purpose, will, and action; that is, it is not possible for
them to disagree or to be in conflict. (3) They exist in perichoresis (circumincession, coinherence, permeation). That is, each is ‘in’ the others; each ontologically embraces the
others; to be a divine Person is by nature to be in relation to the other two; the boundaries
between them are transparent; their love for and communion with each other is such that
they can be said to ‘interpenetrate’ each other.35
Davis has provided a helpful grid for working through an ST understanding of the Trinity. One
of the chief difficulties when working through this doctrine, and particularly the ST version, is
that it would seem we have something like four individuals: God the Father, God the Son, God
the Holy Spirit, and the Godhead. Getting back to our earlier distinction between the “is” of
identity and the “is” of predication, the defender of ST will want to suggest that what is taking
place is the “is” of predication. In other words, “God” is a reference to the divine essence (1).
When we speak of “God,” there is a sense in which we have in mind a single being. That is not
disputed; however, it must remain clear that it is more accurate to speak of God as personal
rather than saying that God is a person. When the defender of ST says “God” has done X, she
means that the entire Godhead (or, perhaps, one of the divine Persons) has accomplished X.
Davis’s emphasis on perichoresis (3) allows the defender of ST to accommodate for the
greater unity between the persons lacking in the Craig and Moreland analogy. Not only do each
of the Persons share a divine essence, each divine Person is completely open up to and penetrates
the other Persons. It is a moving toward the other in divine love. Thomas Torrance provides a
helpful portrait of what this perichoretic love looks like within the Trinity:
When we turn to the First Epistle of St John we learn that ‘God is Love’, and that this Love
is defined by the Love that God bears to us in sending his Son to be the propitiation for our
sins, and indeed for the sins of the world. That is to say, the very Being of God as Love is
identical with his loving, for he is himself the Love with which he loves; his Being and his
Act are one and the same. This very love that God is, therefore, is identical with Jesus Christ
who laid down his life for us, and who in his own Being and Act as the Son of the Father
embodies the Love of God. The self-giving of the Son in sacrificial love and the self-giving
35
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of the Father in sacrificial love are not separable from one another, for the Father and the
Son dwell in one another, together with the Spirit of God, whom we know through his
witness to the Son, and through whose dwelling in us God dwells in us. This means that we
are to understand the Love that God is in his being-in-act and his act-in-being in a
Trinitarian way. The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit who indwell One Another in the
Love that God is constitute the Communion of Love or the movement of reciprocal Loving
which is identical with the One Being of God. It is as God the Father, God the Son, and God
the Holy Spirit that God is God and God is Love. As one Being, three Persons, the Being of
God is to be understood as an eternal movement of Love, both in himself as the Love of the
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit for one Another, and in his loving Self-giving to others
beyond himself.36
Divine Love, as Torrance explains, does not involve merely God’s being or merely His act but
God’s “being-in-act” or “act-in-being.” It is precisely this dynamic and active eternal movement
toward the other—being-in-act, which Torrance borrows from Barth—that makes the unity. It is
also this perichoretic love relationship between the Persons that allows for a complete knowing
of the Other because of the interpenetration and mutual indwelling of that relationship. The
intimate knowledge between the Father, Son, and Spirit is nothing like anything a created being
can experience. Each of the Persons of the divine Trinity knows the others intimately. It is such
an intimacy that a divine Person is completed by the other Persons, so much so that He cannot be
Himself apart from Them. Yet, the knowledge that the divine Person experiences is not merely a
complete intimate knowing of the divine Self in relation to the Others, but a complete knowing
of the Others as They exist in relation to one another. Here we might think of it as something like
omnisubjectivity, whereby each divine Person shares fully His mental states with the other divine
Persons—complete and total vulnerability.37
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Given the above, I suggest that we understand God, in God’s essential nature,38 as three
distinct (but not separate) unembodied centers of consciousness, all of whom are personal agents,
having something like an intellect, emotion, and will of their own. The Persons are co-equal,
sharing fully those properties of the divine nature, while existing eternally in divine perichoretic
and interpenetrating relationship. This perichoretic relationship allows for full and complete
unity and for each of the Persons fully to indwell, embrace, and intimately know the Other. The
giving up of the divine Self to the divine Other reassures that all of the acts of the divine Trinity
are one. Taking something like the above understanding of the Trinity answers, to my
satisfaction, the critic’s charge of incoherence based on identity.

Where to Go From Here?
This project was as much about methodology as it was about arguing for a particular
position. My goal from the beginning was integrative. There is much that philosophers,
theologians, and biblical theologians can learn from one another. As a Christian community we
need to provide a united front, especially as we engage such a difficult issue as that of the
problem from evil.
Philosophers are challenged with providing a more robust response to the problem from
evil, one that gets away from a generic theistic understanding of God, to one that gives more
focus to the particulars of Christian theism. Theologians and biblical theologians are challenged
with the task of becoming more attuned to subtleties in arguments, concepts, and distinctions. It
is my hope that this work will motivate more dialogue between the various disciplines, seeking
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ways to integrate the best of our disciplines into a more coherent and cohesive understanding of
our shared worldview.
Furthermore, I have sought to show that the Christian worldview provides fertile ground
for thinking about how one might answer the problem from evil. Within our own worldview,
there are many areas and avenues that need further exploration, including but not limited to the
following key doctrines: the doctrine of the Trinity, creation, salvation, sin, incarnation,
pneumatology, and eschatology. The Christian Scriptures themselves provide for us the raw data
for working out a more thorough and robust theodicy.
This work also sought to provide a response to both the philosophical/theological and
existential/religious problems from evil. Any adequate theodicy should meet both demands. It is
my contention that reflection on the doctrine of the Trinity gives us the tools and resources for
answering both. The ultimate goal of theological reflection is praxis. Theology, as well as
philosophy, speaks to every area of life. It is my hope that this work has done just that as I have
considered the problem of evil in the world.

“Therefore they are before the throne of God, and serve him day and night in his temple; and he
who sits on the throne will shelter them with his presence. They shall hunger no more, neither
thirst anymore; the sun shall not strike them, nor any scorching heat. For the Lamb in the midst
of the throne will be their shepherd, and he will guide them to springs of living water, and God
will wipe away every tear from their eyes.” (Rev 7:15-17, ESV)
“Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth had passed
away, and the sea was no more. And I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of
heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband. And I heard a loud voice from
the throne saying, ‘Behold, the dwelling place of God is with man. He will dwell with them, and
they will be his people, and God himself will be with them as their God. He will wipe away every
tear from their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning, nor crying,
nor pain anymore, for the former things have passed away.’” (Rev 21:1-4, ESV)

308

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, Marilyn McCord. “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God.” In The Problem of Evil,
edited by Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams, 209-221. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990.
Adams, Robert Merrihew. Finite and Infinite Goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Akin, Daniel L. 1, 2, 3 John. Nashville. TN: Broadman and Holman, 2001.
Allen, Diogenes. “Natural Evil and the Love of God.” In The Problem of Evil, edited by Marilyn
McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams, 189-208. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990.
Alston, William P. “The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition.” In
The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder, 97-125.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996.
Anglin, Bill and Steward Goetz. “Evil Is Privation.” International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 13, no. 1 (1982), 3-12.
Applegate, Kathryn. “A Defense of Methodological Naturalism.” Perspectives on Science and
Christian Faith 65, no.1 (March 2013): 37-45.
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. Vol. 1. Part 1. Translated by the Fathers of the Dominican
Province. New York: Cosimo Classics, 2007.
Athanasius. Ad Adelphium. Vol. 4, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, edited by Philip Schaff
and Henry Wace, translated by A. Robertson. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2004.
________. Against the Arians. Vol. 4, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, edited by Philip
Schaff and Henry Wace, translated by A. Robertson. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2004.
________. Contra Gentes. Vol. 4, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, edited by Philip Schaff
and Henry Wace, translated by A. Robertson. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2004.
________. On the Incarnation. Edited by Cliff Lee. Lexington, KY: Paradorx Media, 2007.
Augustine. The Confessions. Traslated by Maria Boulding. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press,
1997.
________. Enchiridion. Translated by J. F. Shaw. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: A Select
library of the Christian Church. Series One. Vol. 3. Edited by Philip Schaff. Peabody,
MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004.
309

Baggett, David and Jerry Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2011.
Baggett, David and Ronnie Campbell. “Omnibenevolence, Moral Apologetics, and Doubly
Ramified Natural Theology.” Philosophia Christi 15, no. 2 (2013): 337-352.
Barth, Karl. The Church Dogmatics, vol. I.1. The Doctrine of the Word of God, edited by G. W.
Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, first paperback edition (New York, NY: T &T Clark
International, 2004.
________. The Church Dogmatics, vol. 2.1. The Doctrine of God, edited by G. W. Bromiley and
T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T &T Clark, 2000.
Bauckham, Richard. God Crucified: Monotheism and Christology in the New Testament. Grand
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998.
________. Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies on the New
Testament’s Crhistology of Divine Identity. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 2008.
________. “Monotheism, and Christology in the Gospel of John.” In Contours of Christology in
the New Testament, edited by Richard N. Longenecker, 148-166. Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans, 2005. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005.
________. “The Worship of Jesus in Philippians 2:9-11.” In Where Christology Began: Essays
on Philippians 2, ed. Ralph P. Martin and Brian J. Dodd, 128-139. Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox Press, 1998.
Bauer, Walter. A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian
Literature, 3rd ed., edited by Frederick William Danker (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2000.
Beck, W. David and Max Andrews, “God and the Multiverse: A Thomistic Modal Realism.”
Philosophia Christi 16, no. 1 (2014): 101-115.
Berlinski, David. The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and its Scientific Pretensions. New York:
Crown Forum, 2008.
Bhagavad Gita, The. Translated by Eknath Easwaren. 2nd. ed. Canada: Nilgiri Press, 2007.
Blocher, Henri. Evil and the Cross: Christian Thought and the Problem of Evil. Leicester:
Apollos, 1994.
Barrow, John D. and Frank J. Tipler. The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986.
310

Bock, Darrell L. Acts. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007.
________. Recovering the Lost Gospel: Reclaiming the Gospel as Good News. Nashville, TN:
Broadman and Holman, 2010.
Boyd, Gregory A. Satan and the Problem of Evil. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001.
Brand, Paul and Philip Yancey. The Gift of Pain: Why We Hurt and What We Can Do about It.
Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1997.
Broad, C. D. “Phantasms of the Living and of the Dead.” Proceedings of the Society for
Psychical Research 50, no. 183 (1953): 51-67.
Budziszewski, J. “Phillip Johnson Was Right: The Rivalry of Naturalism and Natural Law.” In
Darwin’s Nemesis: Phillip Johnson and the Intelligent Design Movement, edited by
William A. Dembski, 244-260. Downers Gove: InterVarsity Press, 2006.
Campbell, Jr., Ronnie P. “The Eternality of the Immutable God in the Thought of Paul Helm.”
Master’s thesis, Liberty University, 2008.
Clark, David K. and Norman L. Geisler, Apologetics in the New Age. Eugen, OR: Wipf and
Stock, 1990.
Clarke, D. S. “Panpsychism and the Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne.” The Journal of
Speculative Philosophy 16.3, no. 2 (2002): 151-166.
Clarke, W. Norris. Explorations in Metaphysics: Being, God, and Person. Notre Dame, Indiana:
Notre Dame University Press, 2008.
________. The Philosophical Approach to God: A New Thomistic Perspective. New York:
Fordham University Press.
Clayton, Phillip. “Panentheism in Metaphysical and Scientific Perspective.” In In Whom We Live
and Move and Have Our Being, edited by Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, 73-91.
Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2004.
Cobb, John B. and David Ray Griffin. Process Theology: An Introducotyr Exposition. Louisville,
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1976.
Collins, Robin. “A Scientific Argument for the Existence of God.” In Reason for the Hope
Within, edited by Michael J. Murray, 47-75. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1999.

311

________. “The Teleological Argument.” In The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology,
edited by William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, 202-281. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell,
2009.
Cooper, John W. Pantheism—The Other God of the Philosophers: From Plato to the Present.
Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006.
Corrington, Robert S. “Deep Pantheism,” Journal for the Study of Religion 1, no. 4 (2007): 503507.
Craig, William Lane. Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3rd edition. Wheaton,
IL: Crossway Books, 2008.
________. “The Problem of Evil.” Accessed December 13, 2012. <www.reasonablefaith.org/theproblem-of-evil>.
________. Time and Eternity: Exploring God’s Relationship to Time. Wheaton, IL: Crossway
Books, 2001.
Craig, William Lane and James D. Sinclair, “The Kalam Cosmological Argument.” In The
Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, edited by William Lane Craig and J. P.
Moreland, 101-201. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
Craig, William Lane, and Paul Copan. Creation Out of Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and
Scientific Exploration. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005.
Creel, Richard E. Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Cullmann, Oscar. The Earliest Christian Confessions, translated by J. K. S. Reid. London:
Lutterworth Press, 1949.
Davies, Brian. “Reply to Mark Robson on Evil as Privation.” New Blackfriars 94, 1053
(September 2013): 565-568.
Davies, Paul. The Cosmic Jackpot: Why our Universe is Just Right for Life. New York:
Houghton Miflin Company, 2007.
________. The Mind of God. New York: Touchstone, 1992.
Davis, Stephen T. Christian Philosophical Theology. Oxford: Oxford Press, 2006.
________. God, Reason and Theistic Proofs. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Co., 1997.

312

________. “God the Mad Scientist: Process Theology on God and Evil.” In Themelios 5, no. 1
(September, 1979): 18-23.
________. “God’s Action,” In Defense of Miracles, edited by R. Douglas Geivett and Gary
Habermas, 163-177. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997.
________. “Is the God of Process Theology a Valid Option.” In Disputed Issues: Contending for
Christian Faith in Today’s Academic Setting, 121-131. Waco, TX: Baylor University
Press, 2009.
Davis, Stephn, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins, eds. The Trinity. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002.
Dawkins, Richard. River Out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life. New York: Basic Books, 1995.
________. The God Delusion. New York: Mariner Books, 2006.
Dell’Olio, Andrew J. “Do Near-Death Experiences Provide a Rational Basis for Belief in Life
After Death?” Sophia 10 (2010): 113-128.
Dembski, William A. The End of Christianity: Finding a Good God in an Evil World. Nashville,
TN: Broadman and Holman, 2009.
DeWeese, Garrett J. God and the Nature of Time. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company,
2004.
________. Garrett DeWeese. “Natural Evil: A ‘Free Process’ Defense.” In God and Evil: The
Case for God in a World Filled with Pain, edited by Chad Meister and James K. Dew Jr.,
53-64. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2013.
Dilley, Stephen C. “Philosophical Naturalism and Methodological Naturalism: Strange
Bedfellows?” Philosophia Christi 12, no. 1 (2010): 118-141.
Dodds, Michael J. The Unchanging God of Love: Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary Theology
on Divine Immutability, second edition (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University
American Press, 2008.
Dorner, Issac August. Divine Immutability: A Critical Reconsideration. Minneapolis, MN:
Fortress Press, 1994.
Dougherty, Trent. The Problem of Animal Pain: Theodicy for All Creatures Great and Small.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
Draper, Paul. “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists.” In The Evidential
Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder, 12-29. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1996.
313

D’Souza, Dinesh. “Why We Need Earthquakes.” Christianity Today 53, no. 5 (May, 2009), 58.
Erickson, Millard J. Christian Theology, 2nd ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999.
________. The Word Became Flesh: A Contemporary Incarnational Christology. Second
Printing. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2000.
Evans, C. Stephen. God and Moral Obligations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Evans, C. Stephen and R. Zachary Manis, Philosophy of Religion, second edition. Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009.
Evans, Jeremy. The Problem of Evil: The Challenge to Essential Christian Beliefs. Broadman
and Holman, 2014.
Evans, Hilary. Seeing Ghosts: Experiences of the Paranormal. London: John Murray, 2002.
Feinberg, John S. No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2001.
________. The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problems of Evil, revised and
expanded edition. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2004.
________. “Theism.” The Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 2nd Edition, edited by Walter A.
Elwell, 1182-1183. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2001.
Finch, Jefrey. “Athanasius on the Deifying Work of the Redeemer.” In Theosis: Deification in
Christian Theology, edited by Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharloamov, 104-121.
Eugene , OR: Pickwick Publications, 2006.
________. “Irenaeus on the Christological Basis of Human Divinization.” In Theosis:
Deification in Christian Theology, edited by Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov,
86-103. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2006.
Folger, Tim. “Will Indonesia Be Ready for the Next Tsunami?” National Geographic. Accessed
February 26, 2015. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/12/141226-tsunamiindonesia-catastrophe-banda-aceh-warning-science/.
Fracasso, Cheryl and Harris Friedman. “Near-Death Experiences and the Possibility of
Disembodied Conciousness: Challenges to Prevailing Neruobiological and Pscyhosocial
Theories.” NeuroQuantology 9, no. 1 (March 2011): 41-53.
Fretheim, Terence E. The Suffering of God: An Old Testament Perspective. Philadelphia, PA:
Fortress Press, 1984.

314

Gavrilyuk, Paul. The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialecticts of Patristic Thought.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Geisler, Norman. Systematic Theology: God, Creation, Vol. 2. Minneapolis, MN: Bethany
House, 2003.
Geisler, Norman and William Watkins. Perspectives: Understanding and Evaluating Today’s
World Views. San Borodino, CA: Here’s Life Publishers, 1984.
________. “Process Theology: a Survey and an Appraisal.” Themelios 11, no. 1 (1986): 15-22.
Glynn, Patrick. God the Evidence: The Reconciliation of Faith and Reason in a Postsecular
World. Rocklin, CA: Forum, 1997.
Goetz, Stewart and Charles Taliaferro. Naturalism. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 2008.
Gregersen, Niels Henrik. Three Varieties of Panentheism.” In In Whom We Live and Move and
Have Our Being, edited by Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, 19-35. Grand Rapids,
MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2004.
Grenz, Stanley J. Theology for the Community of God. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans,
2000.
Greyson, Bruce. “Near-Death Experiences and Spirituality.” Zygon 41, no. 2 (June 2006): 393414.
________. “Seeing Dead People Not Known to Have Died: ‘Peak in Darien’ Experiences.”
Anthropology and Humanism 35, no. 2 (2010): 159-171.
Griffin, David Ray. A Process Christology. Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1973.
________. God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox
Press, 2004.
________. “Panentheism: A Postmodern Revelation.” In In Whom We Live and Move and Have
Our Being, edited by. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, 36-47. Grand Rapids, MI:
Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2004.
________. Religion and Scientific Naturalism: Overcoming the Conflicts. Albany, NY: Statue
University of New York Press, 2000. Accessed January 30, 2015. eBook Collection
(EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost.
________. Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-body Problem.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998. Accessed January 30, 2015. eBook
Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost.
315

________. Whitehead’s Radically Different Postmodern Philosophy: An Argument for Its
Contemporary Relevance. New York: State University of New York Press, 2007.
Grula, John W. “Pantheism Reconsidered: Ecotheology as a Successor to the Judeo-Christian,
Enlightenment, and Postmodernist Paradigms.” Zygon 43, no. 1 (March 2008): 159-180.
Habermas, Gary. The Historical Jesus: Ancient Evidence for the Life of Christ. Joplin, MS:
College Press Publishing Co., 1996.
________. The Risen Jesus and Future Hope. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers,
2003.
________. Why is God Ignoring Me?: What to do When it Feels Like He’s Giving You the Silent
Treatment. Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2010.
Habermas, Gary. R. and J. P. Moreland. Beyond Death: Exploring the Evidence for Immortality.
Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishing, 2004.
Habermas, Jürgen. Time of Transitions, edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin and Max Pensky.
Cambridge: Polity, 2006.
Habets, Myk. “Reformed Theosis?: A Response to Gannon Murhphy.” Theology Today 65
(2009): 489-498.
Haraldsson, Erlendur. “Alledged Encounters with the Dead: The Importance of Violent Death in
337 Cases.” The Journal of Parapsychology 73, no. 1 (Spring-Fall 2009): 91-118.
________. “Surveyed of Claimed Encounters with the Dead.” Omega 19, no. 2 (1988-89): 103113.
________. “The Iyengar-kirti Case: An Apparitinal Case of the Bystander Type.” Journal of the
Society for Psychical Research 54, no. 806 (January 1987): 64-67.
Harris, Sam. Waking Up: A Guide to Spirituality without Religion. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2014.
Harrison, Paul. Elements of Pantheism: A Spirituality of Nature and the Universe, 3rd edition.
Lexington, KY: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013.
Harrison, Peter. “Theodicy and Animal Pain.” Philosophy 64, no. 247 (January 1989): 79-92.
Harrison, Verna. “Perichoresis in the Greek Fathers.” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 35,
no. 1 (1991): 53-65.

316

Hart, David Bentley. The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, and Bliss. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2013.
Hartshorne, Charles. A Natural Theology of Our Time. La Salle, IL: Open Court Books, 1967.
. Aquinas to Whitehead: Seven Centuries of Metaphysics of Religion: The Aquinas
Lecture, 1976. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Publications, 1976.
. “The Development of Process Philosophy.” In Process Theology: Basic Writings by Key
Thinkers of a Major Modern Movement, edited by Ewert H. Cousins. New York:
Newman Press, 1971.
. The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1967.
Hartshorne, Charles and Creighton Peden. Whitehead’s View of Reality. New York, NY: The
Pilgrim Press, 1981.
Hasker, William. Metaphysics: Constructing a World View. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity
Press, 1984.
________. Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
________. “On Regretting the Evils of This World.” In The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings,
edited by Michael L. Peterson, 152-167. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1992.
________. “Persons and the Unity of Consciousness.” The Waning of Materialism, edited by
Robert C. Koons and George Bealer, 175-190. New York: Oxford University Press,
2010.
________. The Emergent Self. Ithaca: New York: Cornell University Press, 1999.
________. The Triumph of God over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering. Downers Grove,
IL: InterVarsity Press, 2008.
Hayman, Hayman. “Monotheism—A Misused Word in Jewish Studies?” Journal of Jewish
Studies 42, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 1-15.
Hedley, Douglas. “Pantheism, Trinitarian Theism and the Idea of Unity: Reflections on the
Christian Concept of God.” Religious Studies 32, no. 1 (Mar 1996): 61-77. Accessed
December 23, 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20019794.
Heiser, Michael S. “Monotheism, Polytheism, Monolatry, or Henotheism: Toward an
Assessment of Divine Plurality in the Hebrew Bible.” Bulletin for Biblical Research 18,
no. 1 (2008): 2-4.
317

Helm, Paul. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time. New York: Oxford University Press,
1988.
Hick, John. Evil and the God of Love. Reissued. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Holmes, Arthur F. Ethics: Approaching Moral Decisions, 2nd ed. Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 2007.
Horrell, J. Scott. “In the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: Toward a Trinitarian
Worldview.” Bibliotheca Sacra 166 (April-June 2008): 131-146.
Howard-Snyder, Daniel. “God, Evil, and Suffering.” In Reasons for the Hope Within, edited by
Michael J. Murray. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999.
Howard-Snyder, Frances. “Christianity and Ethics.” In Reasons for the Hope Within, edited by
Michael J. Murray. 375-398. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. eerdmans, 1999.
Hume, David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, edited by Richard H. Popkin, second
edition. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1998.
Hurtado, Larry W. “First-Century Jewish Monotheism.” Journal for the Study of the New
Testament 71 (1998): 3-26.
________. God In New Testament Theology. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2010.
________. How on Earth Did Jesus Become God? Historical Questions about Earliest Christian
Devotion. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005.
________. Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity. Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2003.
________. One Lord, One God: Early Christian Devotion and Ancient Jewish Monotheism.
Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1988.
Irenaeus. Against Heresies. Vol. 1, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, edited by Alexander Roberts and
James Donaldson. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2004.
James, William. Principles of Psychology, Vol 1. New York: Henry Holt and Co, 1890.
Accessed January 30, 2015. In the APA PsycNet Digital Library,
http://psycnet.apa.org.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/index.cfm?fa=browsePB.chapters&pbid=
10538.
Keating, James F. and Thomas Joseph White, eds, Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of
Human Suffering Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2009.

318

Kelly, J. N. D. Early Christian Creeds, 3rd ed. Burnt Mill, UK: Longman Group Ltd., 1972.
Kemp, John. “Pain and Evil.” Philosophy 29, no. 108 (January 1954): 13-26.
Keener, Craig S. Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Account, Vol 1. Grand Rapids,
MI: Baker Academic, 2011
Kharlamov, Vladimir. “Theosis in Patristic Thought.” Theology Today 65 (2008): 158-168.
Köstenberger, Andreas J. John. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004.
Kruse, Golin G. The Letters of John. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2000.
Layman, C. Stephen. “A Moral Argument for the Existence of God.” In Is Goodness without
God Good Enough, edited by Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King, 49-65. Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009).
________. “Moral Evil: The Comparative Response.” Internationl Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 53 (2003): 1-23.
________. “Natural Evil: The Comparative Response.” Internationl Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 53 (2003): 1-31.
Leftow, Brian. Time and Eternity. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.
Levine, Michael P. Pantheism: A Non-theistic Concept of Deity. London: Routledge, 1994.
________. “Pantheism, Substance and Unity.” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion
32, no. 1 (Aug. 1992): 1-23.
Lewis, C. S. Mere Christianity. New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1980.
________. The Problem of Pain. New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1996.
Licona, Michael R. The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach. Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2010.
Lister, Rob. God is Impassible and Impassioned: Toward a Theology of Divine Emotion.
Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2013.
Little, Bruce A. A Creation-Order Theodicy: God and Gratuitous Evil. Lanham, MD: University
Press of America, 2005.
________. God, Why This Evil? Lanham, MD: Hamilton Books, 2010.

319

Lommel, Pim van, Ruud van Wees, Vincent Meyers, and Ingrid Elfferich. “Near-death
Experiences in Survivors of Cardiac Arrest: A Prospective Study in the Netherlands.”
The Lancet 358 (December 15, 2001): 2039-2045.
Long, Jeffery and Paul Perry. Evidence of the Afterlife: The Science of Near-Death Experiences.
New York: HarperCollins, 2010.
Longenecker, Richard N. “Christological Materials in the Early Christian Communities.” In
Contours of Christology in the New Testament, edited by Richard Longenecker, 68-74.
Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005.
Lovett, Richard. “Unknown Earth: Why is Earth’s Climate so Stable?” New Scientist 199, no.
2675 (September 2088): 34. Accessed February 26, 2015.
http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/science/article/pii/S02624079086
24409.
Lowe, Victor. “Whitehead’s Metaphysical System.” In Process Philosophy and Christian
Thought, edited by Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr, and Gene Reeves, 1-22.
Indianapolis, IN: Bob’s-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1971.
Marshall, I. Howard. The Epistles of John (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1978.
Martin, Ralph P. Worship in the Early Church. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans, 1974.
MacGregor, Kirk. “The Existence and Irrelevance of Gratuitous Evil.” Philosophia Christ 14,
no. 1 (2012): 165-180.
Mathews, K. A. Genesis 1-11:26, Vol. 1A. The New American Commentary. Nashville:
Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1996.
Mattessich, Richard. “No Substance without Process, No Process without Substance, and Neither
without Energy: Some Thoughts and Extensions on Whitehead and the Endurants
(Continuants) v. Perdurants (Occurrents) Controversy,” Process Studies Supplement 19
(2014): 1-36. Accessed January 30, 2015.
http://www.ctr4process.org/publications/ProcessStudies/PSS/PSS_19_2014Mattessich.pdf.
McCall, Thomas H. Forsaken: The Trinity and the Cross, and Why It Matters (Downers Grove,
IL: InterVarsity Press, 2012.
________. Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism?: Philosophical and Systematic Theologians on
the Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 2010.
McCall, Thoams and Michael C. Rea, Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
320

McCloskey, H. J. “On Being an Atheist.” Question 1 (February 1968): 51-54.
McTaggart, J. M. “Time: an Excerpt from The Nature of Existence.” Metaphysics: The Big
Questions, edited by Peter van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman, 67-74. Malden:
Blackwell, 2004.
Michael N. Marsh, “The Phenomenology of the Near-Death Experience (NDE): An Encounter
with Eternity – or Simply an Aberrant Brain State?” Modern Believing 52, no. 2 (April
2011): 38-47.
Mitchell, Basil. The Justification of Religious Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
Moltmann, Jürgen. God in Creation. Translated by Margaret Kohl. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress
Press, 1993.
________. The Church in the Power of the Spirit: A Contribution to Messianic Ecclesiology.
Translated by Margaret Kohl. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993.
________. The Trinity and the Kingdom. First Fortress Press edition. Translated by Margaret
Kohl. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993.
Moody Jr., Raymond A. Life After Life. Harrisburg, PA: StackPole Books, 1976.
Moreland, J. P. Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument (New York:
Routledge, 2008.
________. Kingdom Triangle. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2007.
________. “The Ontological Status of Properties.” In Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, edited by
William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, 67-109. New York: Routledge, 2000
Moreland, J. P. and Scott B. Rae, Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics.
Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000.
Moreland, J. P., and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview.
Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003.
Morris, Leon. The Gospel According to John. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1995.
Morris, Thomas V. Francis Schaeffer’s Apologetics: A Critique. Chicago, IL: Moody Press,
1976.
________. Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology. Vancouver: Regent
College Publishing, 2002.

321

________. The Logic of God Incarnate. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2001.
Morse, Melvin and Paul Perry. Transformed by the Light: The Powerful Effect of Near-Death
Experiences on People’s Lives. New York: Villard Books, 1992.
Murphy, Gannon. “Reformed Theosis?” Theology Today 65 (2008): 191-212.
Nagel, Thomas. Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is
Almost Certainly False. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Nash, Ronald H. Faith and Reason: Searching for a Rational Faith. Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan, 1988.
________. The Concept of God: An Exploration of Contemporary Difficulties with the Attributes
of God. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1983.
Neiman, Susan. Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2002.
Neufeld, Vernon H. The Earliest Christian Confessions (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans,
1963.
Nichols, Terrance. Death and Afterlife: A Theological Introduction. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos
Press, 2010.
Osborn, Ronald E. Death Before the Fall: Biblical Literalism and the Problem of Animal
Suffering (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2014.
Owen, H. P. Concepts of Deity. New York: Herder and Herder, 1971.
Padgett, Alan. God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers,
1992.
Peterson, Michael L. God and Evil: An Introduction to the Issues. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1998.
________. “God and Evil in Process Theology.” Process Theology, edited by Ronald Nash, 117140. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1987.
Peterson, Michael, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger, Reason and
Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009.
Pinnock, Clark. “Systematic Theology.” The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the
Traditional Understanding of God, 101-125. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press,
1994
322

Plantinga, Alvin. “Advice to Christian Philosophers.” In The Analytic Theist: an Alvin Plantinga
Reader, edited by James T. Sennett, 296-315. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1998.
________. “Epistemic Probability and Evil.” In The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by
Daniel Howard-Snyder, 69-96. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996.
________. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1974.
________. “Is Naturalism Irrational?” The Analytic Theist: an Alvin Plantinga Reader, edited by
James F. Sennett, 72-96. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998.
________. “Self-Profile,” in Alvin Plantinga, edited by James Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen,
3-97. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1986.
________. “Supralapsarianism, or ‘O Felix Culpa’.” In Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil,
edited by Peter van Inwagen, 1-25. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 2004.
________. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
________. Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 201l.
Post, John F. Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. New York: Paragon, 1991.
Pruss, Alexander R. “One Body: Reflections on Christian Sexual Ethics.” Accessed November
12, 2012. http://bearspace.baylor.edu/Alexander_Pruss/www/papers/OneBody-talk.html.
Purkayastha, Moushumi and Kanchan Kumar Mukherjee, “Three Cases of Near Death
Experience: Is it Physiology, Physics or Philosophy?, Annals of Neurosciences 19, no. 3
(July 2013): 104-106
Rainbow, Paul. “Jewish Monotheism as the Matrix for New Testament Christology: A Review
Article,” Novum Testamentum 33, 1 (Jan 1991): 17-91
Rakstraw, Robert V. “Becoming Like God: An Evangelical Doctrine of Theosis.” Journal of the
Evangelical Theological Society 40, no. 2 (June 1997): 257-269.
Reichenbach, Bruce R. Evil and a Good God. New York: Fordham University Press, 1986.
Rice, Richard. Suffering and the Search for Meaning. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press,
2014.

323

Richards, Jay Wesley. The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection,
Simplicity and Immutability. Downers Gove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003.
Richard, of St. Victor. “Of the Trinity. In The Christian Theology Reader, 4th edition, edited by
Alister E McGrath, 177-178. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2011.
Ross, Hugh. The Creator and the Cosmos: How the Greatest Scientific Discoveries of The
Century Reveal God. Colorado Springs, CO: NavPress, 1995.
Rowe, William L. “The Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look.” In The Evidential
Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder, 262-285. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1996.
________. “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.” In The Evidential Argument
from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder, 1-11. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1996.
Rue, Loyal. Nature is Enough: Religious Naturalism and the Meaning of Life. Albany, New
York: Suny Press, 2011.
Russell, Bertrand. “Why I Am not a Christian” in Why I Am not a Christian, edited by Paul
Edwards, 3-23. New York: Touchstone, 1957.
Russell, Norman. Fellow Workers with God: Orthodox Thinking on Theosis. Crestwood, NY: St.
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2009.
Ryrie, Charles C. Basic Theology: A Popular Systematic Guide to Understanding Biblical Truth
(Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1999.
________. Dispensationalism, revised and expanded. Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 2007.
Sabom, Michael. Light and Death: One Doctor’s Fascinating Account of Near-Death
Experiences. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1998.
Saucy, Robert L. The Church in God's Program. Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1972.
________. “The Presence of the Kingdom and the Life of the Church.” Bibliotheca Sacra.
(January-March 1988): 30-46.
Schneider, John R. “Seeing God Where the Wild Things Are: An Essay on the Defeat of
Horrendous Evil.” In Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, edited by Perter van
Inwagen, 226-262. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004.
Searle, John. Mind: A Brief Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Senor, Thomas D. “The Incarnation and the Trinity,” in Reason for the Hope Within, edited by
Michael J. Murray, 238-260. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999.
324

Sexton, Jason S., ed. Views on The Doctrine of the Trinity. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2014.
Shermer, Michael. “The Great Afterlife Debate: Michael Shermer v. Deepak Chopra.” Skeptic
13, no. 4 (2008): 53.
Smart, J. J. C. “Laws of Nature and Cosmic Coincidences.” The Philosophical Quarterly 35, no.
140 (Jul 1985): 272-280, accessed February 11, 2015,
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/stable/2218906?seq=5#page_scan_tab_co
ntents
Smart, Niniam. Worldviews: Crossculturual Explorations of Human Beliefs, 3rd edition. Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000.
Smith, S. M. “Perichorasis,” Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 2nd ed, edited by Walter A.
Elwell, 906-907. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academics, 2001.
Snyder, Howard A. The Community of the King, revised edition (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 2004.
Southgate, Christopher. The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and the Problem of Evil.
Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008.
Spiegel, James. “The Irenaean Soul-Making Theodicy.” God and Evil: The Case for God in a
World Filled with Pain, edited by Chad Meister and James K. Dew Jr, 80-93. Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2013.
Spinoza, Benedict de. Ethics: Part I. Chicago: The Great Books Foundation, reprint, 1956.
Sprigge, T. L. S. The God of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Steinhart, Erick. “Pantheism and Current Ontology.” Religious Studies 40 (2004): 63-80.
Stenger, Victor J. God: The Failed Hypothesis: How Science Shows that God Does Not Exist.
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007.
Stevenson, Ian. “The Contribution of Apparitions to the Evidence for Survival.” The Journal of
the American Society for Psychical Research 76 (October 1982): 341-358.
Stump, Eleonore. Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010.
Stump, Eleonore and Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity,” The Journal of Philosophy 78, no. 8 (Aug
1981): 429-458

325

Swinburne, Richard. “A Defense of the Doctrine of the Trinity,” in Philosophy of Religion: A
Reader and Guide, edited by William Lane Craig, 556-567. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 2002.
________. “Natural Evil.” American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 4 (October 1978): 295-300.
________. “Some Major Stands of Theodicy.” The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by
Daniel Howard-Snyder, 30-48. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996.
________. The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Thomas, John and Gary Habermas, Enduring Your Season of Suffering. Lynchburg, VA: Liberty
University Press, 2011.
Tillich, Paul. Systematic Theology, vol. 2. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1957.
Torrance, Thomas F. The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (New York:
T&T Clark, 1996
van Inwagen, Peter. “The Argument from Evil.” In Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil,
edited by Peter van Inwagen, 55-73. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 2004.
________. “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence.” The
Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder, 151-174. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1996.
van Inwagen, Peter and Dean W. Zimmerman, eds., “Introduction: What is Metaphysics?”
Metaphysics: The Big Questions, 1-13. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
Wallace, Daniel B. Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New
Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996.
Walls, Jerry L. Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Walton, Douglas. Abductive Reasoning. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press,
2013.
Walton, John H. Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament: Introducing the
Conceptual World of the Hebrew Bible. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006.
________. The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the Origins Debate.
Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009.
Ware, Bruce. “An Evangelical Reformulation of the Doctrine of the Immutability of God.” The
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society (Dec. 1986): 431-446.
326

Ward, Keith. God: A Guide for the Perplexed. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002.
Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality, Corrected edition, eds. David Ray Griffin and
Donald W. Sherburne. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1978.
Wierenga, Edward R. The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes. Ithica, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1989.
Williams, Bryan J. Review of Phantasms of the Living (2 Vols) by Edmund Gurney, Fredric W.
H. Myers, and Frand Podmore. Journal of Scientific Explorations 25, no. 2 (2011): 367424.
Wolterstorf, Nicholas. “God Everlasting.” Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, edited by
Steven M. Cahn and David Shatz, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 78-98.
Wright, N. T. Evil and the Justice of God. Grand Rapids, MI: InterVarsity Press, 2006.
________. The Kingdom New Testament: A Contemporary Translation (New York: HarperOne,
2011.
________. “The Lord’s Prayer as a Paradigm of Christian Prayer,” originally published in Into
God’s Presence: Prayer in the New Testament, edited by R. L. Longenecker, 132-54.
Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2001. Accessed December 9, 2011,
www.ntwrightpage.com/Wright_Christian_Prayer.htm.
________. The Resurrection of the Son of God. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2003.
Wykstra, Stephen J. “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On
Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance.’” In The Problem of Evil, edited by Marilyn McCord
Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams, 138-160. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Yancey, Philip. Where Is God When It Hurts? A Comforting, Healing Guide for Coping with
Hard Times. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1990.
Yandell, Keith. Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction (New York: Routledge,
1999
Yarbrough, Robert. W. 1-3 John. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008.
Zagzebski, Linda. “Omnisubjectivity,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: vol. 1, ed.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig, 231-248. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Zizioulas, John D. Communion and Otherness. Edited by Paul McPartlan. New York: T &T
Clark, 2009.

327

